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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research is to propose an alternative approach to determine the 
maintainability prediction for aircraft components. In this research, the author looks at 
certain areas of the maintainability prediction process where missteps or 
misapplications most commonly occur. The first of these is during the early stage of 
the Design for Maintainability (DfMt) process. The author discovered the importance 
of utilising historical information or feedback information. The second area is during 
the maintainability prediction where the maintenance of components is quantified; 
here, the author proposes having the maximum target for each individual 
maintainability component.  
 
This research attempts to utilise aircraft maintenance historical data and 
information (i.e. feedback information systems). Aircraft feedback information 
contains various types of information that could be used for future improvement 
rather than just the failure elements. Literature shows that feedback information such 
as Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) and Air Accidents Investigation Branch, 
(AAIB) reports have helped to identify the critical and sensitive components that need 
more attention for further improvement. 
 
This research consists of two elements. The first is to identity and analyse 
historical data. The second is to identify existing maintainability prediction 
methodologies and propose an improved methodology. The 10 years’ data from 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) SDRS data of all aircraft were collected and 
analysed in accordance with the proposed methodology before the processes of 
maintainability allocation and prediction were carried out. 
 
The maintainability was predicted to identify the potential task time for each 
individual aircraft component. The predicted tasks time in this research has to be in 
accordance with industrial real tasks time were possible. One of the identified 
solutions is by using maintainability allocation methodology. The existing 
maintainability allocation methodology was improved, tested, and validated by using 
several case studies. The outcomes were found to be very successful. 
 
Overall, this research has proposed a new methodology for maintainability 
prediction by integrating two important elements: historical data information, and 
maintainability allocation. The study shows that the aircraft maintenance related 
feedback information systems analyses were very useful for deciding maintainability 
ii 
 
effectiveness; these include planning, organising maintenance and design 
improvement. There is no doubt that historical data information has the ability to 
contribute an important role in design activities. The results also show that 
maintainability is an importance measure that can be used as a guideline for managing 
efforts made for the improvement of aircraft components. 
 
Keywords:  
Aircraft Maintenance, Historical data, Maintainability allocation, Maintainability 
prediction 
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1 Introduction 
The maintenance through prediction methodology has very often been seen 
as one of the potential areas where maintenance effectiveness targets can be easily 
and quickly achieved. They can be achieved through an understanding of historical 
information from previous designs and feedback information supplied by aircraft 
mechanics, engineers and/or aviation regulators. There are many types of aircraft 
related historical data available to be collected, compiled and analysed for future 
improvement. The idea is to ensure that occurrences do not happen again as well as 
to ensure the element of safety is improved. Failure rate (λ) is one piece of historical 
information and for many years failure rates (λ) were important elements used to 
predict maintainability effectiveness.  
 
In this chapter, the purpose of the research is introduced regarding the 
background of maintainability, the importance of maintainability and to highlight the 
opportunities to improve the existing scenario such as the opportunities for closing 
the identified gaps and/or problems. This chapter covers the background and 
problem areas of the research project. It also discusses the research question’s 
limitations and finally the structure of the thesis is specified. 
1.1 Background 
One of the value drivers in the civil aircraft industry is aircraft maintenance. 
Collectively it is defined as the time taken and/or required to restore any 
components and/or systems back to their original intended function without any 
delay in the way of logistics and manpower. Improved maintainability offers 
reduction in flight delays and cancellations, resulting in greater operational 
efficiency, flexibility and customer satisfaction. Therefore, accurate maintainability 
prediction is an important tool to allow designers to improve predict and 
maintainability and therefore reduce maintenance costs and increased revenues. 
 
Every new research development proposes that one of the main targets is 
cost reduction. From a maintainability perspective, cost reduction is important but 
without compromising the aircraft safety element. Cost reductions from a 
maintainability perspective refer to minimising materials, logistics, and man-hours 
required performing the necessary maintenance tasks.  
 
As reported by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
1
 the 
Maintenance Repair Organisation (MRO) spending costs were below 40 billion USD 
between 2002 and 2006. However, from 2007 to 2010 MRO spending costs have 
2 
 
increased to between 40 and 50 billion USD. The report also estimated that the MRO 
spending costs will increase drastically from more than 50 billion USD to nearly 65 
billion USD by 2020. All of these figures are illustrated in Figure 1—1. This report is 
based on 3,312 total fleet aircraft. The main contributors to this report are 63% from 
Boeing, 32% from Airbus – the biggest names in the aircraft industry – and 5% from 
others.  
 
Figure 1—1 Reported Maintenance Cost Spending 
1
 
In terms of human factors, Graeber and Marx 
2
 have suggested three steps as 
a way to reduce, and possibility eliminate, aircraft maintenance human errors: 1) 
Maintenance data should be organized in a form that will allow study of the human 
performance aspects of maintenance; 2) The gap between the maintenance 
community and psychology as it applies to aviation should be narrowed; and 3) 
Methods and tools should be developed to help aircraft designers and maintenance 
managers address the issue of human error in a more analytical manner. They also 
highlighted three different errors: error reduction, error capturing and error 
tolerance. A lack of maintainability knowledge, awareness, and consideration does 
promote accident and incident problems. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
3
 and 
Sear 
4
 have reported that design faults, and maintenance and inspection efficiencies 
are among the top four contributors to aircraft accidents and incidents - each one 
contributing 13% or 12%. 
 
Other types of maintenance related problems caused by human errors are 
incorrect installation of components, fitting of wrong parts, electrical wiring 
discrepancies (including cross-connections), loose objects (tools, etc.) left in aircraft, 
inadequate lubrication, cowling, access panels and fairings not secured, landing gear 
ground lock pins not removed before departure 
5
, omissions (56%), incorrect 
installation (30%) wrong parts (8%) and other (8%) 
2
, and fastenings 
undone/incomplete (22%), Items left locked/ pins not removed (13%), caps loose or 
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missing (11%), items left loose or disconnected (10%), items missing (10%), 
tools/spare fastenings not removed (10%), lack of lubrication (7%), and panels left 
off (3%) 
6
. The Occurrence Maintenance Scheme (OMS) is one of the examples used 
to identify the factors contributing to aircraft incidents, and to make the system 
resistant to similar errors 
7
. 
 
As described in previous paragraphs in this chapter, maintenance related 
problems are affected by technical and non-technical factors. Technical factors refer 
to logistics and manpower, while non-technical factors refer to weather and 
workplace conditions. Technical factors are strongly affected by decisions made by 
designers, whereas the latter are governed by other aspects, which include those 
managed by the operators, such as maintenance, logistics, operations, and 
management. This thesis will address only those technical factors that can be 
influenced by aircraft designers and the role of maintainability prediction in 
designing for maintainability. 
 
Designing a new product requires several elements to be considered. The 
elements under consideration should be able to offer better benefits than previous 
designs. Those potential benefits include cost reduction, error reduction, task time 
reduction, and improved customer satisfaction. Learning from past experiences is 
the best platform. For complex products, one of the important elements to be 
considered is the product’s maintainability factors. Good maintainability 
consideration should be able to offer several benefits including improvement in 
product life cycle and cost reduction. In the aircraft industry, numerous 
improvements and methodologies for maintainability have been proposed. Most of 
the proposed methodologies are successful and offer many more benefits. However, 
there are still gaps and/or problems that need to be filled and solved.  
Based on years of aircraft industry experience, there are a lot of historical 
data which are able to offer improvements in the effectiveness of particular 
products’ design. The effectiveness of one particular product and system are 
dependent on the effectiveness of different design methodologies, such as Design 
for Assembly (DfA), Design for Manufacturing (DfM), Design for Disassembly (DfD), 
Design for Maintainability (DfMt), and Design for Reliability (DfR). There are many 
other types of design methodologies, collectively known as Design for X (DfX). The 
strengths and weaknesses of each individual DfX have been described by several 
authors such as Kuo 
8
, Chiu 
9
, Boothroyd and Dewhurst 
10
, and Blanchard 
11; 12
. 
This research is interested in identifying and solving potential and existing 
gaps and/or problems from the DfMt perspective. DfMt effectiveness is measured 
4 
 
and predicted through several methodologies, collectively known as maintainability 
prediction methodology. The effectiveness of maintainability prediction requires 
several others relevant elements to be considered, such as product design, 
accessibility, human factors, and supporting facilities (i.e. testing equipments). The 
improvement of maintainability prediction methodology was invented and has been 
validated since the 1960s. This is based on several literature reviews and 
maintainability related documentation identified by the author. The literature review 
and maintainability related documents are described in detail in chapter 2. Overall, 
numerous maintenance historical data (e.g. failure rate) and feedback information 
are available to be used for future improvement. The benefits of maintenance 
related data and feedback information include “...to assess the performance, 
effectiveness, operations, maintenance, logistics support capabilities...” 
11
 and “Our 
engineering growth and potential in the future certainly depends on our ability to 
capture past experiences and subsequently apply the results in terms of “what to do” 
and “what not to do” in new design system design.” 
11
 
Traditionally, the failure rate (λ) was the only input used to predict 
maintainability effectiveness. However, due to numerous restrictions such as data 
accessibility and accuracies, researchers (i.e. academicians) have found difficulties in 
proposing potential aircraft design improvement. This is due to several reasons, one 
of which could be to protect the MRO companies’ reputation. The author has 
identified this problem and intends to investigate, identify, propose, test and 
validate the maintenance related feedback information. The main focus of this 
research is to improve the design for maintainability through the use of historical 
data and information, and improved maintainability prediction. One of the 
solutions is the use of historical aircraft maintenance related data – one of which is 
known as feedback information.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Based on overviews and the scenario described in the previous section, the 
problem statements of this research are proposed as shown in Table 1-1. 
Table 1-1 Research questions 
No Research Questions 
1 What are the elements involved in developing maintainability prediction?  
2 How can a method to incorporate feedback into maintainability prediction in the early 
design process be developed, structured and efficiently used by the designer?  
3 How can future aircraft design be improved through the application of aircraft 
maintenance related feedback information systems? 
5 
 
1.3 Rationale of Research Study 
The purpose of this research is to critically review and investigate, and then 
to propose a new approach to improve the design for maintainability with particular 
reference to the use of feedback information. In this research, maintenance issues in 
the aircraft environment are investigated with special reference to maintenance task 
time allocation and prediction. Current practices of aircraft maintenance task time 
allocation and prediction using failure rate are identified based on preliminary 
studies of existing maintainability prediction methodologies.  
 
The best practices aspects of the industry’s solution for this complex problem 
are reviewed. Problems and issues in aircraft maintenance and prediction are 
identified, in terms of various shortcomings and the incapabilities of current 
processes and associated methods/techniques. The study also aims to identify 
possible improvements on maintainability prediction processes and any potential 
benefits of those improvements when implemented in an integrated system 
environment. 
1.4 Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to develop an approach to improve the 
maintainability prediction for aircraft mechanical components. This research will 
endeavour to extend the existing maintainability prediction approaches that are 
often used. The potential outcome from this research could be used as an alternative 
approach in order to enhance the effectiveness and accuracy of the maintainability 
prediction method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1—2 Research aim 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research were set up in line with the aim of this 
research. The intention is to develop a systematic design methodology which 
potentially improves the maintainability prediction for aircraft mechanical 
components as well as maximising the use of feedback information during the 
design process. This research proposes suitable feedback information processes 
from the end user to the designer so that the future product design can be 
improved. The research objectives are listed below and the research aim and 
questions are illustrated in Figure 1—3: 
1. To propose a methodology to extract the important information from the 
collected maintenance data for a selected class of aircraft components; 
2. To perform feedback information analyses; 
3. To develop an improved maintainability prediction methodology through 
utilising quantitative input of feedback information; 
4. To undertake case studies to demonstrate and evaluate the developed 
methodology. 
 
Figure 1—3 Research aim, questions, and objectives 
RESEARCH AIM:
to develop a Maintainability Prediction for aircraft components
To perform feedback information analyses
To propose a methodology to extract the important information from the collected 
maintenance data for a selected class of aircraft components
To undertake case studies to demonstrate and evaluate the developed methodology
To develop an improved maintainability prediction methodology through utilising 
quantitative input of feedback information
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What are the elements involved in developing a maintainability prediction ? 
How can a method to incorporate feedback for a maintainability prediction in the early design 
process be developed, structured, and efficiently used by the designer?
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1.6 Task Objectives 
This research is divided into three main research areas: Service Difficulty 
Report (SDR), Maintainability allocation methodology, and Maintainability prediction 
methodology. Each research area has individual task objectives.  
 
The first task objectives are: 1) to investigate and identify the contents of 
various existing reliable sources of aircraft feedback information; 2) to identify 
valuable information within the Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS); and 3) 
to identify potential use of the analysed SDRS. This will offer better information for 
future research and development activities. The first task objective also proposes a 
methodology for using system feedback to improve the aircraft maintainability issue. 
This analysis has helped to identify the critical and sensitive systems or components 
of the aircraft that need more attention for improvement. 
 
The second task objectives are: 1) to extend the existing maintainability 
allocation methodology and 2) to identify appropriate methodology to improve 
maintainability allocation method. Currently, the methodology is only focusing on 
the electrical and electronic-type of components and systems. The extended 
maintainability allocation methodology, however, focuses on the mechanical-type of 
components and systems; and  
 
The third task objective is to identify opportunities to improve 
maintainability prediction methodology by using a quantitative approach. MIL-
HDBK-472, Procedure III has been selected as the maintainability prediction method 
for this research. This is because the methodology is applicable during both the 
design and development stages 
13
 compared to other types of MIL-HDBK-472 
procedure (i.e. Procedures I, II, and IV). Currently, qualitative interpretations were 
used to identify and allocate potential score values for each individual question. The 
potential benefit of the proposed technique will increase the accuracy of the 
maintainability prediction method. Each task objective is illustrated in Figure 1—4. 
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Figure 1—4 Research Task Objectives 
1.7 Research Methodology 
The rationale behind the research led to the development of a maintainability 
prediction for aircraft mechanical systems and/or components. A developed 
methodology can be used as an alternative method to evaluate the maintainability 
effectiveness at the beginning of the aircraft design process. In addition to the 
feedback information (SDRS) analyses, the proposed model allows us to identity and 
determines potential design improvement by obtaining the trend and pattern of 
SDRS. Figure 1—5 illustrates the main steps of the research methodology. 
Task Objective
Secondary Level
Top Level
To identify the characteristics and issues related to maintainability prediction methodology and 
investigate issues that inf luence the ef fectiveness of  a maintainability prediction;
To review and understand the impact of  proposed maintainability prediction compared to the 
existing maintainability prediction methodology;
To developing a new methodology for maintainability prediction and examine its ef fectiveness; 
To identify the needs and requirements of  developing a new prediction methodology
SDR
to investigate and identify the 
contents of  various existing 
sources of  aircraf t feedback 
information;
to identify valuable information 
within Service Dif f iculty 
Reporting System (SDRS); and
to identify potential use of  the 
analysed SDRS
Maintainability 
Allocation
to extend the existing 
maintainability allocation 
methodology; and 
to identify appropriate 
methodology to improve 
maintainability allocation 
method
Maintainability 
Prediction
to identify opportunity 
to improve 
maintainability 
prediction 
methodology 
Figure 1—
1.7.1 Problem Identification 
For several decades failure rate has been the only element used in 
maintainability prediction. This research focuses on utilising the aircraft maintenance 
feedback information known as SDRS, to identify the opportunity to convert the 
analysed feedback information into 
Problem Identification  
- Chapter 1
Data Collection and 
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Testing and Results 
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future research 
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-
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maintainability prediction, and to identify the opportunity to reduce maintainability 
trial and error. 
1.7.2 Literature Review 
Relevant and related literature reviews have been carried out as well as using 
input from industry experts in order to find the focal point of improvement that is 
relevant to the problem identification statement. 
1.7.3 Data Collection and Analyses 
The data used to demonstrate the main objective of the study were extracted 
from data available from reliable government reports and trustworthy websites. 
Other than that, data was also extracted from reliable sources, as given by one 
approved Maintenance Repair Organisation (MRO) Company. A total of ten years’ 
data sets were used. Figure 3—2 shows the generic historical data sets (i.e. SDRS) 
process flow. Details of the SDRS analyses are presented in Chapter 4. 
1.7.4 Analyses Flow Diagram 
Appropriate flow charts for SDRS data analyses, maintainability allocation, 
and maintainability prediction were designed.  The detailed methodology process of 
SDRS data is illustrated in Figure 3—3 of Chapter 3. This is including the integrated 
methodology developed by author which is presented in Chapter 6. 
1.7.5 Testing and Validation 
Case studies are used for testing and validation processes in this research. 
The selection of case studies is to be more focused on the mechanical components, 
due to the fact that this research is being performed to enhance the maintainability 
prediction for aircraft mechanical components. 
1.7.6 Methodology Development 
There two main elements involved in methodology development: 1) 
Feedback Analyses which include identifying and analysing suitable feedback 
information and 2) Quantitative analyses which include maintainability allocation 
and prediction methodologies. The second element is to identify existing 
quantitative maintainability prediction methodology and propose an improved 
methodology utilising aircraft related feedback information. The greatest 
contribution of this research is through the feedback analyses and maintainability 
allocation methodology 
11 
 
1.7.7 Validation 
The proposed methodology is tested and validated by using real industrial 
maintenance data and tasks time. 
1.7.8 Discussion 
Describes the potential benefits to users of the industry solution when the 
proposed approach and improvements are incorporated into the maintainability 
prediction methodology. 
1.7.9 Identification of contribution and future research direction 
At this stage the contribution and future research direction have been 
identified. The contributions are divided into two sections: 1) Contribution to 
maintainability prediction methodology, and 2) Contribution to academic theory. As 
well as some limitations, some successful results have been achieved from this 
research. There are many opportunities identified by the author with regard to the 
future of this research. 
1.8 Research Focus 
This research project focuses on both the development of a new approach to 
predict maintainability by using aircraft maintenance historical data, and the 
development of maintainability allocation. The focuses are restricted to historical 
data and maintainability allocation, for the following reasons: 
1. Historical data are the focus because they contain rich aircraft information, both 
technical and non technical. The technical information refers to parts conditions 
and non technical information refers to the nature of those conditions. 
2. The focus is on maintainability allocation in order to extend an existing method 
which was developed by Chiphak 
14
 and allow it to be applied to mechanical 
components. 
1.9 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is structured appropriately so that the identified problems, research 
aim, and research objectives are presented accurately and logically so that readers 
are able to understand the identified problems and the outcome of this research. 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
12 
 
 
Chapter Title Description 
1 Introduction Describes an overview of this research. The aim of this 
research is briefly explained and the research questions 
are presented. This section provides an overview of the 
maintenance problems, current practices, and issues in 
the documentation environment. This is followed by an 
overview of maintenance issues in the aerospace 
environment and aircraft related feedback information. 
2 Literature Review Describes and provides a comprehensive review of 
existing design methodologies related to 
maintainability; techniques used to solve the problems; 
various types of aircraft related feedback information 
and systems. This chapter provides an overview of the 
selected feedback information aircraft maintenance, 
repair and overhaul (MRO). 
3 Research Methodology Describes overall proposed methodology and 
techniques to be used, outlining research aim, research 
objectives, and briefly explaining each methodology 
step. Problems and issues in maintainability prediction 
methodology are highlighted in this section, with special 
reference to alternative solutions to predict the 
maintainability and maintenance prediction allocation 
methodology. An improvement for maintainability 
prediction processes within the selected solution is 
presented.  
3 Use of Feedback 
Information for 
Maintainability 
prediction 
Describes all data analyses and results achieved, and the 
proposed formula and method of applying the formula 
in order to enhanced an approach development. This 
research proposes possible improvements for the 
maintainability prediction methodology. 
4 Maintainability 
Allocation Methodology 
5 Maintainability 
Prediction Methodology 
6 Integrated Methodology 
7 Validation Presents the validation results and detailed descriptions. 
8 Discussion Presents the improvements and describes the potential 
benefits to users of the industry solution when the 
proposed approach and improvements are incorporated 
into the maintainability prediction methodology. 
9 Conclusion & Future 
Research 
The paper concludes with findings and suggestions for 
future research.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author describes several related elements to this 
research. These include the elements of Product Development, Design for X (DfX), 
Maintainability allocations methodology, and Maintainability prediction 
methodologies, and various types of aircraft maintenance related feedback. 
Information systems are presented in the following sections of this chapter. The 
purpose is: 1) to provide an overview of five elements which are related to this 
research; 2) to present the trend and current practices; and 3) to present the 
problems of and gaps in current practices. These problems and/or gaps found are 
used for further improvement or minimising the problems. At the end of this 
chapter, the author summarises all the literature reviews from the perspective of 
this research. 
 
2.2 Product Development 
There is growing interest in promoting and developing new methodologies, 
concepts, and approaches to improve the end phase of products. The aim is to 
improve and develop product development process systems to comply with the 
maintainability and service requirements. Maintainability is defined as:  
“The relative ease and economy of time and resources with which an item can be 
retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance is performed by 
personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures and resources, at 
each prescribed level of maintenance and repair and in this context, it is a function of 
design” 
15
. 
Considering maintainability during the design phase will potentially extend 
the life of products, reducing life cycle cost and the use of natural resources, 
improving the service systems, and having the potential to share product. Various 
studies have been carried out to improve product development during the design 
phase such as Design for X (DfX’s); however, it has been concluded that the 
development of DfX’s only focuses on improving the product. There are some areas 
that need to be improved such as approaches to be considered to design and 
development product to provided additional supports and services to the customers.  
14 
 
2.3 Design for X  
Design for X is abbreviated as DfX. The main focus of the literature review in 
this section is to understand the methodology applied to evaluate the effectiveness 
of each individual DfX and further apply any good ideas to improve the 
maintainability prediction methodology. DfX consists of Design for Manufacturing 
and Assembly (DfMA), Design for Disassembly (DfD), Design for Life Cycle (DfLC), 
Design for Quality (DfQ), and Design for Reliability (DfR). 
DfMA and DfD are reviewed because both methodologies apply the same 
concepts to predict the assembly and disassembly effectiveness, known as Design 
Efficiency (DE). DfLC is reviewed in order to understand the elements that contribute 
to the product life cycle. In addition, DfQ and DfR are reviewed in order to 
understand how both design methodologies are considered with regard to quality 
and reliability because both design methodologies are also important elements in 
maintainability prediction methodology. The next section of this chapter describes in 
detail each individual DfX previously mentioned. 
2.3.1 Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DfMA) 
Design for Manufacture (DfM) has an objective to improve product 
manufacturability 
16;
 
17
 through CAD-Based workstations such as Computer Aided 
Design and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CADCAM) 
17
 while Design for Assembly’s 
(DfA) main objective is to achieve the lowest assembly cost possible 
10; 18
 through the 
number of parts required. The design effectiveness is measured by Design 
Effectiveness (DE), using the following formula: 
			
 = 	ℎ
					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  
The tasks were performed using a computer program which has several 
elements of assembly methodology so that the designer is capable of making 
decisions before progressing to the final product design assembly 
10; 18-20
. As a 
conclusion, the implementation of DfMA “led to enormous benefits including 
simplifications of product, reduction of assembly and manufacturing costs, 
improvements of quality, and reduction of time to market” 
8; 9
. However, these 
approaches are only focused on two factors – part manufacturability and reduction 
time for assembly. 
15 
 
2.3.2 Design for Disassembly (DfD) 
The objective of DfD is to reduce the time and effort required to remove 
components or materials from a product. As product assembly and manufacture are 
gradually improving, in the next phase called middle of life (MOL) 
21
, the element of 
disassembly and recycling should also be considered by designers during the design 
stage. Disassembly is defined as “a process of systematic removal of desirable 
constituent parts from an assembly while ensuring that there is no impairment of the 
parts due to the process”. There are several benefits of DfD such as Operational cost 
reduction 
22-25
 and human error reduction 
26
. Being aware of this scenario, several 
other authors have proposed a number of approaches to overcome or improve the 
end of product cycle such as a CAD for disassembly approach on destructive 
disassembly 
27
 and PLM (Product Life Cycle Management) 
24; 25; 28-47
 
In conclusion, the DfD only improves and focuses on the end-phase of the 
component’s life and does not consider the service element for customer 
satisfaction. 
2.3.3 Design for Life Cycle (DfLC) 
Life cycle assessment is a major tool used for DfLC and this assessment is a 
“family of methods for assessing materials, services, products, processes, and 
technologies over the entire life of a product.” 
9
 Life cycle assessment is defined as 
“an objective process to evaluate the environmental burdens associated with a 
product or activity by identifying and quantifying energy and materials used and 
wastes released to the environment”. 
DfLC is one of the methodologies to reduce environmental issues other than 
maintenance through properly maintaining the products. Sakai et al. 
48
 proposed and 
developed “a methodology of product life cycle design based on product life control 
and a product life cycle design support system using the Life Cycle Simulation 
system”. Aurich et al. 
49
 proposed a methodology to maximise product performance 
using the DfLC approach by analysing three different strategies known as Liability-, 
Function-, and Use-driven strategies. These strategies are simplified into two main 
design processes known as systematic product and systematic service before both 
design processes are combined into what is known as an integrated design process. 
The purpose of this process was to increase product performance. Several tools and 
techniques have been introduced starting from managing the product life cycle at 
the design phase 
50
 and including the cost related product life cycle 
51
. 
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From the perspective of maintainability prediction, most DfLC elements are 
not suitable for the maintainability prediction methodology because they are 
focused on environmental issues only. However the idea of maximising the 
performance of products offers some ideas for this research. 
2.3.4 Design for Maintainability (DfMt) 
There are many objectives that have been set by researchers with regard to 
maintainability. Collectively the maintainability objective is “to assure that the 
product can be maintained throughout its useful life-cycle at reasonable expense 
without any difficulty” 
11
 and “…. to design and manufacture a product that is easily 
and economically retained in, or restored to, a specified condition when maintenance 
is performed by personnel having specified skill levels, using prescribed procedures 
and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and repair” 
15
. Maintainability 
“is a key driving element in the effective support and upkeep of the system as well as 
providing the ability to modify and upgrade the system throughout its lifetime”. 
Much of the maintainability is analysed by a quantitative approach such as fuzzy 
theory 
52; 53
 vector projection methodology 
54
, and also by using Computer Aided 
Systems 
52-58
.  
There are some authors who propose including the element of safety into 
Design for Maintainability 
59; 60
. Therefore the author proposes including an element 
of human factors into the maintainability prediction to ensure it is designed in 
accordance with human capabilities 
61-70
. Another approach to improve DfMt and 
maintainability prediction is through the use of an element of historical information, 
for which some authors use the term ‘feedback’ 
11; 13; 14; 59; 71-80
. 
Maintainability effectiveness is predicted by using several maintainability 
prediction methodologies. The initial maintainability prediction methodology was 
proposed in the 1960’s 
13; 81
 and until today remains as the standard focal point. 
Since then several improvements have been proposed, tested, and validated to 
enhance the initial maintainability prediction 
15; 82-86
. One of the improvements has 
been through the application of Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
87
. This is to ensure 
that maintainability can be predicted accurately by positioning maintainability 
elements in the right position. 
2.3.5 Design for Quality (DfQ) and Design for Reliability (DfR) 
Towards the end of the product development process, some researchers 
propose using approaches known as Design for Quality (DfQ), and Design for 
Reliability (DfR). DfQ’s aim is to ensure the design activities are carried out for ease 
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of inspection and statistical analysis. All activities must comply with objectives such 
as: the product shall be designed in such a way as to comply with as well as exceed 
customer requirements and expectations, have a reduced impact on the 
environment, a reduced effect on the potential variation in manufacture of the 
product, and be capable of demonstrating product reliability, performance and 
technology. 
The Design for Reliability (DfR) concept is to ensure that products are 
designed to withstand any damage or failure for a specified period of time under 
certain working conditions 
71; 73; 88-92
. Reliability is defined as “the probability that an 
item will perform a required function, under specified condition without failure, for a 
specified amount of time” 
93; 94
. The prediction is usually carried out using 
mathematical maintenance formulae such as MTBF (Mean Time between Failure), 
MTTR (Mean Time to Repair), MTTMA (Mean Time to a Maintenance Action), and 
MMT (Mean Maintenance Time) 
95
. 
2.3.6 Summary 
Generally, designers have to comply with all design requirements as shown in 
Figure 2—1. In addition there are others factors, such as regulatory, which designers 
must consider while trying to develop a new product. 
 
DFM - Design for Manufacturing DFMt - Design for Maintainability 
DFQ - Design for Quality  DFS - Design for Service 
DFRL - Design for Reliability  DFD - Design for Disassembly 
DFA - Design for Assembly  DFR - Design for Recycle 
DFLC - Design for Life Cycle 
Figure 2—1 Compliance with Design requirement 
DfX has promoted and generated many improvements specifically on product 
development. The improvements also contribute to others elements such as cost 
reduction, time reduction, increase in production and process efficiency, and 
improved business strategy. Moreover, DfX promotes better design techniques to 
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ensure that at the end of the product life there will be a lesser work load and in 
particular a reduction in the financial impact during the end of the life of the 
product.  
However, each approach was only concentrating on the improvement of 
specific problems and did not involve whole systems 
96; 97
. This means that there are 
still opportunity areas available for future improvement as well as extending the 
capability of DfX’s.  
The goal of DfM for instance is no longer only to make products in a 
proficient way, but be able to provide the capabilities that are needed by society, 
such as minimising material and energy consumption, pooling systems, and using 
take-back systems. One of the solutions is to integrate all common information 
during product development. This can be done throughout the design process.  
There are studies that have been conducted which have concluded that a 
product’s characteristics are mostly determined during design process, principally all 
the decisions made during this stage influence the lifecycle of the product 
96; 98; 99
. 
Therefore, much more research in recent years has been dedicated to developing a 
fundamental understanding of the design process, improving design education, and 
devising tools and methods for assisting designers. 
2.4 Feedback information systems – Aircraft Maintenance 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The maintainability prediction can be facilitated by systematically utilising the 
feedback information from past and current in-service aircraft. Learning from the 
past and existing experiences offers numerous opportunities for improvement – 
particularly a reduction in maintenance cost and errors. Therefore it is important 
that all relevant, existing and current feedback information is systematically 
collected, compiled, analysed and validated appropriately, so that necessary actions 
and decisions can be made. This collected information is referred to as feedback 
information. 
 
The importance of aircraft related feedback information has been detected by 
the Boeing Company. This has been transformed into several approaches, some of 
which are known as the In Service Data Program (ISDP) 
100
 and the Flight Recorder 
Data Service (FRDS) 
101
 which provide effective information quickly and check 
maintenance needs. These approaches show that feedback information is valuable 
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for further availability preparation. This indication offers the opportunity for future 
design methodology improvement. The important of feedback is also has been 
described in detail by UK CAA 
7
. 
 
One of the issues for companies to consider before making the decision to buy 
an asset (i.e. new aircraft) is the support available from the manufacturers (i.e. 
maintenance and service issues). This clearly indicates that in order for products to 
be manufactured and to be competitive in the global market, several issues have to 
be considered and carefully analysed. One of these issues is the product’s 
maintainability. Therefore, based on the overall description in the previous sections, 
the following research questions are posed as the basis of the research problem. 
 
Feedback information can be utilised to improve future product development 
as well as safety. These data are also used to determine maintenance activities 
102
. 
The trends and behaviour of previous and/or existing products are analysed and 
therefore assist with appropriate decision-making for future improvements. This is to 
ensure that the determined objectives have been met. The types of information 
collected are the failure types, failure modes and frequencies of failure, and/or 
replacement and maintenance trends. The information is then evaluated and used to 
answer the following common questions, such as ‘Where are we now?’, ‘What 
should we do now?’, ‘Why has this happened?’ and ‘How can we improve this 
situation?’  
2.4.2 Safety improvement from better maintenance data 
To date, many efforts have been proposed by aviation regulatory authorities 
and aircraft manufacturers to improve the safety of aircraft. These have been carried 
out through the development of various types of programs. Generally, the programs 
developed are to reduce human error, such as Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
(MEDA) 
103-106
 and Maintenance Error Management Systems (MEMS) 
107
, and to 
improve future aircraft design as well as maintenance activities and documentation 
such as the Airworthiness Directive (AD) and Service Bulletin and Letter (SB/L).  
2.4.3 Reliability, Availability and Maintainability development data 
Other types of programs developed, including Data Reporting, Analysis and 
Corrective Action Systems (DRACAS) 
108
, are designed to enhance Reliability, 
Availability and Maintainability (RAM), Service Difficulty Reporting Systems (SDRS) 
109
, Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) 
110
, Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) 
111
, and Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
112
. The 
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purpose of most of the developed programs is to gather as much information as 
possible to be evaluated for further required actions. This includes identifying any 
potential improvements as well as identifying the current trend of the developed 
products. 
2.4.4 Other data system 
Other potential sources of feedback information are the monitoring systems 
known as the Health Monitoring System (HMS) and Condition Monitoring System 
(CMS). The information is collected at the stage when the equipment or systems are 
being operated, and the information is collected through feedback loops. Feedback 
is generally known as the information which comes from the output section and is 
looped back to the input section.   
2.4.5 Sources of Feedback Information 
This section describes some of the existing sources of aircraft maintenance 
related feedback information. This is available from a range of different types of 
sources, including historical data, item design and/or manufacturing data, data 
recorded during testing, and field use data. The main aircraft maintainability and 
maintenance related sources of feedback information are reviewed and discussed in 
this section. The objectives are:  
1) To explore the type of information collated in the sources;  
2) To explore the strength of the developed feedback program; and  
3) To acquire any potentially useful information that can be used for DfMt 
improvement.  
The role of mandatory and non mandatory aircraft documentation related to 
maintenance activities such as Airworthiness Directives (ADs), Airworthiness Notices 
(ANs) and Service Bulletins (SBs), will also be explored. Some of the potential sources 
of aircraft maintenance related feedback information are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Table 2-1 provides a summary of the information that is collected by the 
various historical information or feedback systems. The Service Difficulty Reporting 
System (SDRS) contains much more information than other types of feedback 
systems. The author has decided to use and analyse the SDRS for the purpose of this 
research. This is to ensure that a detailed investigation can be made of the affected 
aircraft.  
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Table 2-1 Summary of aircraft related feedback information 
 
Most feedback provides information about what happened? (i.e. Incident and 
Accident), and through detailed investigation will be able to offer several clues to 
reviewers for them to perform the necessary investigations into the problems. At the 
same time they will be able to solve and improve the problems in the form of 
prevention and/or improvement. Among these sources of feedback information, the 
ADs offer the most information in order to highlight any unsafe conditions. However, 
a great deal of component information comes from Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM). The OEM normally works closely with aircraft manufacturers 
and customises the designs based on the aircraft manufacturer’s needs. Another 
source of information is available from equipment repairs and overhauls 
organisations.  
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Procedures X
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Product/Engine/Propeller
Application
Inputs
Aircraft
General
Focus
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2.4.5.1 Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) was developed to determine “the 
factors that contribute to maintenance errors and taking corrective actions to 
eliminate or reduce the probability of future, similar errors” 
105
. These are carried out 
based on the philosophy “that maintenance technicians do not make errors on 
purpose, that errors result from a series of related contributing factors, and that 
these factors are largely under management control and, therefore, can be changed” 
103-106
. Traditionally, the prevention and correction methodology has focused on 
“blaming and improving” human errors. MEDA consist of five sections, as follows:  
Section 1 – General Information 
Section 2 – Event 
Section 3 – Maintenance Error 
Section 4 – Contributing Factors Checklist 
Section 5 – Error Prevention Strategies 
 
The process in MEDA consists of five stages: event, decision, investigation, 
prevention, and feedback 
104
. In terms of design, there is much information that can 
be used by the designer at the design stage which could also lead to future error 
reduction. The information obtained from Sections 3 and 4 of MEDA provides a great 
deal of useful information for future product development 
113
.  
 
One concern is that designers do not have much time to review and analyse 
such information. An appropriate strategy is, therefore, required to reduce the 
complications within such information. There are strategies that have been proposed 
by CAA to ensure the feedback information is optimised and utilised. Although the 
strategies are specifically proposed to reduce human error, they can, however, still 
be applied to design activities. There are three main strategies that have been 
highlighted to reduce human errors, that include: “1) Maintenance data should be 
organized in a form that will allow study of the human performance aspects of 
maintenance, 2) The gap between the maintenance community and psychology as it 
applies to aviation should be narrowed, and 3) Methods and tools should be 
developed to help aircraft designers and maintenance managers address the issue of 
human error in a more analytical manner” 
3
. 
2.4.5.2 Maintenance Error Management Systems (MEMS) 
Maintenance Error Management Systems (MEMS) are described in CAA 
Airworthiness Notice 71. The aim is to understand and examine what and why an 
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event happened. The objective is “to identify the factors contributing to incidents and 
to make the system resistant to similar errors” 
107
. The aim is not restricted to 
knowledge of what happened, but also to solve why it happened, and thus offer 
opportunities to minimise recurrence. The system is used by large commercial 
aircraft maintainers to develop systematic procedures to identify potential errors 
and occurrences. This scheme claims that human elements are the major 
contributors to maintenance errors. Leaflet 11-50 defines the maintenance error as 
“one of the safety objective restriction due to failures to perform the necessary 
expected action appropriately” 
107
. 
2.4.5.3 Aviation Safety Reporting Systems (ASRS) 
The ASRS was developed by NASA to identify the potential causes of aircraft 
accidents. The information is available online for public review 
111
. The methodology 
encompasses the collection of and analyses and responses to any type of aviation 
safety incident report. The objective is to reduce and prevent further aircraft 
accidents. All the ASRS data are used to solve existing insufficiencies and 
discrepancies, to provide recommendations to appropriate authorities, and to 
improve human factor issues regarding aircraft. ASRS encompasses four types of 
reporting inputs: 1) General, 2) Air Traffic Control, 3) Maintenance, and 4) Cabin. 
This reporting system focuses on the maintenance types of reporting inputs 
in seven main categories, namely Time and Location, Experience, Contribution 
Factors, Consequences/Outcome, Aircraft and Airworthiness Status, Mission, 
Reporting Organisation, in addition to Type of Aircraft and Engine. Although this 
source of feedback contains much information, such as the causes of accidents, the 
designer has to put more effort into analysing the information using appropriate 
analysis tools. This is to ensure that the relevant information is captured 
appropriately for future design improvements.  
2.4.5.4 Air Accident Investigations Branch (AAIB) accident reports 
The aims of the AAIB accident reports are “to determine the circumstances 
and causes of the accident and to make safety recommendations, if necessary, with a 
view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of accidents in the future”, and “It 
is not to apportion blame or liability” 
114
. This is associated with the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements stated in Annex 13 of the Aircraft 
Accident and Incident Investigation. Annex 13 is one of the documents controlled 
and prepared by the ICAO.  
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The main intention of this document is to outline international standards and 
recommended practices to prevent aircraft accidents as well as aircraft safety 
enhancement. Investigations encompass various aspects such as flying procedures 
and techniques, and engineering factors such as aircraft airworthiness and 
maintenance techniques. Typical data collected are: 1) Type of Aircraft and 
Registration; 2) Type of Engines and Year of Manufacture; 3) Date & Time 
(Coordinated Universal Time known as UTC) and Location; 4) Type of Flight; 5) 
Persons on Board; 6) Injuries; 7) Nature of Damage; 8) Commander’s Licence, Age, 
Flying Experience; and 9) Information Source.  
The information is easily accessible and can be downloaded from the above 
mentioned webpage 
111
. Unfortunately, due to large amounts of information 
contained in the database, it is often difficult for readers to trace the way in which 
particular conclusions have been reached. Due to this issue, Johnson 
115
 proposes a 
mathematical solution to simplify the findings of accident investigations and claims 
that: “These techniques enable analysts to formally demonstrate that a particular 
conclusion is justified given the evidence in a report. In doing so, it is possible to 
identify missing pieces of evidence, to identify ambiguities and to determine which 
items of evidence are critical to particular lines of argument”. 
As a conclusion, Johnson 
115
 proposed design techniques to support the 
design of safety-critical applications using Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) which 
“helps to ensure that findings about previous failures are propagated into the 
subsequent development of future systems”. Meanwhile, Smart 
116
 examined the 
trust of the public and the aviation industry towards AAIB, as well as its ability to 
conduct independent and objective investigations. He concludes that both the 
quality and culture of the organisation influence the public’s trust in accident 
investigation. 
2.4.5.5 Service Difficulty Reporting Systems (SDRS) 
SDRS is another source of feedback information which collects data and 
focuses on aircraft service difficulties 
117; 118
. The information is used to gain a better 
understanding of the problems of service difficulties and can be used to investigate 
the trends of difficulties. The data gained from the SDRS can potentially contribute to 
future product development as well as safety factors. The information is submitted 
by using FAA Form 8070-1.  
This contains three major sections: Major Equipment Identification; Problem 
Description, including the part name, part number, part condition and part/defect 
location; and, Information from the individual submitting the information. SDRS is 
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categorised in accordance with the Joint Aircraft Components and Systems (JASC) 
Code. The JASC Code is divided into four major components: Aircraft, Airframe, 
Propeller/Rotor Systems, and Powerplant Systems. 
 
Figure 2—2 List of JASC Code (Illustration prepared by author) 
2.4.5.6 Service Bulletin/Service Letter (SB/SL) 
The Service Bulletin (SB) contains information for any modification to the 
existing products or systems to improve the safety and efficiency of the aircraft. 
Service Bulletins are usually supplied by either airframe or engine manufacturers for 
any type of improvement or modification made.  
The aim is to improve the safety and operation of the affected aircraft. In 
terms of the design stage concerned, this type of information should be kept or 
stored as required by regulatory authorities (i.e. EASA Part 145) so that all the 
information can be used for future product development. An example of regulatory 
requirement is shown in Appendix A. In addition to SB, a Service Letter is also 
supplied by the manufacturer to describe maintenance actions without equipment 
modifications. SL is a letter to assist maintenance personnel to perform their duty 
according to the SB. 
2.4.5.7 Airworthiness Directive (AD) 
Airworthiness Directives are one of the regulatory documents for aircraft 
maintenance. These documents are issued by airworthiness authorities for any 
JOINT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM/COMPONENT (JASC) CODE
AIRCRAFT
1XXX
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS
2XXX – 5XXX
PROPELLER/ROTOR SYSTEMS
6XXX
POWERPLANT SYSTEM
7XXX – 8XXX
21XX AIR CONDITIONING
22XX AUTO FLIGHT
23XX COMMUNICATIONS
24XX ELECTRICAL POWER
25XX EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS
26XX FIRE PROTECTION
27XX FLIGHT CONTROLS
28XX FUEL
29XX HYDRAULIC POWER
36XX PNEUMATIC
38XX WATER/WASTE
35XX OXYGEN
37XX VACUUM
32XX LANDING GEAR
31XX INSTRUMENTS
30XX ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
34XX NAVIGATIONS
33XX LIGHTS
49XX AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER
45XX CENTRAL MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (CMS) 51XX STANDARD PRACTICES / STRUCTURES
56XX WINDOWS
55XX STABILIZERS
54XX NACELLES/PYLONS
53XX FUSELAGE
52XX DOORS
57XX WINGS
11XX PLACARDS AND MARKINGS
18XX HELICOPTER VIBRATION
14XX HARDWARE
12XX SERVICING
67XX ROTORS FLIGHT CONTROL
65XX TAIL ROTOR DRIVE
64XX TAIL MOTOR
63XX MAIN MOTOR DRIVE
62XX MAIN ROTOR
75XX AIR
61XX PROPELLERS/PROPULSORS
76XX ENGINE CONTROLS
71XX POWERPLANT
85XX RECIPROCATING ENGINE
83XX ACCESSORY GEARBOXES
82XX WATER INJECTION
72XX TURBINE/TURBOPROP ENGINE
73XX ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL
74XX IGNITION
81XX TURBO CHARGING
80XX STARTING
79XX ENGINE OIL
78XX ENGINE EXHAUST
77XX ENGINE INDICATING
26 
 
unsafe conditions for existing aircraft, components and systems 
91
. They are 
mandatory documents that must be complied with by affected aircraft, products and 
systems. All paperwork should be kept or stored in accordance with regulatory 
requirements for future reference. Usually, an AD is a result of several types of 
investigation, including accident and incident investigations. Typically, an AD consists 
of: 
1. A description of the unsafe condition; 
2. The affected products; 
3. Type of actions to comply; 
4. The effective date to comply; 
5. Sources of reference; 
6. A suggestion for an alternative solution.  
It is clear that the AD is a document which contains information that is 
relevant to safety requirements, and therefore can be considered as one of the 
sources of feedback information that should be used for future design improvement. 
However, it is not clear how the information can be compiled, analysed and 
transformed into design enhancement.  
2.4.5.8 Problem/Failure/Data Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Systems 
(PRACAS/FRACAS/DRACAS) 
Problem Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Systems (PRACAS), and 
Data Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Systems (DRACAS) are the closed-
loop systems which ensure all feedback information for further action and 
improvement is provided, including discrepancies and failures which happen during 
design, testing and manufacturing 
108
. The tool is used by the Reliability and 
Maintainability (RAM) engineers, specifically at the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), to 
evaluate the potential improvements of existing product design and development. 
DRACAS is a new terminology used by the MOD, which was previously known as 
Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action Systems (FRACAS). This is because 
the scope of DRACAS is much wider, specifically regarding the types of data collected 
relative to FRACAS.  
Another category of feedback information is known as Problem Reporting, 
Analysis and Corrective Action Systems (PRACAS) 
119
. PRACAS was developed by 
NASA specifically for an aeronautical perspective. Typical types of information 
collected are:  
1. The location of failure;  
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2. When the failure was detected and/or discovered;  
3. Applicable part number, serial number and model numbers;  
4. Operation being performed;  
5. Failure symptom/mode;  
6. Particulars of individual who performed the duty; 
7. The impact of the failure occurring to systems and/or other components.  
Regardless of what type of terminologies and acronyms are used, the concept 
of this type of feedback collection methodology is known as closed-loop analysis and 
the correction action process, and offers opportunities to track and report problems 
or failures 
69; 74; 75
. Consequently, the tracked and reported problems can be analysed 
by using appropriate analysis tools to improve performance as well as enhance the 
product design. 
2.4.6 Other sources of feedback 
Other sources of feedback information which could be used for future aircraft 
design improvements are data collected from the monitoring systems. Monitoring is 
an activity carried out through the observation of particular systems. The main 
purpose of monitoring systems is for health monitoring and preventive maintenance. 
Preventive maintenance is an action to ensure the systems operate at a specified 
level of required performance. There are several types of monitoring systems, which 
include: 1) Aircraft Engine Health/Monitoring Systems; 2) Aircraft Tyre Monitoring 
Systems – which aim to monitor the inflation pressure or temperature of an aircraft 
tyre; 3) Aircraft Systems Monitoring Systems (i.e. Hydraulic Pump); 4) Structural 
Health Monitoring Systems (SHMS); and 5) Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring 
(IVHM).  
Generally, monitoring systems encompass two major elements: computer and 
electronic components. The combination of these two elements allows the necessary 
information to be collected during the monitoring stages. Some of the benefits of 
monitoring systems include the ability to improve aircraft availability, minimise 
maintenance and eliminate errors. The collected information is considered as 
feedback information which may be used to determine the life cycle of the systems 
or components.  
Monitoring systems are able to contribute to DfM as well as maintainability 
improvement such as cost reduction 
120
 and reduction in maintenance time 
121
. 
However, the extent to which the information is used and its contribution to future 
product development is still not clear. This information needs to be channelled or 
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transformed into better information for designers to make adjustments and future 
improvements. 
2.5 Existing maintainability prediction methodologies 
Maintenance plays an important role in the aircraft industry 
67; 122
. The trend 
of maintenance and maintainability in the aircraft industry has also changed 
tremendously 
123
. The literature review presented in this report focuses on the 
maintainability prediction methodologies. Most of the reviewed methodologies are 
extracted from reliable sources which are commonly used in the aircraft industry – 
both civil and military. The rest of the literatures 
124-126
 explain the important of MIL-
HDBK-472 and present the techniques of each individual procedure effectively. 
Maintainability also predicted by using other approaches known as the 
maintainability index 
59; 85; 127; 128
. 
This section describes the existing maintainability prediction methodologies. 
The research will be using the element of historical data (i.e. feedback information) 
to develop an alternative maintainability prediction method for a new approach to 
the maintainability prediction at the design stage. The existing maintainability 
predictions were reviewed and identified those most closely related to design 
activities. 
The identified maintainability prediction should have elements of design within 
the prediction methodology. The following section describes the existing types of 
maintainability prediction methodologies. 
2.5.1 MIL-HDBK-472 
The philosophy of this type of maintainability prediction is that “the systems 
failures are primarily due to the malfunction of replaceable items and therefore, the 
time cycle for the various steps required to replace these items is a measure of 
downtime which is a parameter of system maintainability” 
129
. 
MIL-HDBK-472 consists of four main procedures. The list and a description of 
each procedure are shown in Table 2-2. The type of maintainability prediction 
researched by the author is the one that is suitable to assist the designer to design 
and perform the necessary improvement at the design and development stages. 
The author’s philosophy is that a good maintainability prediction method is 
the one that is user-friendly, practical, and possibly consists of an element of 
historical data. 
29 
 
Table 2-2 List of MIL-HDBK-472 procedures 
13
 
 
Table 2-3 shows the summary of all four types of maintainability prediction 
procedures. The purpose of this table is to identify and pull out the important 
elements as possible and at the same time contribute to the author’s decision 
making. The author decided to choose the procedure that has an element of design 
characteristics. In the initial stage of consideration, the author found three 
procedures (i.e. I, II, and IV) had a few contributions to design elements although all 
procedures contributed to the maintainability prediction methodology. Procedure III 
was, therefore, chosen for the following reasons: 
1. Consists of elements of design such as accessibility, tool manipulation, and 
visual; 
2. Consists of elements of facilities such as sources of testing, human resource 
requirement, and special tools and/or equipment required; 
3. Consists of elements of identification for improvement and modification; 
4. Consists of elements of the human factor. 
Procedure Description
I “ …applicable to predict flight-line maintenance of airborne
electronic and electro-mechanical involving modular replacement
at the flight line.”;
II “…applied to predict the corrective maintenance time.”;
III “The procedure is adaptable for performing maintainability
predictions during the Design and Development stage.”;
IV “Time analysis can be performed as soon as sufficient
system/equipment definitions exists.”
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Procedure Study Discipline Goal Methodology Analysis Methods 
I Prediction of flight-line 
maintenance of airborne 
electronic and electro-
mechanical systems 
“….to predict system downtime of 
airborne electronic and electro-
mechanical systems involving 
modular replacement at the flight –
line.” 
To determine the prediction 
of flight-line maintenance of 
airborne after the design 
concept has been established 
provided fundamental data 
are available 
Data analyses and prediction The distribution of System Downtime 
II Prediction of the corrective 
maintenance time and 
active maintenance time 
“….describes the method and 
techniques which are used to predict 
Corrective, Preventive, and Active 
Maintenance parameters.” 
Method is suitable for 
shipboard and shore 
electronic 
systems/equipment, 
mechanical equipment or 
systems if the functional 
levels can be established, 
however ONLY applicable 
during the final design stage 
Data analyses and prediction – the table 
was produced based on 300 observations 
of maintenance activity in the US fleet 
and divided into nine categories 
including Localisation, Isolation, 
Disassembly, Interchange, Reassembly, 
Alignment, and Checkout 
Equipment Repair Time (ERT) 
 =	∑ =   
Corrective Maintenance (Mc) 
 
 =	 Σ	 

Σ  
Preventive Maintenance (Mp) 
  =	 Σ		 
Σ	  
Active Maintenance (M) 
 =	 Σ 
 + Σ	 "
Σ + 	Σ	"  
Maintainability Index (MI) 
 # = 	 Σ 
 + Σ	 "  
 
III Prediction of the mean and 
maximum corrective 
maintenance downtime for 
ground electronic 
systems/equipments.” 
“… describes a method of performing 
a maintainability prediction of 
ground electronic systems and 
equipment by utilising the basic 
principle of random sampling.” 
Repair by replacement Data analyses and prediction by using 
score values for three checklists, 
including design, facilities, and human 
factors and substitution of these score 
values into a regression equation, and 
the result is an estimate of downtime 
 
 = 	3.54651 − 0.02512- −
0.03055.−0.010930  
IV Prediction of the mean 
and/or total corrective and 
preventive maintenance 
downtime 
systems/equipments 
“… based on the use of historical 
experience, subjective evaluation, 
expert judgement, and selective 
measurement for predicting the 
downtime of system/equipment.” 
Task time estimation 
combined to predict overall 
system/equipment 
Data analyses and prediction – the input 
of data is based on historical experience 
and expert judgement 
Mean Corrective Downtime – MCDT; 
Mean Preventive Downtime – MPDT; 
Total Mean Downtime - TMDT 
Table 2-3 Summary description of MIL - HDBK - 472 procedures 
13
 (Simplified by Author) 
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Procedure II has considerable application for this research because the 
approach has been formulated into nine different levels: Part, Stage, Subassembly, 
Assembly, Unit, Group, Equipment, System and Subsystem. The author’s concern 
with procedure II was about what to do if the maintainability prediction were to be 
more than the allocation time because the designer did not know which design 
element needed to be changed or altered (i.e. redesigned). 
 In procedure III, if the maintainability prediction value is more than the 
allocation time, the designer may look back to the lowest score value in each 
checklist – A, B, or C. Procedure III offers score values of 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0, where the 
highest score is allocated to the most maintainable element, and the lowest score is 
allocate to the least maintainable element. To illustrate the score value allocation as 
described, the following Checklist A is used. 
Table 2-4 Checklist A - Question 1 
 
The first question is asking about the external accessibility. If the mechanical 
component has both elements of visual and tool manipulation, the final score is 4, 
because the highest score offer is equal to 4. Meanwhile if the mechanical 
component has no indication of visual and tool manipulation, the score is 0, meaning 
the least maintainability element. Based on the previous paragraph’s example, this 
shows that procedure III does have a design element that is useful for this research. 
The MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III, consists of design checklists and scoring 
values which are used to determine the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). The checklists 
are categorised into three types of element related to design parameters: the 
Product “the physical configuration of the system”; the Facilities “the facilities 
provided for maintenance by the design”; and the Human Factors “the degree of 
maintenance skills required of personnel charged with the repair responsibility”. 
Each element is evaluated by using quantitative score values for the purpose 
of maintainability prediction. Collectively, the score value starts at 0 and goes to a 4 
rating score. The higher the score value equivalent, the better the contribution to 
the design element as well as to the maintainability prediction.  The lowest values 
scored equivalent to the worst design element. This offers the opportunity to 
Number Scoring Physical Design Factors Scores Value
Access adequate both for visual and manipulative tasks (electrical and mechanical) 4
Access adequate for visual, but no manipulative 2
Access adequate for manipulaltive, but not visual 2
Access not adequate for visual or manipulative 0
CHECKLIST A - PHYSICAL DESIGN FACTORS
Access (External)1
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redesign or review the score value for a better MTTR value at the end of the 
prediction evaluation. 
2.5.2 MIL-HDBK-470 
The procedure presented in this section is from the MIL-HDBK-470A, 
Appendix D, and Procedure V. It was developed to overcome deficiencies identified 
in Procedures I, II, III, and IV within the MIL-HDBK-472 
130
. However, the aim still 
remains the same, i.e. to perform the maintainability predictions which include the 
modern automated maintainability analyses tools. 
2.5.3 Maintainability analyses and prediction 
The goal of maintainability prediction was performed “an assessment of the 
design of the systems (and its components) from a maintainability perspective” 
13
. 
The objective of this is to ensure each part and component is designed in accordance 
with maintainability criteria. The accuracy of the maintainability prediction is 
dependent on the accuracy of the input data, availability of accurate historical data, 
evaluation techniques or methodology used, and suitable knowledge to ensure the 
prediction can be performed from various directions or perspectives. 
Maintainability analysis is always used to analyse the systems. The analysis is 
based on available components and any other related elements contributing to the 
success of the function of systems. There are several existing maintainability 
analyses and predictions available for reference. Some of these are Maintainability 
Prediction 
15
, Designing and Develop Maintainability Products and Systems 
130
, and 
Maintainability Verification, Demonstration, and Evaluation 
131
. Normally the 
analyses are conducted after the designed has been completed.  
2.5.4 Maintenance Time 
Maintenance time is always associated with maintainability characteristics.  
Design for Maintainability (DfM) is also associated with three major DfX’s namely 
Design for Disassembly (DfD), Design for Assembly (DfA), and Design for Reliability 
(DfR). MIL-HDBK-472 which was published in 1966 is used as a major reference for 
prediction maintainability 
132
. There are many papers published associated with time 
for removing items which refer to DfD and DfA. However, DfR is always associated 
with Failure rate (λ) and Availability as an element to predict the reliability of specific 
components.  
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Fielding 
132
 mentioned that Safety, Reliability and Maintainability are three 
major elements that have to be considered in gaining the effectiveness of product 
development. The questions to answer are: How can all of these major elements be 
connected together and contribute to the effectiveness, and How can time be 
associated with that effectiveness? 
Time estimations for maintainability can also be calculated through a 
combination of DfD and DfA. There are several factors from DfD and DfA which are 
able to contribute to time for maintainability prediction. This is carried out by using 
Number of Parts, Tools Manipulation Factors, and Maintainability Characteristics. All 
of these three elements are then multiplied to obtain the Design Efficiency. Does 
Design Efficiency give the indication that the aim of maintainability is achievable? 
Figure 2—3 and Figure 2—4 show different types of time associated with 
maintenance. 
 
Figure 2—3 Time Relationship 
133
 
 
Figure 2—4 Maintenance time relationship 
12
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Boothroyd et al. 
10
 provided three important elements to consider during the 
decision to evaluate DfA Design Efficiency. DfA also has been used in the aviation 
industry and proved to be successful 
20
. DfD also uses the same concept as DfA. The 
three elements of DfA were used during design practices and evaluation 
32-34; 36; 37; 41; 
42; 45; 134
. 
2.5.5 Maintainability relationship 
Figure 2—5 shows some of the elements involved in ensuring the aim of 
maintainability is achievable. Those elements are safety, manufacturing, human 
engineering, diagnostics and maintenance, and logistics support. Each one of these 
elements has it is own strengths. In term of priorities, this is difficult to determine 
because each one of these elements is connected to all the others.  
 
Figure 2—5 Some key elements of the Maintainability relationship 130 
2.5.6 Design for maintenance strategies 
This started with the development of Maintenance Steering Group (MSG)-1 
which was to improve the development of MSG 2. MSG 3 came after that with more 
improvements having been made. MSG 2 was based on process-oriented while the 
improvement through to the MSG 3 was focused on task-oriented. The trend has 
grown with the invention of Maintenance-by-the-hour (MBTH) 
135
, Maintenance Free 
Operating Period (MFOP) 
136; 137
, and Failure-Free Operating Period (FFOP) 
138
. 
Generally this type of strategy is defined as “a period of continuous operation 
without the need for logistic support” 
139
.  An MFOP “is a period of time during which 
there is no need for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance” 
109
. 
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2.5.7 Elements of maintainability 
The following Table 2-5 shows elements of maintainability: 
Table 2-5 Maintainability Elements (Compiled by the Author) 
Bluvband and 
Zilberberg 
140
 
Bineid and Fielding 
141
 Boyd 
142
 DoD- HDBK-791 
62
 MIL-HDB-472, 
Procedure II 
129
 
Montgomery and 
Marko 
130
 
1. Accessibility; 
2. Visibility; 
3. Testability; 
4. Complexity; 
5. Interchangeability; 
6. Identification; and 
Labelling; 
7. Verification; 
8. Simplicity. 
 
1. Accessibility; 
2. Assemblability; 
3. Standardisation; 
4. Simplicity; 
5. Identification; 
6. Diagnosability; 
7. Modulisation; 
8. Serviceability; 
9. Testability; 
10. Parts/Components; 
11. Reliability. 
1. Reach, clearance, 
and strength; 
2. Space needed for 
manipulation of 
tools; 
3. Restrictive effects 
of apparels; 
4. Demands for 
visibility; 
5. Conditions that 
reduce sense of 
balance and 
position; 
6. Demands for fine 
control of 
movements. 
1. Simplicity; 
2. Accessibility; 
3. Standardisation; 
4. Modulisation; 
5. Identification;  
6. Testability; 
7. Ergonomics. 
1. Localisation; 
2. Isolation; 
3. Disassembly; 
4. Interchange; 
5. Reassembly; 
6. Alignment; 
7. Checkout. 
1. Localisation; 
2. Isolation; 
3. Disassembly; 
4. Interchange; 
5. Reassembly; 
6. Alignment; 
7. Checkout; 
8. Start-up. 
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Although the various authors have different perspectives on the element of 
maintainability, it can be concluded that there are two important elements to be considered. 
These are the times to perform the necessary maintenance actions and error/failure detection 
which includes the methodology to detect an error when failure occurs. Based on these two 
elements, others elements such as accessibility, verification, removal and replacement etc. can 
be considered as supportive elements. This is to ensure the two important elements,, as 
mentioned previously, can be minimised. 
2.5.8 Maintenance tasks for airframe systems 
Under MSG-3, maintenance tasks for airframe systems are divided into 8 tasks and Table 
2-6 shows the detail. 
Table 2-6 Maintenance Tasks for airframe and structural items 
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Maintenance Tasks 
Structural Inspection 
Airframe Systems Structural Items 
1. Lubrications; 
2. Servicing; 
3. Inspection; 
4. Functional Check; 
5. Operational Check; 
6. Visual Check; 
7. Restoration; 
8. Discard. 
1. Environmental 
deterioration; 
2. Accidental damage; 
3. Fatigue damage. 
1. General Visual 
inspection; 
2. Detailed inspection; 
3. Special detailed 
inspection. 
 
The impacts of not considering maintainability as a major element for the components’ 
life extension is broadly explained by several researchers 
144; 145
. Although these papers did not 
specifically explain in detail the contribution of maintainability to the life cycle they did give a 
better view of the impact on cost as well as on “human life”. Alonso-Rasgado et al. 
146
 explain in 
detail the combination of several elements of DfX in order to achieve a Total Care maintenance 
strategy goal. This includes maintainability elements and how they relate to others elements 
such as Reliability, Remanufacturing and other methodologies. Coulter et al. 
147
 in particular, 
explain how fasteners contribute to material separation.  The information from this thesis can 
be used as justification for the methodology used for selecting the type and number of 
fasteners required for the design for maintainability. Shehory et al. 
148
 explain how previous and 
existing information should be organised accordingly as this will improve the strength of 
maintainability. It will help the aircraft mechanic and engineer to perform their duties 
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accordingly and within the allocated time frame.  Again, in this research, this type of effort can 
be used for future development, where all information is gathered and fed into a system and 
therefore the collective information can be channelled to the appropriate systems. 
Which elements of maintainability need to be considered the most? Maintainability 
elements involve three major stages: Disassembly (Removal), Rectification (Inspection, 
Reliability), and Assembly (Installation). Each one of these stages requires support from several 
other factors 
130
. 
At the rectification stage, information such as why the component failed is analysed and 
rectified in order to have the system operate to the specified requirement. At this stage, the 
history reliability information is highly important. The information is not only used to analyse 
the trend of the component’s failure, it is also very useful to identify potential design 
improvements, such as type of materials and processes, as well as the potential to improve 
methods of failure detection. At the Assembly stage, most of components are assembled 
together in accordance with the manufacturers or maintenance manual. This stage can be 
considered as the reverse of the disassembly procedure, as any mistake when matching parts to 
the wrong components may cause further failure and there could be potential difficulty in 
detecting the failure. 
In conclusion, each stage must be carried out with systematic procedures. The major 
element involved at each stage is time. Generally, the more time taken to carry out each task 
will affect the next stages, and so on. Several literatures such as 
130; 149; 150
 were used to identify 
standard times for disassembly and assembly. 
 
Figure 2—6 Relation of Maintenance and Others Elements 
140
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2.6 Summary 
After all comprehensive literature reviews have been performed; this section can be 
summarised as follows:  
2.6.1 Designer Perspective 
At this level, the perspective of maintainability should be improved at the design stage 
where all required information should be supplied to the respective department such as 
Engineering or Design. The information supplied should be specific to the problems that have 
arisen or to the specific required improvements. This is because the designer does not have 
time to evaluate the whole set of reports from the customer or the end user (i.e. Maintenance 
Engineer, Mechanic and Pilot). In the aviation industry, there are many feedback mechanisms 
developed to obtain as much information as possible from the end user in order to improve the 
existing designed of products or systems. The information is also used to reduce human error, 
improve the maintenance time interval, and to set a bench mark for the future trend of 
products or systems to be designed. 
2.6.2 Historical Data and Information Perspective 
To ensure that the improvement of a new design offers additional benefits to those 
previously provided, historical data should be utilised. Collectively, historical data and 
information are capable of providing a better understanding for better design improvement 
and, consequently, be able to offer others benefits such as both cost and human error 
reductions. There are different types of historical data available from reliable sources.  
Based on the literature review, there are more than ten types of reliable sources of 
information as per described in section 2.4.5 and section 2.4.6. Some sources of information 
such as Airworthiness Directive (AD) are controlled by regulatory bodies (i.e. FAA and CAA). This 
research is focused on sources of information that can be used as alternatives to predict 
maintainability effectiveness. The Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) is the most 
appropriate source of information that is suitable for this research. 
Most of the information included in the SDRS contains information that is useful to the 
designer when considering improvements such as part conditions, nature of conditions, stage 
of operations, aircraft types, aircraft model, and precautionary actions. These elements should 
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be able to offer a clear indication to the aircraft designer that the data have been analysed 
appropriately, accurately and systematically. 
In this research, the SDR data were collected from reliable sources and were analysed 
systematically to ensure the most reported service difficulties are followed by improvement in 
terms of maintainability prediction. 
2.6.3 Maintenance Perspective 
This level is referred to as the end user of designed products or systems. Almost all the 
valuable information for future products improvement is supplied from this level. This is 
because at this level, each person is not only performing his/her duties according to the 
requirements but they are also putting their ideas or theories of design into a practical form. 
2.6.4 Quantitative Perspective 
After reviewing each element from the MIL-HDBK-472 checklists, the highest score is 
allocated to the maintenance task needing minimum effort to be performed. Other than that 
the fewest tools, or no tools, required to perform the maintenance tasks will also be awarded 
the highest score.  
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3 Use of Feedback Information for Maintainability prediction 
3.1 Objectives 
• to illustrate how feedback information can be used to provide information to aid 
maintainability prediction consequently promote better Design for Maintainability;  
• to identify valuable information within Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS); and 
• to identify potential use of the analysed SDRS for maintainability prediction. 
3.2 Overview 
One of the reasons why SDR was selected is because the system is comprised of a 
considerable amount of maintainability related information. The collected data encompass 
seven information sources: 1) Joint Aircraft/Systems (JASC) Code; 2) Part Name; 3) Aircraft 
Make; 4) Aircraft Model; 5) Aircraft Systems; 6) Nature Condition; and 7) Stage of Operations. 
The SDR also contains two categories of data known as “G” category for General Aviation and 
“A” category for Air Carriers. In this research, the “A” category was used because all the aircraft 
types and models referring to commercial types of aircraft. 
For this research the historical data information for all types of aircraft, JASC Code, 
aircraft engine types were collected over a period of 10 years, from 2000 until 2009. JASC 
contains a list of aircraft components and systems which were previously known as the Air 
Transport Association (ATA) of America 
117
 and divided into four categories: Aircraft, Airframe 
Systems, Propeller/Rotor Systems and Powerplant Systems. There are 51 subsystems as shown 
in Figure 3—1. All are categorised into four different groups namely Aircraft contains 4, 
Airframe contains 27, Propeller/Rotor Systems contains 6, and Powerplant contains 14.  
The process of analyses was implemented by using a Microsoft Excel application. After 
elements of the JASC Code were identified, the next part of the process was to propose the 
range of the data set to be selected.  
The first step began with data collection and categorisation in accordance with JASC 
Systems. The purpose of the first step was to validate that the Airframe was the main 
contributor to SDRS. The second step of the process was to determine the highest contributors 
to SDRS within the airframe systems. The third steps of the process was to identify the types of 
part conditions, and was followed by choosing the appropriate aircraft components associated 
with maintainability and serviceability, and related types of part conditions. The analysis 
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processes were divided into two, namely Global SDR dataset and Detailed SDR dataset analyses. 
Both analyses are description and results are shown in the following chapter 4. 
 
 
Figure 3—1 Joint Aircraft System/Component (JASC) subsystems 
3.3 Proposed process flow for SDR data analysis 
This section described, a methodology to analyse the feedback information known as 
Service Difficulties Report (SDR). Figure 3—2 show the generic process flow for SDR analysis 
proposed by the author.  
The process begins with identifying the data range. In this research, the author decided to 
use ten years data range starting from year 2000 up to year 2009. This decision is based on 
authors’ own analysis presented in Figure 1—1 and through intensive literature reviews which 
is previously presented in section 2.4. The following process is using the Joint Aircraft 
System/Component (JASC) code to identify the problems. This is one of the main reasons the 
SDRS was selected by author where all the data are arranged in accordance with JASC code. 
JASC code is previously also known as ATA Chapter. 
The following is narrowed the SDR analysis in accordance with systems. In this research, 
the author was interested in mechanical related components and therefore most of the 
components are allocated in airframe systems. Other analyses includes the stage of operation 
where in this analyses the designer is able to known at what stage that most of the service 
difficulties are discovered and reported. 
JOINT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM/COMPONENT (JASC) CODE
AIRCRAFT
1XXX
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS
2XXX – 5XXX
PROPELLER/ROTOR SYSTEMS
6XXX
POWERPLANT SYSTEM
7XXX – 8XXX
21XX AIR CONDITIONING
22XX AUTO FLIGHT
23XX COMMUNICATIONS
24XX ELECTRICAL POWER
25XX EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS
26XX FIRE PROTECTION
27XX FLIGHT CONTROLS
28XX FUEL
29XX HYDRAULIC POWER
36XX PNEUMATIC
38XX WATER/WASTE
35XX OXYGEN
37XX VACUUM
32XX LANDING GEAR
31XX INSTRUMENTS
30XX ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
34XX NAVIGATIONS
33XX LIGHTS
49XX AIRBORNE AUXILIARY POWER
45XX CENTRAL MAINTENANCE SYSTEM (CMS) 51XX STANDARD PRACTICES / STRUCTURES
56XX WINDOWS
55XX STABILIZERS
54XX NACELLES/PYLONS
53XX FUSELAGE
52XX DOORS
57XX WINGS
11XX PLACARDS AND MARKINGS
18XX HELICOPTER VIBRATION
14XX HARDWARE
12XX SERVICING
67XX ROTORS FLIGHT CONTROL
65XX TAIL ROTOR DRIVE
64XX TAIL MOTOR
63XX MAIN MOTOR DRIVE
62XX MAIN ROTOR
75XX AIR
61XX PROPELLERS/PROPULSORS
76XX ENGINE CONTROLS
71XX POWERPLANT
85XX RECIPROCATING ENGINE
83XX ACCESSORY GEARBOXES
82XX WATER INJECTION
72XX TURBINE/TURBOPROP ENGINE
73XX ENGINE FUEL AND CONTROL
74XX IGNITION
81XX TURBO CHARGING
80XX STARTING
79XX ENGINE OIL
78XX ENGINE EXHAUST
77XX ENGINE INDICATING
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Figure 3—2 Service Difficulties Report generic process flow 
Figure 3—3 shows a detailed process flow of SDR data in this research. The process 
begins with collecting necessary information which was collected for ten years from 2000 to 
2009. 
TREND OF SDR BETWEEN 
2000 - 2009
TO UNDERSTAND THE TREND OF THE EXISTING FEEDBACK INFORMATION 
RELATED TO SERVICE DIFFICULTIES
JASC SYSTEMS
ANALYSING FOUR TYPES OF SYSTEMS IAW JASC CODE NAMELY 
AIRCRAFT, AIRFRAME SYSTEMS, PROPELLER/ROTOR SYSTEMS, AND 
POWERPLANT SYSTEM
DATA ANALYSES PROCESS FLOW
AIRFRAME ANALYSES
TO IDENTIFY THE HIGHEST CONTRIBUTOR TO AIRFRAME SERVICE 
DIFFICULTIES.  
SELECTED JASC CODE
THIS IS TO REANALYSE THE SELECTED JASC CODE WHICH IS RELATED 
TO THE AIM OF RESEARCH AIM AND IDENTIFY THE HIGHEST 
CONTRIBUTOR TO SERVICE DIFFICULTIES.
PART CONDITION
TO IDENTIFY WHAT WOULD BE TYPES OF PART CONDITIONS CAUSED THE 
MOST SERVICE DIFFICULTIES
STAGE OF OPERATION
TO IDENTIFY AT WHAT STAGE OF OPERATIONS ARE MOST THE SERVICE 
DIFFICULTIES DISCOVERED.
NATURE CONDITION
TO IDENTIFY IN WHICH KINDS OF CONDITION ARE MOST OF THE SERVICE 
DIFFICULTIES LIKELY TO OCCUR.
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Figure 3—3 Process flow analyses of Service Difficulties Report (SDR) 
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3.4 Service Difficulties reports (SDR) analyses 
3.4.1 Investigation global analysis of SDR Data 
  The results allow identification of the main causes of SDR for all types of aircraft 
components. The global results as shown in Figure 3—4, that the most common causes of SDR 
are cracked and corroded condition of parts. This indicates that it is important to select 
appropriate materials and processes, and analyse the service environment in order to reduce 
such part condition problems.  
  However, these types of part condition are difficult to avoid during the design stage. 
From a design perspective, it is also interesting to consider some of the maintainability related 
part conditions, such as “inoperative”, “dented” and “damaged”. Feedback from SDR related to 
these part conditions may be useful to designers of future aircraft in identifying common 
maintainability problems for the components that they design. Therefore, this thesis suggests 
that feedback values should be considered as one of the evaluation methodologies used by 
designers. This is one of the suggestions made in order to aid designers and/or project team 
members so that such problems are able to be minimised in the future. The detail of global 
analysis of SDR dataset were presented in Appendix B 
 
Figure 3—4 Causes of Service Difficulties classified by JASC Code 
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3.4.2 Investigation detailed analysis of SDR Data 
  The objective of the analysis is to investigate particular components in detail, and 
particularly to find the information related to maintainability issues. In performing the detailed 
analysis only a sub-set of part conditions related to maintainability have been analysed. The 
results show that there are some elements related to maintainability that require attention 
from the designers. This is because some types of part conditions may cause unnecessary 
incidents which could be avoided through the improvement of design for maintainability. 
  Figure 3—5 shows the breakdown of the results for maintainability related SDR. The 
Landing gear shows the highest percentage of SDR with 44.71% from 3,968 SDRS, followed by 
fuselage with 25.19% (1,880 SDR), and the third highest is doors with 21.18% (1,880 SDR). 
Other types of aircraft component such as Nacelles/Pylons, Stabilisers, Windows, and Wings 
show the values from 1.03% to 5.12% of SDR.  
 
Figure 3—5 Maintainability related causes of Service Difficulties classified by JASC Code 
  The types of part condition that causes service difficulties vary for different types of 
aircraft component. For Landing gear, the highest contribution of SDR is from malfunction with 
68.20%, followed by out of adjust and out of rig. For doors, the out of adjustment contributed 
the highest SDR with 40.20% followed by malfunctions and unsecured doors. The fuselage 
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shows that misdrilled contributed the highest SDR with 47.72% compared to other types of part 
condition such as misrigged.  
  Based on the results from the first and second analyses, there are two types of 
indication. The first is that for the whole aircraft system and components, the main issues to be 
considered are the improvement of cracked and corroded problems. However, these types of 
part conditions are very difficult to detect or prevent during the design process. Learning from 
the percentages, the trends and/or the quantity values from the analyses offer opportunities to 
develop an alternative solution to predict potential failures, such as the cracked and corroded 
problems. One possible solution is through an improvement in the selection of materials that 
can extend the aircraft components’ lifetime without crack or corrosion, but this may have cost 
implications. 
  The second indication is the element of maintainability improvement. There are several 
maintainability elements that have to be considered in order to evaluate the effectiveness of 
maintainability. Some of these elements are accessibility, simplicity, serviceability and reliability 
53; 64-66; 151
. In addition, the element of time to repair is also included. 
  In the following sections, detailed analyses of three selected structural components are 
presented. These have been selected to highlight the different SDR causes for different aircraft 
component types. 
3.4.2.1 Landing Gear detailed analysis 
The objective of this section is to illustrate the detailed analysis and results achieved for 
the Landing Gear. The objective of the analysis is to illustrate the JASC Code most affected by 
the part conditions.  The results are shown in Table 3-1. There are 18, 571 data in total related 
to Landing Gear in the period 2000 to 2009. The highest contributor to SDR for landing gear is 
the Landing gear position and warning systems with 25.68% (4,769 SDR), followed by Landing 
gear retract/extend systems with 17.02% (3,160 SDR). 
For part condition malfunctioned contributed 16.5% (3,027 SDR) and failed with 13.4% 
(2,455 SDR) as shown in Table 3-2. Meanwhile Figure 3—6 depict the percentage distribution 
for other types of part condition.  
Based on the results achieved, it is clear that the electrical elements of aircraft require 
special attention from the designer, as well as the landing gear retract/extend systems. The 
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potential improvements that could be made from these results are by understanding the 
elements of mechanical (i.e. hydraulic) and aircraft (i.e. Pilot) handling. 
The interest of this research is to find potential solutions for the mechanical aircraft 
parts. From a maintainability perspective, the elements such as easy access and diagnosis are 
the main elements to be considered at the design stage. This is to ensure that the 
malfunctioning and failed components are able to be detected and maintained within the 
minimum time possible. 
Table 3-1 Landing Gear SDR results 
 
Table 3-2 Landing Gear SDR results in accordance with part conditions (Top 10) 
 
NO JASC CODE DESCRIPTION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 3200 LANDING GEAR SYSTEM 18 49 39 15 7 6 18 20 21 17 210 1.13%
2 3201 LANDING GEAR/WHEEL FAIRING 3 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 11 0.06%
3 3210 MAIN LANDING GEAR 41 47 66 81 54 95 84 72 37 25 602 3.24%
4 3211 MAIN LANDING GEAR ATTACH SECTION 64 40 40 28 17 18 22 12 35 52 328 1.77%
5 3212 EMERGENCY FLOTATION SYSTEM 7 1 95 122 17 2 11 5 1 1 262 1.41%
6 3213 MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT/AXLE/TRUCK 48 42 56 79 42 54 52 69 46 38 526 2.83%
7 3220 NOSE/TAIL LANDING GEAR 88 33 53 49 83 81 59 79 31 34 590 3.18%
8 3221 NOSE/TAIL LANDING GEAR ATTACH SECTION 8 16 10 7 4 1 10 1 3 1 61 0.33%
9 3222 NOSE/TAIL LANDING GEAR STRUT/AXLE 66 83 59 45 23 24 22 58 73 70 523 2.82%
10 3230 LANDING GEAR RETRACT/EXTEND SYSTEM 352 335 385 305 274 282 263 314 357 293 3,160 17.02%
11 3231 LANDING GEAR DOOR RETRACT SYSTEM 70 74 56 45 41 41 52 57 55 70 561 3.02%
12 3232 LANDING GEAR DOOR ACTUATOR 26 37 20 36 13 12 10 15 20 15 204 1.10%
13 3233 LANDING GEAR ACTUATOR 94 63 79 76 70 58 66 83 119 98 806 4.34%
14 3234 LANDING GEAR SELECTOR 83 78 69 66 75 56 59 79 71 67 703 3.79%
15 3240 LANDING GEAR BRAKE SYSTEM 141 75 81 99 132 159 142 245 214 139 1,427 7.68%
16 3241 BRAKE ANTI-SKID SELECTION 36 41 30 42 45 58 52 39 27 42 412 2.22%
17 3242 BRAKE ANTI-SKID SELECTION 148 62 53 44 59 37 41 15 22 25 506 2.72%
18 3243 MASTER CYLINDER/BRAKE VALVE 17 8 17 11 16 22 12 29 23 12 167 0.90%
19 3244 TIRE 48 59 45 47 79 80 78 75 52 57 620 3.34%
20 3245 TIRE TUBE 2 3 3 0 0 1 4 5 6 2 26 0.14%
21 3246 WHEEL/SKI/FLOAT 81 48 96 73 62 59 35 51 50 21 576 3.10%
22 3250 LANDING GEAR STEERING SYSTEM 32 44 45 56 30 70 89 117 53 67 603 3.25%
23 3251 STEERING UNIT 7 7 15 6 10 11 9 6 7 5 83 0.45%
24 3252 SHIMMY DAMPER 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 9 0.05%
25 3260 LANDING GEAR POSITION AND WARNING 513 501 450 548 511 492 405 472 436 441 4,769 25.68%
26 3270 AUXILIARY GEAR (TAIL SKID) 6 4 1 2 3 3 1 2 5 0 27 0.15%
27 3297 LANDING GEAR SYSTEM WARNING 31 39 58 62 54 96 99 145 116 99 799 4.30%
GRAND TOTAL 2,030 1,790 1,928 1,945 1,722 1,819 1,698 2,068 1,880 1,691 18,571 100.00%
NO CODE PART CONDITION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 19 BROKEN              98 86 81 88 49 63 50 53 38 54 660 3.60%
2 39 CORRODED            67 89 122 115 36 50 88 58 69 75 769 4.20%
3 41 CRACKED             242 98 102 74 65 35 40 33 31 25 745 4.07%
4 47 DAMAGED             72 36 64 82 94 64 63 95 69 57 696 3.80%
5 82 FAILED              453 297 279 257 185 210 148 202 224 200 2,455 13.40%
6 86 FAULTY              21 92 120 92 85 88 139 140 130 130 1,037 5.66%
7 120 INOPERATIVE         123 81 85 146 153 175 115 196 163 162 1,399 7.64%
8 127 LEAKING             69 52 79 86 50 49 36 49 42 35 547 2.99%
9 134 MALFUNCTIONED       223 180 251 289 342 347 301 404 383 307 3,027 16.52%
10 164 OUT OF ADJUST       54 94 84 69 67 73 77 72 75 80 745 4.07%
11 OTHERS 6,238 34.05%
18,318 100.00%TOTAL
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Figure 3—6 Percentage Distribution of Part Condition for the Landing Gear Retraction/Extend 
System (JASC Code 3230) 
3.4.2.2 Door detailed analysis 
The second analysis relates to aircraft doors. The objective of the analysis was to 
identify the dominant JASC Codes for different part conditions. As shown in Table 3-3, the 
results indicated that the passenger/crew doors contributed the highest SDR compared to 
others with 40.78% (7,235 SDR) followed by cargo and baggage doors with 23.26% (4,127 SDR).  
For the part condition cracked is the highest part condition with 30.89% (5,429 SDR) and 
followed by corroded with 7.78% (1,368 SDR). All results are shown in Table 3-4 and meanwhile 
Figure 3—7 depict the percentage distribution of other part conditions for the passenger/crew 
doors.  
Based on these results, the values are as expected because of the role of the doors 
which are likely to be dented or have mechanical failures. These types of door are most 
frequently opened and closed. As shown in Table 3-3, the most service difficulties for this type 
of JASC code are out of adjustment, malfunctioned, and unsecured. The second highest 
numbers of SDR are contributed by the cargo/baggage doors. Again, this is due to the operation 
of the doors, which are frequently opened and closed when the aircraft arrives and before 
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departure. This also includes using these doors to gain access to the aircraft for inspection and 
maintenance activities. 
From a maintainability perspective, elements such as accessibility and simplicity are the 
main factors to be considered at the design stage. Therefore, the time to perform the required 
diagnosis can be evaluated. This is to ensure that the malfunctioning and failed doors are able 
to be detected and maintained within the minimum possible time. It is also important to design 
reliable mechanical systems with robust mechanisms. 
Table 3-3 Doors SDR results 
 
Table 3-4 Doors SDR results in accordance with part conditions (Top 10) 
 
NO JASC CODE DESCRIPTION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 5200 DOORS 8 31 40 33 11 16 11 24 28 50 252 1.42%
2 5210 PASSENGER/CREW DOORS 520 383 364 401 537 631 787 1,131 1,095 1,386 7,235 40.78%
3 5220 EMERGENCY EXITS 75 58 72 62 55 66 114 153 151 146 952 5.37%
4 5230 CARGO/BAGGAGE DOORS 681 486 407 300 271 376 304 404 427 471 4,127 23.26%
5 5240 SERVICE DOORS 136 118 80 61 67 99 109 130 197 190 1,187 6.69%
6 5241 GALLEY DOORS 9 12 20 9 3 25 29 42 26 17 192 1.08%
7 5242 E/E COMPARTMENT DOORS 32 16 20 5 17 22 36 25 13 34 220 1.24%
8 5243 HYDRAULIC COMPARTMENT DOORS 2 3 3 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 14 0.08%
9 5244 ACCESSORY COMPARTMENT DOORS 11 6 4 2 4 3 4 5 6 8 53 0.30%
10 5245 AIR CONDITIONING COMPARTMENT DOORS 12 1 7 6 11 7 3 7 3 23 80 0.45%
11 5246 FLUID SERVICE DOORS 29 14 4 5 12 8 3 9 10 5 99 0.56%
12 5247 APU DOORS 8 5 10 7 9 2 9 4 6 10 70 0.39%
13 5248 TAIL CONE DOORS 7 2 0 2 4 0 0 1 1 2 19 0.11%
14 5250 FIXED INNER DOORS 9 20 5 29 12 10 13 8 8 7 121 0.68%
15 5260 ENTRANCE STAIRS 48 51 64 117 48 69 133 70 52 45 697 3.93%
16 5270 DOOR WARNING SYSTEM 137 164 190 165 171 137 153 131 148 99 1,495 8.43%
17 5280 LANDING GEAR DOORS 145 92 71 63 78 63 49 104 84 70 819 4.62%
18 5297 DOOR SYSTEM WIRING 4 10 4 7 9 13 13 20 16 12 108 0.61%
GRAND TOTAL 1,873 1,472 1,365 1,277 1,319 1,548 1,771 2,268 2,272 2,575 17,740 100.00%
NO CODE PART CONDITION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 19 BROKEN              30 46 28 43 73 69 61 50 65 51 516 2.94%
2 39 CORRODED            157 112 115 75 81 88 145 184 215 196 1,368 7.78%
3 41 CRACKED             643 477 433 330 355 498 618 789 620 666 5,429 30.89%
4 47 DAMAGED             98 86 56 89 76 89 105 150 181 106 1,036 5.89%
5 54 DENTED              85 71 54 61 51 83 58 59 85 80 687 3.91%
6 105 GOUGED              90 54 38 39 25 48 33 48 51 60 486 2.77%
7 126 LACK OF LUBE        33 29 26 44 47 32 54 99 109 100 573 3.26%
8 132 MAKING METAL        0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 14 331 363 2.07%
9 134 MALFUNCTIONED       21 25 28 31 24 41 72 60 81 50 433 2.46%
10 164 OUT OF ADJUST       117 93 79 83 65 72 67 83 99 112 870 4.95%
11 OTHERS 5,815 33.08%
17,576 100.00%TOTAL
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Figure 3—7 Percentage Distribution of Part Condition for the Passenger/Crew Doors (JASC Code 
5210) 
3.4.2.3 Fuselage detailed analysis 
The third case study presents the analysis of the fuselage for the 53XX JASC Code series. 
The objective of the analysis was to illustrate the JASC Code most affected by the part 
conditions, and the results are shown in Table 3-5. The JASC Code 53XX series shows that the 
Fuselage Miscellaneous Structures contributed the highest SDR with 25.11% (41,344 SDR). The 
second highest is the Fuselage Main, Plates/Skin with 16.12% (20,739 SDR) and the Fuselage 
Main, Frame contributing the third highest of SDR with 13.46% (17,306 SDR). 
For part condition corroded and cracked were the highest part conditions, with each 
one of them contributing 40.49% (66,573 SDR) and 40.32% (66,305 SDR) respectively. The 
details of the results are depicted in Figure 3—8. 
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Table 3-5 Fuselage SDR results 
 
Table 3-6 Fuselage SDR results in accordance with part conditions (Top 10) 
 
 
NO JASC CODE DESCRIPTION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 5300 FUSELAGE STRUCTURE (GENERAL) 24 679 215 100 26 28 41 39 26 22 1,200 0.73%
2 5301 AERIAL EQUIPMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.00%
3 5302 ROTORCRAFT TAIL BOM 6 7 24 24 11 4 11 24 29 23 163 0.10%
4 5310 FUSELAGE MAIN, STRUCTURE 1,077 1,772 1,150 854 940 673 1,002 1,006 763 770 10,007 6.08%
5 5311 FUSELAGE MAIN, FRAME 2,378 1,867 1,564 1,050 1,373 1,802 2,281 2,861 3,006 2,728 20,910 12.70%
6 5312 FUSELAGE MAIN, BULKHEAD 731 849 426 387 382 444 424 464 499 736 5,342 3.24%
7 5313 FUSELAGE MAIN, LONGERON/STRAINERS 1,201 966 899 621 782 744 1,019 1,463 833 902 9,430 5.73%
8 5314 FUSELAGE MAIN, KEEL 106 92 103 87 100 110 97 93 98 154 1,040 0.63%
9 5315 FUSELAGE MAIN, FLOOR BEAM 1,702 1,301 1,123 1,015 1,331 1,303 1,414 1,516 1,683 1,563 13,951 8.47%
10 5320 FUSELAGE MISCELLANEOUS STRUCTURE 6,400 4,127 3,584 2,952 3,401 3,303 3,438 3,833 4,508 5,798 41,344 25.11%
11 5321 FUSELAGE FLOOR PANEL 706 353 313 469 547 387 501 338 794 1,196 5,604 3.40%
12 5322 FUSELAGE INTERNAL MOUNT STRUCTURE 13 18 10 10 32 493 502 486 565 698 2,827 1.72%
13 5323 FUSELAGE INTERNAL STAIRS 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 6 0.00%
14 5324 FUSELAGE FIXED PARTITIONS 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 0.00%
15 5330 FUSELAGE MAIN, PLATE/SKIN 2,609 2,385 2,121 1,938 2,243 2,610 3,109 2,960 2,833 3,085 25,893 15.72%
16 5340 FUSELAGE MAIN, ATTACH FITTINGS 240 83 85 218 500 1,170 1,315 1,942 1,830 1,668 9,051 5.50%
17 5341 FUSELAGE, WING ATTACH FITTINGS 3 6 6 5 2 3 5 3 5 1 39 0.02%
18 5342 FUSELAGE, STABILIZER ATTACH FITTINGS 19 26 19 12 10 5 6 8 5 11 121 0.07%
19 5343 LANDING GEAR ATTACH FITTINGS 28 32 46 24 54 60 39 85 61 34 463 0.28%
20 5344 FUSELAGE DOOR HINGES 3 7 8 2 1 30 40 24 44 36 195 0.12%
21 5345 FUSELAGE EQUIPMENT ATTACH FITTINGS 9 15 18 11 9 6 8 5 3 24 108 0.07%
22 5346 POWERPLANT ATTACH FITTINGS 0 77 18 13 18 42 29 29 14 5 245 0.15%
23 5347 SEAT/CARGO ATTACH FITTINGS 2,359 1,479 1,280 865 1,221 1,569 2,285 1,779 1,717 1,469 16,023 9.73%
24 5350 AERODYNAMIC FAIRINGS 105 48 33 106 61 39 58 74 80 84 688 0.42%
25 5397 FUSELAGE WIRING 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 1 0 1 12 0.01%
GRAND TOTAL 19,719 16,190 13,049 10,765 13,047 14,831 17,629 19,033 19,397 21,010 164,670 100.00%
NO CODE PART CONDITION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 29 CHAFED              227 122 217 187 103 139 181 163 123 128 1,590 0.97%
2 39 CORRODED            7,884 6,598 5,760 4,412 5,631 6,191 7,746 7,158 6,907 8,286 66,573 40.49%
3 41 CRACKED             7,847 6,666 4,874 4,148 4,934 5,716 6,435 8,610 8,538 8,537 66,305 40.32%
4 47 DAMAGED             950 856 628 502 727 760 936 1,123 1,735 1,931 10,148 6.17%
5 53 DELAMINATED         23 84 34 107 132 133 149 61 97 59 879 0.53%
6 54 DENTED              632 698 587 529 673 587 772 732 766 716 6,692 4.07%
7 105 GOUGED              452 332 359 232 209 251 303 259 342 338 3,077 1.87%
8 138 MISDRILLED          595 86 14 1 50 195 118 5 0 0 1,064 0.65%
9 145 MISREPAIRED         32 16 4 11 13 23 103 264 222 333 1,021 0.62%
10 271 WORN                310 156 111 119 124 123 111 128 171 116 1,469 0.89%
11 OTHERS 5,619 3.42%
164,437 100.00%TOTAL
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Figure 3—8 Percentage Distribution of Part Condition for the Fuselage Miscellaneous Structures 
(JASC Code 5320) 
  The results for the fuselage show significantly different patterns of SDR to those of the 
landing gear and doors. The fuselage structure does not have any mechanical components so 
does not suffer from the difficulties of “malfunctioned” or “out of adjustment”. For this 
component, the fatigue related problems of cracking and corrosion are the major problems for 
design consideration. 
3.4.2.4 Stage of Operations 
In this section, the objective of the analysis was to answer the question When do most 
of the difficulties happen and/or are discovered? To answer this question, the collected data set 
from the 1
st
 analysis of the investigation was used. The analysis was based on a 424,834 data 
set collected. There are 17 stages of operations, highlighted as depicted in Table 3-7. The 
results show that an average of 72.68% of part conditions are discovered during inspection and 
maintenance activities, which demonstrates that current maintenance practices are generally 
effective in identifying faults. 
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Table 3-7 SDR Stage of operations analysis 
 
During the last 10 years, the trend of service difficulties were decreasing, starting in 
2001; however, the trend of service difficulties has since increased, starting from 2003, as 
shown in Figure 3—9. This is possibly happening due to the age of the aircraft. However, further 
analyses could be performed to investigate the sources of SDR that occur during flight, and 
whether maintainability prediction could be used to reduce these problems in the future. 
 
Figure 3—9 The trend of the top five stages of operations 
NO CODE STAGE OF OPERATIONS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 AA AIR AMBULANCE 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 11 19 35 0.008%
2 AB AEROBATIC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000%
3 AG AGRICULTURE 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.001%
4 AP APPROACH 661 700 644 594 666 768 775 901 870 763 7,342 1.728%
5 CL CLIMB 3,071 2,895 2,776 2,458 2,572 2,671 2,328 2,705 2,618 2,418 26,512 6.241%
6 CR CRUISE 2,131 2,435 2,239 2,000 1,967 1,919 2,117 2,384 2,093 2,021 21,306 5.015%
7 DE DESCENT 374 389 414 375 384 422 441 456 414 455 4,124 0.971%
8 EX EXTERNAL LOAD 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0.001%
9 FF FIRE FIGHTING 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.001%
10 HO HOVERING 6 4 17 4 8 11 2 3 1 3 59 0.014%
11 IN INSP/MAINT 33,302 29,547 26,253 21,883 25,183 25,428 32,306 36,377 38,092 40,407 308,778 72.682%
12 LD LANDING 281 273 272 261 265 319 349 404 302 295 3,021 0.711%
13 MS MAPPING/SURVEY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.000%
14 NR NOT REPORTED 959 1,188 1,146 5,660 3,156 3,130 4,383 2,930 2,630 1,721 26,903 6.333%
15 TO TAKEOFF 1,150 1,172 1,189 894 1,005 861 1,091 896 644 606 9,508 2.238%
16 TX TAXI/GRND HDL 1,067 1,255 1,303 1,321 1,343 1,447 1,692 1,804 1,139 1,445 13,816 3.252%
17 UK UNKNOWN 87 258 334 243 74 81 229 296 505 1,311 3,418 0.805%
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3.4.3 The evaluation of Service Difficulties Reports (SDR) 
SDR analyses were divided into two phases: Global SDR analysis and Detailed SDR 
analyses. The former includes all analyses of all Joint Aicraft Component and System (JACS) 
codes, the latter detailed being the analyses for specific and selected JASC codes related to this 
research interest. 
The following process of SDR is to identify a methodology to make use of the analysed 
SDR. The focus is to answer the question How should the analysed numbers be used? In this 
research, the author proposes to convert the SDR analyses into a rate by using the following 
formula. 
1
			
	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1 
=	2			1
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Equation 3-1 
 
 
 
The Service Difficulties Rate is the term proposed and used by author and abbreviated 
to SR. Equation 3-1 is used as the main formula to be used for the next process to investigate 
the potential correlation between Failure Rate (λ) and Service Difficulties Rate (SR). The 
outcome from this research will be able to answer one of the research questions: How can a 
method to incorporate feedback for a maintainability prediction in the early design process be 
developed, structured, and efficiently used by the designer? Both the values of failure rate and 
number of flight flown hours per year have been collected from reliable sources of information 
known as Non Electronic Product Data (NPRD) 
152
, and from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) 
153
. This is to ensure consistencies within the data sets. The FAA numbers of flight flown 
hours per year are depicted in Appendix C. 
3.4.4 Investigation of correlation between Failure Rate (λ) and Service Difficulties 
Rate (SR) 
All the SDR data sets have been presented in a previous chapter 3. Most of the collected 
data sets have been converted into a Service Difficulties Rate (SR) by using Equation 3-1. For the 
purpose of testing, three case studies have been used: Aircraft Fuel System (JASC 28), Aircraft 
Communications (JASC 23), and Aircraft Landing Gear (JASC 32) because of availability. 
The detail SDR Data set for each case study is shown in Appendix D for Aircraft fuel 
system, Appendix E for Aircraft communications, and Appendix F for Aircraft Landing gear. 
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The trendline is used to graphically display trends in data and to analyse problems of 
prediction. As an example, a trendline is shown in Figure 3—10 for Aircraft Fuel Systems, Figure 
3—12 for Aircraft Communication Systems and Figure 3—14 for Aircraft Landing Gear. It can be 
seen that there is a large amount of scatter in the results. The trendline accuracy is measured 
by a parameter known as the R-squared value, abbreviated to R
2
. The value of R
2
 is measured 
between 0 and 1. The trendline is considerably accurate and reliable when the R
2
 value is nearly 
equal or equal to 1. The R
2
 value also can be calculated by using the following formula: 
Y = m X + b 
Where y = The Service Difficulty Rate; m = slope; X = The Failure Rate (λ); and b = intercept 
value. 
3.5 Testing Correlation between Service Difficulties Rate and Failure Rate 
In this section three case studies will be presented to investigate the correlation 
between Service Difficulties Rate (SR) and Failure Rate (λ) 
3.5.1 Case Study 1 – Aircraft Fuel System 
The first case study is aircraft fuel systems. Table 3-8 shows the list of aircraft fuel 
system components, list of failure rates and predicted service difficulty rates. The predicted 
service difficulty rate was abbreviated as SR and calculated using Equation 3-1. 
Table 3-8 List of Failure Rate versus Service Difficulties Rate - Aircraft Fuel System 
 
No Aircraft Components FR SR
1 Hand Pump 1.0000E-06 1.5802E-05
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) 2.0000E-05 5.4115E-07
3 Pressure Valve (PV) 2.8000E-05 5.4115E-08
4 Reservoir 2.8000E-05 5.4115E-08
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) 1.3000E-07 8.9831E-06
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) 2.7000E-05 1.5802E-05
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) 4.8000E-05 8.9831E-06
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) 2.7000E-05 1.5802E-05
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) 8.2000E-06 8.9831E-06
10 Pipe 2.7000E-05 2.7057E-07
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) 1.4000E-06 5.4115E-08
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) 7.1100E-05 5.4115E-08
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) 7.1100E-05 5.4115E-08
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) 6.0500E-04 5.4115E-08
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) 6.0500E-04 5.4115E-08
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) 1.1200E-06 5.4115E-08
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) 3.1300E-04 5.4115E-08
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) 3.1300E-04 5.4115E-08
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) 3.1300E-04 6.1150E-06
20 Hose 1.5000E-05 1.1364E-06
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) 1.1000E-05 8.9831E-06
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) 1.0700E-04 8.9831E-06
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) 2.7000E-05 4.8703E-07
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Figure 3—10 Failure Rate versus Service Difficulty Rate for Aircraft Fuel Systems (JASC 28) 
Figure 3—11 shows the line patterns between failure rate and service difficulties rate. 
The line patterns comparison between both lines is not the same and therefore the author 
concluded there is no correlation between failure and service difficulties rates for aircraft fuel 
systems (JASC 28) and consistence results, as shown in Figure 3—10. 
 
Figure 3—11 Comparison Failure and Service Difficulty Rates for Aircraft Fuel Systems 
y = -9.7436x + 0.0002
R² = 0.0948
0.0000E+00
1.0000E-04
2.0000E-04
3.0000E-04
4.0000E-04
5.0000E-04
6.0000E-04
7.0000E-04
0.0000E+00 2.0000E-06 4.0000E-06 6.0000E-06 8.0000E-06 1.0000E-05 1.2000E-05 1.4000E-05 1.6000E-05 1.8000E-05
Se
rv
ic
e
 D
if
fi
cu
lt
y
 R
at
e
s 
(p
e
r 
m
ill
io
n
s 
a
ir
cc
a
ft
 h
o
u
rs
 f
lo
w
n
)
Failure Rate (per millions)
Correlation between Failure and Service Difficulty Rates for Aircraft Fuel Systems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
FR 1.00 2.00 2.80 2.80 1.30 2.70 4.80 2.70 8.20 2.70 1.40 7.11 7.11 6.05 6.05 1.12 3.13 3.13 3.13 1.50 1.10 1.07 2.70
SR 1.58 5.41 5.41 5.41 8.98 1.58 8.98 1.58 8.98 2.70 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 5.41 6.11 1.13 8.98 8.98 4.87
1.00E-08
1.00E-07
1.00E-06
1.00E-05
1.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.00E-02
1.00E-01
1.00E+00
R
a
te
 (
p
e
r 
m
il
li
o
n
s 
h
o
u
rs
)
Comparison between Failure and Service Difficulty rates for Aicraft Fuel Systems
57 
 
3.5.2 Case Study 2 – Aircraft Communications 
Table 3-9 shows the second case study which is for the aircraft communication system 
154
 (JASC 23). The predicted service difficulty rate was abbreviated as SR and calculated using 
Equation 3-1. 
Table 3-9 List of Failure Rate versus Service Difficulties Rate - Aircraft Communications (JASC 23) 
 
 
Figure 3—12 Failure Rate versus Service Difficulty Rate for Aircraft Communications (JASC 23) 
Failure Difficulties
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 1.66805E-04 1.89402E-06
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 1.66805E-04 1.89402E-06
3 Headset 1 1.56400E-04 7.03495E-07
4 Headset 2 1.56400E-04 7.03495E-07
5 Handheld Microphone 1 3.55700E-04 1.78579E-06
6 Handheld Microphone 2 3.55700E-04 1.78579E-06
7 Speaker 1 4.74600E-05 5.95265E-07
8 Speaker 2 4.74600E-05 5.95265E-07
9 VHF 1 Antenna 1.07580E-05 2.48929E-06
10 VHF 1 Transceiver 6.00000E-05 1.17429E-05
11 VHF 1 Control Panel 1.06596E-04 3.03044E-06
12 VHF 2 Antenna 1.07580E-05 2.48929E-06
13 VHF 2 Transceiver 6.00000E-05 1.17429E-05
14 VHF 2 Control Panel 1.06596E-04 3.03044E-06
15 HF Antenna 3.31000E-05 2.48929E-06
16 HF Lightning Arrestor 2.38140E-05 5.41150E-08
17 HF Antenna Coupler 9.60890E-05 3.13867E-06
18 HF Transceiver 5.83380E-05 1.17429E-05
19 HF Control  Panel 1.17750E-05 3.03044E-06
20 Selcal Decoder 2.46745E-05 3.24690E-07
21 Selcal Control Panel 7.23840E-05 3.03044E-06
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 1.39992E-04 1.40699E-06
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 1.39992E-04 1.40699E-06
24 PA Speaker 4.53200E-05 5.95265E-07
25 PA Speaker 4.53200E-05 5.95265E-07
26 PA Speaker 4.53200E-05 5.95265E-07
27 PA Speaker 4.53200E-05 5.95265E-07
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control  Panel 2.60000E-05 5.41150E-08
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder 1.50000E-04 5.41150E-08
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Figure 3—13 shows the line pattern between failure rate and service difficulties rate for 
aircraft communication systems. Although the magnitude is significantly different, there is 
some similarity in the line pattern. The results also show significant error between the patterns 
and therefore there is no correlation between failure and service difficulties rates for aircraft 
communications system (JASC 23) and consistence results as shown in Figure 3—12. 
 
Figure 3—13 Comparison Failure Rate (FR) and Service Difficulty Rate (SR) for Aircraft 
Communications  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13    14    15    16    17    18    19    20    21    22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    
FR 1.66 1.66 1.56 1.56 3.55 3.55 4.74 4.74 1.07 6.00 1.06 1.07 6.00 1.06 3.31 2.38 9.60 5.83 1.17 2.46 7.23 1.39 1.39 4.53 4.53 4.53 4.53 2.60 1.50
SR 1.91 1.91 7.10 7.10 1.80 1.80 6.01 6.01 2.51 1.18 3.06 2.51 1.18 3.06 2.51 5.46 3.16 1.18 3.06 3.27 3.06 1.42 1.42 6.01 6.01 6.01 6.01 5.46 5.46
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3.5.3 Case Study 3 – Landing Gear 
The third case study was the aircraft landing gear (JASC 32), as shown in Table 3-10. The 
predicted service difficulty rate was abbreviated as SR and calculated using Equation 3-1. 
Table 3-10 List of Failure Rates and Service Difficulties Rates - Aircraft Landing Gear (JASC 32) 
 
 
Figure 3—14 Failure Rate versus Service Difficulty Rate for Aircraft Landing Gear (JASC 32) 
No AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS FR SR
1 ACTUATOR                1.3684E-04 4.9623E-05
2 BRAKE                   6.3609E-04 2.6192E-05
3 BRAKE ASSY              2.1000E-06 2.2566E-05
4 CONNECTOR               4.1056E-05 2.1375E-05
5 CONTROL UNIT            2.3552E-04 1.6343E-05
6 PROXIMITY SENSOR        6.7237E-04 2.8627E-05
7 PROXIMITY SWITCH        1.1625E-04 2.5759E-05
8 SELECTOR VALVE          9.5238E-05 2.3756E-05
9 SENSOR                  6.9634E-06 2.1105E-05
10 STRUT                   6.6270E-06 2.9222E-05
11 SWITCH                  1.1625E-04 3.1116E-05
12 TIRE                    1.4960E-05 3.4796E-05
13 UPLOCK SWITCH           6.7017E-05 1.3475E-05
14 V-BELT                  1.6401E-04 1.6451E-05
15 WARNING LIGHT           3.2492E-05 2.2404E-05
16 WARNING SYSTEM          2.0442E-05 1.6018E-05
17 WHEEL                   3.2361E-06 1.9048E-05
18 WIRE                    5.0900E-07 1.5964E-05
19 WIRE HARNESS            2.2727E-06 1.4070E-05
y = 0.0086x + 2E-05
R² = 0.0382
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Figure 3—15 shows the line pattern between failure rate and service difficulties rate for 
Aircraft Landing Gear (JASC 32). The line patterns for service difficulties rate (SR) shows 
consistency patterns compared to Failure Rate (λ) as well as inconsistent errors for all 
components. This outcome shows consistent result, as shown in Figure 3—14 and therefore no 
correlation between failure and service difficulties rates for aircraft landing gear (JASC 32). 
 
Figure 3—15 Comparison Failure and Service Difficulty Rates for Aircraft Landing Gear 
Overall, based on the testing by using three different case studies in this section, the 
author has concluded that the analysed SDR is not able to be used as an alternative to the 
failure rate. This is because, as shown in the results above, there is no correlation between 
failure and service difficulty rates. One of the main issues identified by the author is that some 
of the aircraft components and/or systems have no reported service difficulties for the whole 
ten years period under review. However, there are some components and/or systems that have 
less than ten service difficulties reports. Therefore, these issues make it difficult for this 
research to identify potential improvement. 
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3.6 Summary 
Although, there are no correlations from all case studies, do not show any correlation 
between Service Difficulties Rate and Failure Rate, however, the SDR analysis does provide 
important feedback information has abilities to contribute an important role in design activities. 
The SDR can be utilised effectively not only for design modification but also for future design 
improvement by providing and presenting to the designers the simplification and/or summary 
reports affected the service difficulties as shown in Figure 3—6, Figure 3—7, and Figure 3—8. 
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4 Maintainability Allocation Methodology 
Maintainability Allocation is a process to identify the allowable maximum task time for 
each individual component. Consequently, this provides clear pictures to the designers to 
design and identify potential design improvement within allowable maintenance allocation 
time limits. 
The rationale of the development of a maintainability allocation method led to the 
expansion of an existing maintainability allocation methodology through inserting several new 
modules and new score values to allocate task times specifically for mechanical aircraft 
components. The existing maintainability allocation was mostly focused on electrical and 
electronic systems and components. The maintainability allocation offers the following 
functions: 
1. Allows the maximum allowable task times to be predicted; and 
2. Acts as a task time bench mark (if there is no actual time available). 
4.1 Objectives 
• to extend an existing maintainability allocation methodology for use with mechanical 
components; and  
• to calculate the maximum allocation time for maintenance tasks for each individual 
aircraft component for use early in design process. This will provide a target 
maintenance time for each individual component which the designer can use when 
designing components. 
4.2 Chipchak’s method 
Chipchak’s 
14
 methods consists of three main weighting factors namely Generic Modules 
Types (Kj1), Fault Isolation Techniques (Kj2), and Differences in M Design Characteristic (Kj3). M 
is referring to modules. In Table 4-1 depicts the existing list of modules and score values. In 
total there 13 modules but only three modules, namely numbers 11, 12 & 13, are closely 
related to mechanical aircraft components. Based on this scenario and because the nature of 
this research is focused on mechanical aircraft components, the author decided to extend the 
method for other applications to mechanical components 
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Towards the end of the section, the proposed modules and score values will be used to 
predict maintainability allocation for mechanical components. The rationale is to identify the 
maximum maintenance task time for each individual component while the maintainability 
prediction is carried out. Others modules includes Fault Isolation Techniques or Kj2 which 
presented in Table 4-2 and Differences in M Design Characteristic or Kj3 which presented in 
Table 4-3. 
Table 4-1 Existing list of Modules and Score values in Chipchak’s method 
14
 
 
Table 4-2 Weight Factor Kj2 by Fault Isolation Techniques
14
 
Fault Isolation Technique Kj2 Considerations 
Automatic 0 
computer or bit circuitry providing automatic 
fault isolation to replaceable item 
Semiautomatic 2 
bit circuitry controlled manually (includes test 
point selector switch/meter combination) 
Manual 4 
manually making measurements using portable 
test equipment at circuit test points 
Table 4-3 Weight Factor Kj3 by M Design Characteristic14 
M Design Characteristic Kj3 Characteristic 
Accessibility Handling 
Accessibility/Handling    
Simple 0 affords direct access, rack mounted one-man lift and carry 
Difficult 2 involves removal of more than one 
cover 
two-man lift, awkward carry 
Very Difficult 4 requires considerable disassembly 
to reach 
hoist lift, needs dolly for 
movement subject item 
EXISTING MODULE AND SCORE
No Module Score
1 Lights 1
2 Digital 1
3 Low-level analogue 1.5
4 High-level analogue 1.5
5 Digital Computers 2
6 Power Supplies 2
7 Electromechanical equipment 3
8 High-power/high-frequency components 4
9 Interconnections 4
10 Air conditioners 4
11 Liquid coolant systems 4
12 Mechanical Structures 6
13 Rotating mechanism/engines 10
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4.3 Proposed improvement 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The prediction of maintenance time in this research consists of two methods: 1) Using the 
failure rate (λ), and 2) using the service difficulties rate (SR). The purpose of doing this is to 
compare the results as well as to answer the research question: How can a method to 
incorporate feedback for maintainability prediction in the early design process be developed 
and efficiently used by the designer? The calculation of allocated maintenance tasks also 
includes two other elements: 1) Name of Systems/Subsystems and 2) Maintainability 
prediction
13
 procedure III. The following Equation 4-1 and Equation 4-2 are used to calculate 
the allocation maintenance time. The detailed sequential formula is presented in Appendix G. 
5 = 	∑ "5"
6789
Σ	  Equation 4-1 
ksystem = Weighting factor for the system 
kj = Individual Weighting factor  
λ = Failure Rate 
 
;7 =	  5 57 Equation 4-2 
Rpj = Allocated Active Repair Time 
MTTR = Mean Time To Repair 
4.3.2 Proposed Maintainability Allocation improvement process 
The first step in this analysis was to try to find a correlation between allocation 
maintainability score values used by Chipchak 
14
 and other measures. Once this relationship had 
been established, the score values could be calculated for new module types and added to the 
list of allocation methods. 
The development of methodology begins with identifying a methodology for assigning 
scores values by using the existing list, as shown in Table 4-4. The first approach was to use the 
failure rate and the results are shown in Figure 4—1. The values of the failure rate are collected 
by using an NPRD data set 
155
. Results show a trend of failure rates that are not consistent with 
the score values. 
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Table 4-4 Identifying score value methodology – Approach 1 
 
 
Figure 4—1 The trend of failure rates 
155
 
A second attempt made was using the task time approach. All the task time values were 
predicted by using MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure III. The author performed maintenance task time 
estimation for the removal and reassembly of each component by using the MIL-HDBK-472, 
Procedure III maintainability prediction method. The outcomes of the estimation are shown in 
Table 4-5. The outcomes have shown some good indications compared to the first approach. By 
looking at the minutes or hour values as shown in Figure 4—2, the results show consistent 
values compared to the existing score values. As the task times increased, the score values also 
increased. 
No Module
14
Score
14 λ (per millions) 154
1 Lights 1 7.2623E-05
2 Digital 1 2.0440E-05
3 Low-level analogue 1.5 6.0000E-06
4 High-level analogue 1.5 6.0000E-06
5 Digital Computers 2 1.5525E-05
6 Power Supplies 2 1.5525E-05
7 Electromechanical equipment 3 3.0000E-06
8 High-power/high-frequency components 4 2.7364E-05
9 Interconnections 4 5.2304E-05
10 Air conditioners 4 5.0820E-04
11 Liquid coolant systems 4 6.5725E-04
12 Mechanical Structures 6 1.6000E-08
13 Rotating mechanism/engines 10 1.7543E-04
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Table 4-5 Identifying score values methodology – Approach 2 
 
 
Figure 4—2 Identifying score value methodology – Approach 2 
Once the general correlation had been established the following trendlines were 
performed to identify the most appropriate formula to allow score values to be predicted from 
any given task time. To do this, the author proposed four different formulae and identified the 
formulae which have the closest R
2
 values. As a result, Figure 4—3 and Table 4-6 show a 
summary of the evaluations. 
No Module 
14 Minutes Hour Score 
14
1 Lights 8.86 0.15 1
2 Digital 31.89 0.53 1
3 Low-level analogue 31.89 0.53 1.5
4 High-level analogue 31.89 0.53 1.5
5 Digital Computers 22.66 0.38 2
6 Power Supplies 20.18 0.34 2
7 Electromechanical equipment 64.45 1.07 3
8 High-power/high-frequency components 48.64 0.81 4
9 Interconnections 40.61 0.68 4
10 Air conditioners 60.41 1.01 4
11 Liquid coolant systems 67.82 1.13 4
12 Mechanical Structures 79.20 1.32 6
13 Rotating mechanism/engines 368.84 6.15 10
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Figure 4—3 Four types for trendlines and formula 
Table 4-6 Summary of four types of trendlines and formula 
 
From this initial analysis it can be seen that the Log and Linear trendlines provide the 
best R
2
 values. The selection is based on the closest R
2
 value to 1. The results are quite similar 
so both Log and Linear have been tested. The following process was to apply the selected 
formula and perform testing and validation. This is to ensure the selected formulae are proven 
as well as applicable for this research. The testing and validation were performed by using three 
main case studies: 1) Aircraft Fuel System (JASC 28), 2) Aircraft Communications System (JASC 
23), and 3) Aircraft Landing Gear (JASC 32). The testing and validation was performed by using 
predicted score values, as shown in Table 4-7. The “value” column shows the predicted values 
means while the “Round” column shows the round from the decimal. In this technique the 
author decided to use only the 0.5 decimals. Therefore if the predicted value was 2.8 the 
“round” column result will be 3.0. 
y = 2.5681ln(x) + 4.2099
R² = 0.8171
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Series1 Prediction Expon. (Series1)
Trendline Formula R
2
Log y = 2.5681ln(x) + 4.2099 0.8171
Linear y = 1.4364x + 1.769 0.7959
Power y = 3.3696x
0.6838 0.7418
Exponential y = 1.895e
0.3163x 0.4942
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Table 4-7 Three types of formula used for testing and validation 
 
4.4 Other elements in maintainability allocation methodology 
The following equations are used to predict the maintainability allocation 
11
. 
3		 = 	 2						 Equation 4-3 
 		.4	3	 .3 = 	1 Equation 4-4 
#ℎ	-	- = 	  .3 .3 +  Equation 4-5 
 				  = 	 .3	1 − --  Equation 4-6 
In this research, for some of the elements such as MTBF and Inherent Availability (Ai), 
the author will only assume the values. This is because the author is only interested in and 
focusing on maintainability prediction and at the same time identifying the appropriate value 
for MTTR which will be used in maintainability allocation prediction. 
For the purpose of illustration, it is assumed that the landing gear systems must be 
designed to meet an inherent availability (Ai) requirement of 0.9998, an MTBF of 500 hours. 
Thus, the MTTR requirement is 0.1 hour as shown in calculation below. 
  =	500	1 − 0.99980.9998 = 0.1 
λ 154
Value Round Value Round
1 Lights 72.6227 8.9 0.15 1.0 -0.7 -1.0 2.0 2.0
2 Digital 20.4399 31.9 0.53 1.0 2.6 3.0 2.5 3.0
3 Low-level analogue 6.0000 31.9 0.53 1.5 2.6 3.0 2.5 3.0
4 High-level analogue 6.0000 31.9 0.53 1.5 2.6 3.0 2.5 3.0
5 Communication 305.9465 23.3 0.39 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.0
6 Digital Computers 15.5250 22.7 0.38 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.0
7 Power Supplies 15.5250 20.2 0.34 2.0 1.4 1.0 2.3 2.0
8 Electromechanical equipment 71.1744 64.4 1.07 3.0 4.4 4.0 3.3 3.0
9 High-power/high-frequency components 27.3640 48.6 0.81 4.0 3.7 4.0 2.9 3.0
10 Interconnections 52.3040 40.6 0.68 4.0 3.2 3.0 2.7 3.0
11 Air conditioners 508.1964 60.4 1.01 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.2 3.0
12 Liquid coolant systems 657.2513 67.8 1.13 4.0 4.5 5.0 3.4 3.0
13 Mechanical Structures 0.0160 79.2 1.32 6.0 4.9 5.0 3.7 4.0
14 Mechanical Structures with Mechanism (i.e.: LG, Stabilisers, Wings) 1.0000 217.5 3.63 8.0 7.5 8.0 7.0 7.0
15 Rotating mechanism/engines 175.4275 368.8 6.15 10.0 8.9 9.0 10.6 11.0
(per millions)
Generic ModuleNo
TASKS TIME
LOG FORMULA
SCORE
LINEAR FORMULA
EXISTINGHOURMINUTE
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4.5 Testing and Case Studies 
Testing by using case studies has been carried out. Table 4-8 shows the comparison 
between two selected formulas (i.e.: LOG and LINEAR). In the existing column, the calculation 
was performed by using existing score value developed by Chipchak
14
. In LOG and LINEAR 
columns the calculation were performed by using equation as shown in Table 4-6. Based on the 
results as illustrated in Figure 4—4 show that the LOG formula is the most suitable formula. This 
is because the average values indicate the lowest compare value calculated by using LINEAR 
formula. 
Table 4-8 Validation results summary for Aircraft Communication Systems 
 
Mean	Absolute	Error	MAE = 1n	J|	L − L| = 	
1
nJ|eM|
N
M89
N
M89
 
Absolute Error (ei) = |fi – yi| where: fi = the prediction value and yi = the true value 
 
Existing 
154 x - mean (x - mean)
2 LOG x - mean (x - mean)
2 LINEAR x - mean (x - mean)
2 LOG LINEAR
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 High-level analogue 0.72 -0.29 0.09 1.32 0.34 0.12 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.60 0.75
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 High-level analogue 0.84 -0.17 0.03 1.10 0.12 0.01 1.22 0.30 0.09 0.26 0.38
3 Headset 1 Communication 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.02
4 Headset 2 Communication 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.02
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Communication 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.02
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Communication 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.02
7 Speaker 1 Communication 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.98 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.02
8 Speaker 2 Communication 1.44 0.43 0.18 1.32 0.34 0.12 1.22 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.22
9 VHF 1 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
10 VHF 1 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
11 VHF 1 Control Panel Digital Computer 0.48 -0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.54 0.29 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.04 0.01
12 VHF 2 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
13 VHF 2 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
14 VHF 2 Control Panel Digital Computer 0.48 -0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.54 0.29 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.04 0.01
15 HF Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Lights 0.24 -0.78 0.60 0.22 -0.76 0.58 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.02 0.25
17 HF Antenna Coupler High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
18 HF Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
19 HF Control Panel Digital Computer 0.48 -0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.54 0.29 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.04 0.01
20 Selcal Decoder High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 -0.05 0.00 0.88 -0.10 0.01 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.08 0.23
21 Selcal Control Panel Digital Computer 0.48 -0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.54 0.29 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.04 0.01
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 0.91 0.83 1.76 0.78 0.61 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.46
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 0.91 0.83 1.76 0.78 0.61 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.46
24 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 0.91 0.83 1.76 0.78 0.61 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.46
25 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 0.91 0.83 1.76 0.78 0.61 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.46
26 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 0.91 0.83 1.76 0.78 0.61 1.47 0.54 0.29 0.16 0.46
27 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.44 0.43 0.18 1.32 0.34 0.12 1.22 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.22
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Digital Computer 0.48 -0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.54 0.29 0.49 -0.44 0.19 0.04 0.01
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Digital 0.24 -0.78 0.60 0.66 -0.32 0.10 0.73 -0.19 0.04 0.42 0.49
SUM (Σ) 29.48 7.28 28.44 5.70 26.95 3.53 3.60 6.54
MEAN  = 1.02 0.98 0.93 0.12 0.23
Standard Deviation (s) in hour = √Σ  (x - mean)2 / n-1 0.51 0.45 0.35
Variance (s
2
) = 0.26 0.20 0.13Σ  (x - mean)2 / n-1
Absolute Error (ei)
No Components 
154 Generic Module Types
Allocation Value (Hour)
MEAN Absolute Error =
n
Xi
n
i
∑
=1
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The existing data has shown that MEAN is 1.02 hours whereas with LOG application the 
MEAN is 0.98 hours and with LINEAR application the MEAN is 0.93 hours. Therefore, the LOG 
formula seems better with 12% error (0.12/0.98) than the LINEAR formula with 25% error 
(0.23/0.93). Looking at the data in general the LOG formula is better than the LINEAR formula 
since the MEAN and Standard Deviation (s) values for the LOG formula are both closer to the 
EXISTING value than the values for the LINEAR formula.  Also, the MEAN absolute error for the 
LOG formula is considerable smaller than for the LINEAR, also showing that this is a better fit. 
 
Figure 4—4 Comparison between all validation results for maintainability allocation 
Validation of the findings is shown in the following chapter of this thesis. The detail of 
the testing and validation is also attached to this thesis and is depicted in the following 
appendices. 
Appendix Title Name 
G Testing and Validation of four selected trendlines 
H.1 Testing results summary 
I.1 Testing Case Study 1 Aircraft Fuel System 
I.2 Testing Case Study 2 Aircraft Communications 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
S
co
re
Components
Comparison between three validation scores values for Communication Systems
Existing Logarithmic Formula LINEAR Formula
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As shown in Table 4-9, the errors are very small and therefore the selected formula 
works very well in allocating the correct score values to the new modules proposed. The 
percentage errors are calculated by Number of Acceptable errors divided by Number of 
Components. If the errors between predicted values and existing errors are between -0.5 and 
0.5 (i.e. -0.5 ≤ Absolute Errors ≤ 0.5) they are considered to be acceptable. The acceptable 
values are equal to the Number of Acceptable errors. 
This formula can now be used to add new modules as needed, as long as the 
maintenance task time is known. For this exercise the task time has been estimated using a 
maintainability prediction method; however, to be more accurate, the task time should come 
from the historical data or records. 
Table 4-9 Summary of testing and validation results 
Case 
Study 
JASC Title 
No of 
Components 
% ABSOLUTE ERROR 
LOG LINEAR LOG LINEAR 
1 28 Fuel 23 83.7% 91.3% 0.40 0.20 
2 23 Communications 29 96.6% 96.6% 0.12 0.23 
 
Finally, Table 4-10 shows both the existing and new list of modules and score values. 
These modules and values from the new list will be used in this research activity to predict the 
maintainability allocation prediction as well as to measure the effectiveness of maintainability 
prediction. The list is firstly arranged with the lowest score values up to the highest values. If 
there is more than one module with the same score values, then the list is arranged in 
alphabetical order. 
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Table 4-10 Comparison of existing and new lists of maintainability allocation 
 
4.6 Summary 
The main contribution from this exercise is the LINEAR formula (y = 1.4364x + 1.769) can be 
used to calculate any other potential modules. In this research, author has proved that the 
mentioned formula has been used to calculate potential score value for new module. In the 
future more modules can be added and therefore offer accuracy in determining the allowable 
maximum task time for specific components.  
EXISTING MODULE AND SCORE
No Module Score
1 Lights 1
2 Digital 1
3 Low-level analogue 1.5
4 High-level analogue 1.5
5 Digital Computers 2
6 Power Supplies 2
7 Electromechanical equipment 3
8 High-power/high-frequency components 4
9 Interconnections 4
10 Air conditioners 4
11 Liquid coolant systems 4
12 Mechanical Structures 6
13 Rotating mechanism/engines 10
NEW MODULE AND SCORE
No Module Score
1 Lights 1
2 Digital 1
3 Low-level analogue 1.5
4 High-level analogue 1.5
5 Communications 2
6 Digital Computers 2
7 Power Supplies (Electrical/Electronic) 2
8 Actuator 3
9 Electromechanical equipment 3
10 Interconnections (Mechanical) - Pipe, Valve 3
11 Pump 3.5
12 Air conditioners 4
13 High-power/high-frequency components 4
14 Interconnections (Electrical) 4
15 Liquid coolant systems 4
16 Mechanical Structures 6
17
Mechanical Structures with Mechanism (i.e.: Landing 
Gear & Flight Control Surfaces)
8
18 Rotating mechanism/engines 10
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5 Maintainability Prediction Methodology 
The maintainability prediction methodology described in this section was performed in 
accordance with the steps described by Lipa 
82
, as shown below. Lipa described in detail the two 
types of maintainability prediction incorporated in MIL—HDBK-472 which are detail procedure 
and early procedure. Both of these procedures allow the designer to improve the design if the 
maintainability requirements are not met. 
1. Define the prediction requirements;  
a. This includes defining the maintainability parameters to be evaluated. 
b. This involve defines the what, and when of maintenance. 
2. Collect the prediction parameter data; 
a. All the necessaries data set such as failure rate are identified from reliable sources 
155
 and computed; 
3. Select model; 
a. In this work procedure III was chosen as a maintainability prediction model based 
on decision making, as described in the previous chapter. 
4. Compute; 
a. Maintainability parameters are computed in this step to find the potential task time 
for each individual component. 
5.1 Objective 
• to propose improvement to the maintainability prediction methodology to improve 
repeatability and accuracy. 
5.2 Maintainability prediction – MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure III 
In this section, each element of MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III will be described. Further, 
in checklist C of Human Factors all improved element will be described in detail. 
5.2.1 Checklist A – Design 
Checklist A contains all the questions that are related to product design. The questions 
are designed to help designers include or exclude the necessary elements such as BITE (Built in 
Test Equipment). The questions are developed to encourage designers to consider the element 
74 
 
of maintainability through design. Collectively, the questions encourage designers to minimise 
additional tasks during maintenance activities. One of the examples is question 12: adjustments 
from checklist A as shown in Table 5-1, the designers have to design the components in such a 
way that no alignment necessary as possible to install the equipment back to operations as a 
solution to reduce the potential maintenance task time. One of the recommended solutions is 
that the components should be designed in one direction only, as shown in Figure 5—1. 
 
Figure 5—1 The recommended orientation for alignment 
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Table 5-1 List of question in Checklist A, choice of answers, and score values 13 
 
Number Scoring Physical Design Factors Scores Value
Access adequate both for visual and manipulative tasks (electrical and mechanical) 4
Access adequate for visual, but no manipulative 2
Access adequate for manipulative, but not visual 2
Access not adequate for visual or manipulative 0
External latches and/or fasteners are captive, need no special tools, and require only a fraction of a turn for release 4
External latches and/or fasteners meet two of the above three criteria 2
External latches and/or fasteners meet one or none of the above three criteria 0
Internal latches and/or fasteners are captive, need no special tools, and require only a fraction of a turn for release 4
Internal latches and/or fasteners meet two of the above three criteria 2
Internal latches and/or fasteners meet one or none of the above three criteria 0
Access adequate both for visual and manipulative tasks (electrical and mechanical) 4
Access adequate for visual, but no manipulative 2
Access adequate for manipulaltive, but not visual 2
Access not adequate for visual or manipulative 0
Internal access to components and parts can be made with no mechanical disassembly 4
Little disassembly required (less than 3 min) 2
Considerable disassembly is required (more than 3 min) 0
Units or parts of plug-in nature 4
Units or parts of plug-in nature and mechanically held 2
Units of solder-in nature 2
Units of solder-in nature and mechanically held 0
Sufficient visual information on the equipment is given within one display area 4
Two display areas must be consulted to obtain sufficient visual information 2
More than two areas must be consulted to obtain sufficient visual information 0
Fault or malfunction information is provided clearly and for rapid action 4
Fault or malfunction information clearly presented but requires operator  interpretation 2
Fault or malfunction information requires no operator interpretation, but is not clearly  presented 2
Fault or malfunction information not clearly presented and requires operator interpretation 0
Task did not require use of test points 4
Test points available for all needed tests 3
Test points available for most needed tests 2
Test points not available for most needed tests 0
All test points are identified with required readings given 4
Some are suitably marked 2
Points are not marked and test data are not given 0
All parts labelled with full identifying information and all identifying information clearly visible 4
All parts labelled with full identifying information , but some information hidden 2
All information visible, but some parts not fully identified 2
Some information hidden and some parts not fully identified 0
No adjustment or realignment is necessary to place equipment back in operation 4
A few adjusments, but no major realignments are required 2
Many adjustments or major realignment must be made 0
Defective part or component can be determined without removal from the circuit 4
Testing requires removal 0
Equipment was automatically kept from operating after malfunction occurred to prevent further damage. (This refers to 
malfunction of such area as bias supplies, keep-alive voltage, etc.)
4
Indicators warned that malfunction has occurred 2
No provisons have been made 0
Task did not require work to be performed in close proximity to hazardous conditions (high voltage, radiation, moving parts and/or 
high temperature parts)
4
Some delay encountered because of precautions taken 2
Considerable time consumed because of hazardous conditions 0
CHECKLIST A - PHYSICAL DESIGN FACTORS
Access (External)
Latches and Fasteners (External)
Latches and Fasteners (Internal)
Access (Internal)
Packaging
1
2
3
4
5
11
Units - Parts (Failed)6
Visual Displays7
Fault and Operation Indicatos (Built-In Test Equipment)8
Safety (Personnel)15
Test Points (Availability)9
Test Points (Identification)10
Labelling
Adjustments12
Testing (In Circuit)13
Protective Devices14
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The first four questions in checklist A focus on accessibility and types of latches and 
fasteners both externally and internally. One of the solutions to make the right decision and 
help identify the potential score value is by choosing the right latches or fasteners. At the same 
time, minimising the used of hand tools such as screwdrivers and wrenches is another solution 
to reduce potential maintenance task time. Task time reduction and design improvement 
includes the element of choosing the right latches or fasteners. 
A new approach proposed in this report is to use a list of latches or fasteners. The 
latches and fasteners are categorised into several groups in accordance with latches and 
fasteners times. The less time required scores the highest value and the more time required 
scores the lowest value. Table 5-2 shows some recommendations for accessibilities and Table 
5-3 shows the recommended types of fasteners. 
Table 5-2 Recommended equipment accesses 
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Score Value 4 2 0 
Time (in minutes) 0 - 3 4 - 7 8 and more 
Fastener Types 
Adjustable Pawl; 
 
Dzus – Screw driver slot; 
Dzus – Wing Head; 
Captive – Knurled and Slotted Head 
None 
Latch types 
Hook-hool Latch 
Trigger-Action Latch; 
Snapslide Latch; 
Hook Latch; 
None None 
Chassis Mounted on Horizontal 
Shelf (Secured by screw fasteners 
through flange) 
None Captive Screw 
Screw into tapped note with flat 
washer and lock washer; 
Screw through clearance holes with 
flat washer, lock washer, and nut; 
Screw through clearance holes with 
lock nut 
Chassis Mounted on Horizontal 
Shelf (Secured by screw fasteners 
through chassis) 
None Captive Screw 
Stud through chassis with flat washer, 
lock washer, and nut; 
Screw into stand-off with flat washer 
and lock washer 
Chassis Mounted on Vertical Rack 
(Screw Fasteners into Frame) 
None Captive Screw 
Thumb screw with lock washer and 
flat washers; 
Screw into tapped hole with flat 
washer and lock; 
Chassis Mounted on Horizontal 
Shelf (Quick-Acting Fasteners) 
Snap-slide latch; 
Dzus – type fastener; 
Spring or drawhook latch 
None None 
Chassis Mounted on Vertical Rack 
(Quick-Acting Fasteners) 
Push-button latch; 
Pawl latch 90° turn; 
Cam-action 90-180° turn of handle; 
Adjustable pawl latch 
None None 
Table 5-3 The proposed scheme for questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of checklist A (compiled by author) 
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5.2.2 Checklist B – Facilities 
The facilities questions in MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III, in checklist B focus on both 
human and equipment resources. Most of the questions asked are quite straightforward. All 
the questions and a description of each answer, and the score values are shown in Table 5-4.  
To illustrate how straightforward the questions are, the following scenario is set as an 
example. Question 1 asks about external test equipment. Only four choices are available for the 
designer to choose from and decide on. Considering the landing gear hydraulic systems as an 
example, the mechanic and/or engineer might require only one equipment of hydraulic 
pressure test to measure the pressure on landing gear hydraulic systems in accordance with 
manufacturer’s specification. 
Therefore, the final answer will be two. As technology has increased and improved 
tremendously, there are some aircraft components that have been designed as remove and 
replacement (R&R); however, testing on new installations is still required. This is to ensure the 
installation satisfies an aircraft’s operational requirements as well as checking that the installed 
components are functioning properly. 
Table 5-4 List of Checklist B questions, choice of answers, and score values 
13
 
 
The design team together with other teams such as Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) 
teams can decide and finally conclude the best score values in this checklist in accordance with 
the design of the components. This is discussed through several tools such Level of Repair 
Analysis (LORA) and Life Cycle Costing through forums such as the Maintenance Review Board 
(MRB). If the designer decides to assign the highest score value for one specific component and 
with the intention to have the minimum task time, therefore the designer has to identify 
Task accomplishment  does not require the use of external test equipment 4
One piece of test equipment is needed 2
Several pieces (2 or 3) of test equipment are needed 1
Four or more items are required 0
Connectors to test equipment require no special tools fittings or adapters 4
Connectors to test equipment require some special tools fittings or adapters (less than two) 2
Connectors to test equipment require no special tools fittings or adapters (more than two) 0
No supplementary materials are needed to perform task 4
No more than one piece of supplementary materials is needed to perform task 2
Two or more pieces of supplementary materials are needed 0
The activities of each member are always visible to the other member 4
On at least one occasion one member can see the second, but the reverse is not the case 2
The activities of one member are hidden from the view of the other on more than one occasion 0
Task did not require consultation with operation personnel 4
Some contact was required 2
Considerable coordination required 0
Task required only one technician for completion 4
Two technicians were required 2
Over two were used 0
Task did not require consultation with supervisor or contractor personnel 4
Some help needed 2
Considerable assistance required 0
6
7
Connectors2
3
4
5
Assistant (Supervisors or Contractor Personnel)
Assistant (Technical Personnel)
Assistant (Operations Personnel)
Visual Contact
Jigs or Fixtures
External Test Equipment1
CHECKLIST B - FACILITIES
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suitable fasteners, latches, minimise number of remove and replace steps, as well as improve 
the design. MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III, allocates the highest score value (i.e. 4) to the most 
maintainable indication, and the lowest score value (i.e. 0) to the least maintainable indication. 
5.2.3 Checklist C – Human Factors 
Checklist C estimating the score value related to human capabilities. The capabilities are 
put into five categories, namely: Maximum effort (0 point), Above average effort (1 point), 
Average effort (2 points), Below Average effort (3 points), and Minimum effort (4 points). These 
points are very subjective and difficult to determine unless supported by quantitative-type of 
evaluation. In this research, the author decided to investigate any potential quantitative-type 
solution to determine the most suitable score value for each question in checklist C. 
The designer should be able to consider the skills required and the personnel available 
to inspect and maintain equipment. The designer should also be able to reduce human error 
through design. Great understanding of human errors offers numerous benefits such as “reduce 
the probability of damaged equipment or personnel injury” 62. This can be done through a 
better understanding of the limitations of humans. Human error includes 
62
:  
1. Failing to perform a task (omission); 
2. Incorrectly performing a task; 
3. Performing a task not required; 
4. Performing a task out of sequence; 
5. Failing to perform a task within the allocated time; 
6. Responding inadequately to a contingency. 
The human errors listed show a consistency with the objectives of this research 
development. This helps aircraft designers by drawing their intention to focus more efforts in 
their design to reduce or eliminate those errors. Such human error reduction or potential 
elimination can be performed through design activities. List item four, for instance, shows the 
necessity for design simplification and most importantly to include the element of procedure 
into maintainability prediction methodology. 
Human factor decisions are very difficult to judge and measure. However, with help and 
advice from industry experts, the author proposed to use the human factor data in 
maintainability prediction methodology to help designers predict the potential task time in 
Checklist “C” of MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III. There are several references such as Woodson et 
al. 145 , Military Standard 156-158
correct data and understand the characteristic
The generic approach proposed by 
elements: input, evaluation and output
all human factor elements and data 
following section. 
The second element, i.e.
channelled to the next element
targets, the results are channelled to the output element where the final decision is concluded 
from the score values of 4 (Minimum effort), 3 (Below average effort), 2 (Average effort), 1 
(Above average effort), or 0 (Maximum effort).
Figure 5—2 Process of evaluations of MIL
5.2.4 Arm, Leg and Back Strength
In this scenario the author decided to use human strength in 
(%). Table 5-5 shows the percentage distribution for the purpose of score value evaluation. If 
the strength required to perform and complete 
be 3 because 30% is within the range of 25% 
cater for the five available score values.
Table 5-5 Percentage distribution fo
Score 4 
Strength (%) 5 
5.2.5 Endurance and Energy
In this scenario the author decided to evaluate the score values by using the maximum 
load lift limits. Other types of data can be used 
time works to perform. For this research
author assumed that the maintenance task performed related 
data shown in Table 5-6 were
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Table 5-6 Average maximum load lift for male158 
Distance (up to) in inches 36 60 Average 
Males (in lbs) 87 56 71.5 
The purpose of this paragraph is to illustrate further how the maximum load lifts are 
formulated. Table 5-6 shows the values for the average maximum load lift for both male and 
female. The author had to formulate the available data into five categories and be able to 
contribute to the available score values (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4) with each score value representing 
the level of effort required by a human to perform and complete the tasks. An average of a data 
set is a measure of the “middle” value of the data set. Therefore the “middle” value between 
zero and ten is equal to five. By using this theory, therefore, five values are equal to an average 
maximum load lift.  
The score values are categorised into five categories: 1) Minimum (4 points); 2) Below 
Average (3 points); 3) Average (2 points), 4) Above Average (1 point), and 5) Maximum (0 
points). In order to fit with the checklist C score values, the data are distributed into five 
categories as shown in Table 5-7. 
Table 5-7 An average lifting weight for male 
Score Value 4 3 2 1 0 
Average 
Weight (lbs) 
0-17 18 - 35 36 - 51 52 – 86 87 or more 
 
Figure 5—3 illustrates that humans require highest strength percentage for minimum 
time and less percentage of strength capable to have more time required to perform and 
complete specific tasks. 
 
Figure 5—3 The typical endurance time in relation to force requirement 
145
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5.2.6 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 
In this category of questions, the author proposed and decided to use the element of 
the number of resources required to perform and complete the necessary tasks. If the number 
of resources is the minimum (i.e. only a screwdriver) then this indicates that the performer 
requires minimum effort to complete the task and therefore the score value will be 4. However, 
if the necessary number of resources required is more than five for instance, then the score 
value could be less. This means the effort required to perform and complete the specific task 
could be in the average or above average range, depending on how the allocation of the 
number of resources required is assigned. 
In this research, the author decided to assign a minimum of two resources required for 
minimum efforts and then increased by two for each score (i.e. 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10). This means 
that if the works requires more than 10 resources of equipment and/or tools to perform and 
complete the tasks, then the score will be zero which means maximum effort is required. This is 
because the mechanic/engineer has to be familiar and organised to ensure the proper 
equipments and/or tools are used effectively. 
5.2.7 Others 
For the rest of the questions, as listed below, the author’s decision was based on 
understand the meaning and interpretation of each question. This is because each question 
focuses on personal skills to organise and give attention to the work to be performed.  
1. Eye-hand Coordination, Manual Dexterity and Neatness (Question 3) 
2. Visual Acuity (Question 4) 
3. Logical Analysis (Question 5) 
4. Memory - Things and Ideas (Question 6) 
5. Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy (Question 8) 
6. Concentration, Persistence and Patience (Question 9)  
7. Initiative and Incisiveness (Question 10) 
If the mechanic and/or aircraft engineer has more experience, this person may more 
organised compared to the person with less experience in performing specific tasks. However, 
it is very difficult to judge people’s experience at the design and development stage. Therefore, 
the author decided to use the element of number of procedures to generate a suitable 
outcome.  
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The fewer procedures needed for specific equipment means the effort in the above 
categories required will be minimised but if there are more procedures to follow, then there 
will be greater effort required to perform and complete the task. The rationale is that the 
person performing the task has to understand the procedure correctly and be organised. Under 
these circumstances the proposed approach strongly advises the designer to simplify the 
product design as much as possible and offer minimum procedure to complete the task. Table 
5-8 show the distribution of number of steps for each individual component. If one specific 
component required 4 steps to remove and replace the component therefore the score value is 
equal to 3. The final table is shown in Table 5-9. 
Table 5-8 Distribution for question number 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 
Score Value Description 
4 Number of steps = 3 or less 
3 Number of steps = 4 to 6 
2 Number of steps = 7 to 9 
1 Number of steps = 10 to 12 
0 Number of steps more than 13 
 
Table 5-9 The final list of Checklist C - Human Factor 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 SCORE DESCRIPTION
5 17.0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 Minimum efforts
25 35.0 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 Below average efforts
50 51.0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 Average efforts
75 86.0 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1 Above average efforts
100 150.0 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 Maximum efforts
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Table 5-11 illustrate how the final score value for each individual for checklist C. For an 
example, assume hydraulic components weigh 8 kilo average, number of steps to remove and 
replace are 8 steps by using standard tools (i.e. wrenches and flat screw driver). Estimation to 
remove and replace each individual component is five minutes in average. The explanation is 
shown in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-10 Checklist C score value explanation 
Question Score description 
1 Hydraulic component weight 8 kilo falls between 5 and 25, therefore the 
score is equal to 3 
2 Average time to remove and replace is equal to five minutes, therefore the 
strength required is approximately 25% and the score value is equal to 4 
3 
There are 8 steps to remove and replace the components, therefore the score 
value is equal to 3 
4 
5 
6 
7 The process is perform by using standard tools, therefore less than 3 
recourses the score equal to 4 
8 
There are 8 steps to remove and replace the components, therefore the score 
value is equal to 3 
9 
10 
 
Table 5-11 Final result for Checklist C – Human Factor, maintainability prediction 
 
Question Checklist C Input Output
1 Arm, Leg and Back Strength 8 4
2 Endurance and Energy 25 4
3 Eye-hand Coordination, Manual Dexterity and Neatness 8 3
4 Visual Acuity 8 3
5 Logical Analysis 8 3
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 8 3
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 4 4
8 Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy 8 3
9 Concentration, Persistence and Patience 8 3
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 8 3
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5.3 Testing and Case Study 
The new maintainability prediction methodology was tested by using a case study. In 
the initial stage of maintainability prediction testing, the author prepares a generic list of 
landing gear components, as shown in Table 5-12. The purpose of performing this initial stage 
of maintainability prediction is to ensure the author has a better understanding of MIL-HDBK-
472, procedures III, and to identify the strengths and drawbacks of this approach for the 
purpose of further improvement. 
As a result, the author found difficulty in identifying suitable score values for each 
question in checklist C which related to human factors. This is one of the opportunities 
identified by the author to propose a new approach. A methodology and improved approach to 
checklist C has been described previously in Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
Table 5-12 The generic list of landing gear components 
 
Check List A: DESIGN Struts Tires Brakes Actuators Wheels Steering Hydraulic Anti Skid Structure Attachments
References: CAAIP Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-10, pg 10 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-8, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 5 Part 5-8, pg 15 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3. pg 2
1 Access (External) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
2 External latches and/or fasteners 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
3 Internal latches and/or fasteners 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 Access (Internal) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 Packaging 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Units - Part (Failed) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
7 Visual Display 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
8 Fault and Operation Indicators (BITE) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4
9 Test Points (Availability) 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4
10 Test Points (Identifications) 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2
11 Labelling 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
12 Adjustments 0 2 2 2 4 0 2 2 0 2
13 Testing (In Circuit) 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 4
14 Protective Devices 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0
15 Safety (Personnel) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 4
44 44 40 40 46 42 40 40 44 46
Check List B: FACILTIES Struts Tires Brakes Actuators Wheels Steering Hydraulic Anti Skid Structure Attachments
Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-10, pg 10 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-8, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 5 Part 5-8, pg 15 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3. pg 2
1 External Test Equipment 2 4 2 1 4 2 1 1 2 4
2 Connectors 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4
3 Jigs or Fixtures 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4
4 Visual Contact 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 Assistance (Operational Personnel) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 Assistance (Technical Personnel) 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 2 4 4
7 Assistance (Supervisor or Contractor Personnel) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
24 16 14 15 16 24 23 21 24 26
Check List C: Maintenance Skills (Human Factors) Struts Tires Brakes Actuators Wheels Steering Hydraulic Anti Skid Structure Attachments
Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-10, pg 10 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 5-8, pg 2 Part 6-3, pg 5 Part 5-8, pg 15 Part 6-3, pg 2 Part 6-3. pg 2
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 2 4 2
2 Endurance and Energy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 Eye-hand Coordination,Manual Dexterity and Neatness 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 2
4 Visual Acuity 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 Logical Analysis 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 0 1
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 1
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0
8 Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 2
9 Concentration, Persistence and Patience 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
14 20 20 15 24 18 15 24 14 16
Mct (Minutes) 35.89 54.18 78.60 83.08 43.64 36.44 47.33 43.44 35.89 26.41
Mct (Hour) 0.60 0.90 1.31 1.38 0.73 0.61 0.79 0.72 0.60 0.44
No
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The following process was tested by using a case study. The selected case study was 
aircraft fuel systems from a twin–engine long haul aircraft. With regard to the references for a 
case study, the author used the acceptable method for aircraft maintenance known as CAAIP 
107
. 
5.3.1 Case Study – Aircraft Fuel Systems 
The main purpose of this exercise is to test the developed quantitative methodology 
(i.e. MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III in checklist C) by author. The results from this case study were 
performed by using the developed approach and then compare with predicted maintainability 
by Bineid 
141
, which is the fuel system of a twin-engine long haul aircraft. A case study 
presented in this report is for right and left fuel systems. In Table 5-13 show the predicted 
maintenance time for each individual component for aircraft fuel system. 
Table 5-13 List of predicted maintenance corrective times 
141
 
 
The improvement of the maintainability prediction presented in this section is focused 
on focused on Checklist C - Human Factor of MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III as shown in Table 
5-14. 
No LRU Maintenance Corrective time (hour)
1 Hand Pump 0.47
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) 0.40
3 Pressure Valve (PV) 0.40
4 Reservoir 1.01
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) 0.76
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) 1.71
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47
10 Pipe 0.92
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) 0.69
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) 0.69
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) 0.36
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) 0.36
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) 1.16
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) 0.30
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) 0.30
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) 0.30
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) 0.33
20 Hose 0.13
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) 0.15
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) 0.73
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Table 5-14 List of questions from checklist C 
 
All description and quantitative methodology for checklist C has been described 
previously in section 3.3.2. In this testing exercise, some of the information is not accessible; 
therefore the author used the generic assumption. The assumptions based on authors’ analysis 
which have been presented in Table 5-6 & Table 5-8. The assumption includes the average 
strength required is equal to 71.5% (see Table 5-6) and the average weight of each component 
is equal to 18 lbs (see Table 5-7). These assumptions allow author to assign suitable score value 
for question 1 and question 2. 
 
For question 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10, the score value is assign in accordance with number 
of steps required to remove and replace the components. The information of number of steps 
are identified from acceptable methods, techniques, and practices or known as CAP 562: Civil 
Aircraft Airworthiness Information and Procedures (CAAIP)
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. CAAIP is an acceptable methods, 
techniques and practices as well as minimum guidelines to perform any maintenance tasks. 
 
Meanwhile for question 7: Planfulness and Resourcefulness, the assumption made 
based on CAAIP. On average after reviewing the CAAIP document, the average resource 
required to perform the removal and replace tasks is five resources such as standard wrenches, 
standard screw driver, locking wire, and disposable materials. Some components required less 
than three resources such as valve, pipe, and light bulb. 
 
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength
2 Endurance and Energy
3 Eye-hand Coordination, Manual Dexterity and Neatness
4 Visual Acuity
5 Logical Analysis
6 Memory - Things and Ideas
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness
8 Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy
9 Concentration, Persistence and Patience
10 Initiative and Incisiveness
Check List C: Maintenance Skills (Human Factors)
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5.3.2 Testing results and discussion 
In Table 5-15 show the results summary for the aircraft fuel systems testing and 
illustrated in Figure 5—4. Clearly, the improved checklist C of Human Factor in MIL-HDBK-472, 
procedure III is capable to make some contribution in maintainability predictions. The most 
important lesson learned from this piece of work is not only about the potential of 
improvement using either a developed approach or any other approach. The author’s viewpoint 
is how can researchers include the element of human data into one specific methodology and 
as a result contribute several benefits for aircraft designers, as well as human error reduction.  
 
Most importantly, the results show that designer has capabilities to improve 
maintenance task time by understanding the human capabilities. Table 5-16 show the 
maintainability prediction before the implementation of improvements and Table 5-17 shows 
the final results after improvements by using the developed approach. 
Table 5-15 Case study - Results summary 
 
Bineid results 
141 Author results
1 Hand Pump 0.47 0.44 0.03
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) 0.40 0.40 0.00
3 Pressure Valve (PV) 0.40 0.40 0.00
4 Reservoir 1.01 0.92 0.09
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47 0.48 -0.01
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) 0.76 0.72 0.04
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47 0.48 -0.01
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) 1.71 1.58 0.13
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47 0.48 -0.01
10 Pipe 0.92 0.83 0.09
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) 0.69 0.64 0.05
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) 0.69 0.48 0.21
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) 0.36 0.34 0.02
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) 0.36 0.48 -0.12
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) 1.16 1.04 0.12
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) 0.30 0.30 0.00
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) 0.30 0.30 0.00
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) 0.30 0.30 0.00
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) 0.33 0.34 -0.01
20 Hose 0.13 0.13 0.00
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) 0.15 0.15 0.00
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) 0.47 0.48 -0.01
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) 0.73 0.59 0.14
LRUNo
Maintenance Corrective time (hour)
Error
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Figure 5—4 Case study - Testing results 
5.4 Summary 
The main outcome and success of this chapter is the author is able to identify, 
developed, and improved maintainability prediction methodology specifically in checklist C 
Human Factor. Traditionally, score value in checklist C is difficult to allocate. This is because the 
available range of selection is too subjective (i.e.: Below Average, Average, Above Average). By 
using human data, this research is able to allocate and determine suitable score value for each 
questions. 
 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80
Hand Pump
Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV)
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Non Return Valve (NRV)
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Pump Low Light (PLL 2)
Heat Exchanger (HEX)
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Author results Bined results
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Table 5-16 The maintainability prediction before improvement 141 
 
Table 5-17 The maintainability prediction after improvement by using a developed approach 
 
Hand 
Pump
RFSV PV Reservoir NRV EDP ACMP Pipe POL PLL
Heat 
Exchanger
HLL HQI Hose
Depressurisation 
Valve
Moisture 
vent trap
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength 3 3 2 2 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3
2 Endurance and Energy 2 3 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 3
3 Eye-hand Coordination,Manual Dexterity and Neatness 3 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 3
4 Visual Acuity 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 3
5 Logical Analysis 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 2 3
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 2 4 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 2 3
8 Alertness, Cautiousness, and Accuracy 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 3
9 Concentration, Persistence and Petience 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 3
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 3 3 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 3
29 36 36 20 33 28 21 20 25 29 22 36 36 38 35 30
Predicted Downtime
A 0.02512 A 1.2560 1.1053 1.1053 1.0550 1.0048 1.1555 0.8792 1.0048 1.1053 1.2811 0.8541 1.2811 1.1806 1.4570 1.4067 1.1053
B 0.03055 B 0.5194 0.6721 0.6721 0.4888 0.7332 0.4277 0.4277 0.5805 0.5499 0.6110 0.6110 0.6110 0.6721 0.7943 0.7943 0.5499
C 0.01093 C 0.3170 0.3935 0.3935 0.2186 0.3607 0.3060 0.2295 0.2186 0.2733 0.3170 0.2405 0.3935 0.3935 0.4153 0.3826 0.3279
3.54651-0.02512A-0.03055B-0.01093C 1.4542 1.3757 1.3757 1.7841 1.4478 1.6573 2.0101 1.7427 1.6181 1.3374 1.8410 1.2609 1.3003 0.8799 0.9629 1.5634
MTTR MINUTES 28.46 23.75 23.75 60.82 28.04 45.42 102.35 55.29 41.50 21.75 69.34 18.24 19.97 7.58 9.18 36.60
MTTR HOUR 0.47 0.40 0.40 1.01 0.47 0.76 1.71 0.92 0.69 0.36 1.16 0.30 0.33 0.13 0.15 0.61
TOTAL
0-1-2-3-4
Check List C - Scoring Design Dictates - Maintenance Skills
SCORE
Hand 
Pump
RFSV PV Reservoir NRV EDP ACMP Pipe POL PLL Heat 
Exchanger
HLL HQI Hose Depressurisation 
Valve
Moisture 
vent trap
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
2 Endurance and Energy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 Eye-hand Coordination,Manual Dexterity and Neatness 3 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 3
4 Visual Acuity 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 3
5 Logical Analysis 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 2 3
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 Alertness, Cautiousness, and Accuracy 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 3
9 Concentration, Persistence and Petience 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 4 3
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 3 3 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 3
32 36 36 24 32 30 24 24 28 31 26 36 35 36 35 31
Predicted Downtime
A 0.02512 A 1.2560 1.1053 1.1053 1.0550 1.0048 1.1555 0.8792 1.0048 1.1053 1.2811 0.8541 1.2811 1.1806 1.4570 1.4067 1.1053
B 0.03055 B 0.5194 0.6721 0.6721 0.4888 0.7332 0.4277 0.4277 0.5805 0.5499 0.6110 0.6110 0.6110 0.6721 0.7943 0.7943 0.5499
C 0.01093 C 0.3498 0.3935 0.3935 0.2623 0.3498 0.3279 0.2623 0.2623 0.3060 0.3388 0.2842 0.3935 0.3826 0.3935 0.3826 0.3388
3.54651-0.02512A-0.03055B-0.01093C 1.4214 1.3757 1.3757 1.7404 1.4588 1.6354 1.9773 1.6989 1.5853 1.3156 1.7973 1.2609 1.3112 0.9018 0.9629 1.5525
MTTR MINUTES 26.39 23.75 23.75 55.00 28.76 43.19 94.91 50.00 38.48 20.68 62.70 18.24 20.47 7.98 9.18 35.69
MTTR HOUR 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.92 0.48 0.72 1.58 0.83 0.64 0.34 1.04 0.30 0.34 0.13 0.15 0.59
Check List C - Scoring Design Dictates - Maintenance Skills
0-1-2-3-4
TOTAL
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6 Integrated Methodology 
This research utilises the aircraft maintenance related feedback information in 
maintainability prediction methodology. Figure 6—1 shows overall methodology of the 
maintainability prediction process for aircraft mechanical components proposed in this 
research and described in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 6—1 The maintainability prediction for the aircraft components methodology 
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6.1 Maintainability prediction process 
The maintainability prediction is performed to achieve a more accurate prediction rather 
than predicting the lowest task time. The processes consist of two, namely Service Difficulties 
Report, Maintenance allocation, and Maintenance prediction. 
 
6.1.1 Service Difficulties Report 
The first process was to identify and analyse the feedback information related to 
maintenance difficulties and determine the maintainability effectiveness. The process of 
analysing the feedback information is in accordance with Figure 3—3.  
6.1.2 Maintenance allocation 
The second process was determining the effectiveness of maintainability prediction is by 
using estimating the maintenance allocation time for each individual component by using the 
following Table 6-1 and steps: 
Table 6-1 Maintainability allocation analyses report 14 
 
Step 1 Identify or Calculate the Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) requirement. The MTTR 
can be predicted or calculated by using Equation 4-6; 
Step 2 Enter the basic information regarding the system, sub-system, components; 
Step 3 Enter the weight factor (Kj1, Kj2, and Kj3); 
Step 4 Calculate the total score value for each component; 
Allocated  Rpj
Module Isolation Accessiblity (hour)
TOTAL (Σ) λ or SR λj Kj λRpj
1.00
Check: MTTRsystem = ΣλRpj/λ
λRpj
Estimation
λ or SRNo Components List of Modules Allocation (Kj) Σ  Kj λj Kj
MTTR
K = Σλj Kj / ΣFR
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj
2 
1 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
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Step 5 Enter the value of failure rate (λ) and/or Service difficulties rate (SR). The SR 
values are calculated by using Equation 3-1; If the SR (Service Difficulties) is used, 
change the failure rate (λ) to SR values. 
Step 6 Calculate the contribution of maintainability allocation time for each component 
by using Equation 4-1; 
Step7 Calculate the Allocated Rpj for each individual component by using Equation 4-2; 
Step 8 To ensure the allocation for each component meet the MTTR requirement, 
compute the to system by using Equation 6-1; If the computed of MTTR is equal 
to the MTTR requirement, the result will show as PASSED, and if not then the 
result will show as FAILED 
  = 	Σ""  Equation 6-1 
6.1.3 Maintenance prediction 
Step 1 Estimate the Corrective Maintenance Time (Mct) of individual maintenance tasks 
using the following Table 6-2
13
; 
Table 6-2 Maintainability prediction methodology 
13
 
 
Step 2 Calculate the total score values for each component and calculate the predicted 
maintenance corrective time by using Equation 6-2. 
Mct = antilog (3.54651 – 0.02512A – 0.03055B – 0.01093C)  
 
Equation 6-2 
 
Mct  = Maintenance Corrective Time 
A  = Checklist A: Physical Design Factor; 
B  =  Checklist B: Facilities   
C = Checklist C: Maintenance Skills 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
A
B
C
Questions TOTALCheck List
Corrective Maintenance Time (Mct)
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Step 3 Compare the predicted Maintenance Corrective Time (Mct) and Maintainability 
Allocation (Rpj). As the Mct is equal to or less than Maintenance Allocation time 
(Rpj), then the decision is “GOOD”. If the decision is “NOT GOOD”, repeat step 
no 1 in maintenance prediction and/or simplify the design; 
6.2 Research methodology - summary 
This approach is able to assist aircraft designers to improve their design by providing the 
maximum target maintenance task time for each individual aircraft components and/or 
systems. The maintainability prediction of each individual aircraft component and/or system is 
performed after the target maintenance task time has been assigned. If the predicted values 
are equal to or below the targeted time, then the maintainability is acceptable. However, if the 
individual predicted task time is above the allocated task time, then it is not acceptable and a 
redesign is one of the solutions. Figure 6—2 show the process flow for both maintainability 
allocation and prediction methodologies developed by the author. 
 
 
Figure 6—2 Process flow of maintainability allocation and prediction methodology 
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This research has been carried out based on the outline strategies previously described 
in section 1.8. The process begins with analysing the SDR as per described in chapter 3. 
Furthermore, the maintainability allocation methodology has been used to ensure this research 
achieved the targeted aim and research objectives. The descriptions of the selected techniques 
are given in chapter 4. The maintainability prediction methodology has been reviewed, and is 
described in chapter 5. After the existing maintainability prediction methodologies have been 
carried out, the author has been able to conclude the following: 
 
1. The existing prediction methodologies rely on failure rate (λ) as a main input to estimate 
the effectiveness of maintainability predictions; 
2. The failure rate (λ) can be multiplied by individual maintenance task times, in order to 
estimate maintainability effectiveness; 
3. Existing prediction methodologies are able to estimate maintainability effectiveness for 
each individual system or sub system; however, there is no indication whether the 
estimated values are within limits or off limits; 
4. The table can be redesigned with the intention of providing allocation time for 
maintainability. The methodology of providing allocation time is described in the next 
section of this thesis. 
Others element that should be considered is the element of mechanical components 
(i.e.: Mass, Number of Components assembled). In order to meet the maintenance allocation 
target as well as to improve maintenance prediction time number of components assembled 
for example should be reviewed. This could also include the consideration of eliminate the 
unnecessary component. The element of mass could also be improved. Through these 
considerations, the overall aircraft systems design process can be implemented.  
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7 Validation 
The aim of this chapter is to apply the integrated maintainability prediction 
methodology and to compare the predicted values to the real world values (i.e.: Maintenance 
tasks time). 
One of the most challenges in this research has been to obtain real world maintenance 
task times from industry. Due to these restrictions, the author proposed using the element of 
target-value. Target-value is the termed used by the author to represent the maximum 
allowable task time for individual aircraft mechanical components or systems. Throughout this 
research the author successfully developed a methodology to identify potential maximum 
allowable task time for aircraft mechanical components/systems. This was performed based on 
existing methodology developed by Chipchak 14 which focused on electrical and electronic 
aircraft components/systems as there are very few elements of mechanical 
components/systems. 
The validation process reported and described in this chapter and the following sections 
was implemented by using the process flow described and shown in Figure 6—1. Two case 
studies of aircraft landing gear for two aircraft BAe 146 and Jetstream 31 were used for the 
purpose of validation. 
7.1 Validation 1 – BAe 146 – 300 – Landing Gear 
7.1.1 Introduction 
The validation process in this section is performed based on the author visit to approved 
MRO Company in UK. The BAe 146 – 300 is one of the aircraft available for author to study and 
visualise the aircraft components. Figure 7—1 show the pictures of BAe 146 – 300 aircraft 
landing gear used by author for the purpose of validation process. 
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Figure 7—1 BAe 146 – 300 aircraft landing gear (Source: Author) 
7.1.2 Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) - Landing Gear 
The first process was to understand the trend of SDR related to BAe 146. The historical 
data and information were analysed for a period of twenty years (1990 – 2009) and the results 
are shown in Table 7-1. BAe 146 SDR started from 1992 and increased up to 1998 with various 
types of part conditions. In total there are 1,688 SDR and the trend is illustrated in Figure 7—2. 
 
The author decided to perform the SDR analysis up to twenty years because the data 
available for ten years (i.e. 2000 – 2009) are not enough for this research to make appropriate 
judgements. By extending the SDR analyses period this research should be able to understand 
and undertake necessary action to identify the most suitable aircraft mechanical components. 
 
The results show increasing SDR reports in the first nine years (i.e. 1990 – 1998) 
however begins to decreasing in the following years beginning in 1999. This could be caused by 
the decrease in demand for this of type aircraft and/or the invention of new types of aircraft 
that could be more reliable and efficient. 
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Table 7-1 Summary of BAe 146 SDR Analyses 
 
 
Figure 7—2 The trend of SDR analyses for all types of BAe 146 
The first in the analysis is to identify which part name of the aircraft cause the greatest 
number of SDR. Figure 7—3 illustrates the percentage distribution of failed part condition for 
both BAe 146 – 200 and – 300. These two types of aircraft are chosen because they have 
-100 -200 -300
1990
1991
1992 1 6 7 0.41%
1993 1 43 44 2.61%
1994 14 3 17 1.01%
1995 74 113 57 244 14.45%
1996 11 150 47 208 12.32%
1997 8 124 192 324 19.19%
1998 48 250 85 383 22.69%
1999 18 144 17 179 10.60%
2000 15 93 11 119 7.05%
2001 12 43 19 74 4.38%
2002 12 12 0.71%
2003 14 10 24 1.42%
2004 9 22 31 1.84%
2005 2 5 9 16 0.95%
2006 3 3 0.18%
2007 3 3 0.18%
2008
2009
TOTAL 190 1,014 484 1,688 100.00%
TOTAL
Reported Difficulties Bae 146
Year %
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
S
D
R
 (
%
)
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contributed the highest SDR reports, as previously shown in Table 7-1. Landing gear has 
contributed the highest percentage of SDR reports with 18.18%, followed by Engine 
(Turbine/Turboprop) with 15.91%, and Flight Control System with 10.61%. as illustrate in Figure 
7—3 with the total number of SDR for BAe 146 is 132. 
 
Figure 7—3 Failed Part Condition percentage distribution for BAe 146 in accordance with JASC 
Code 
Because the Landing gear systems shows the highest contribution to SDR for BAe 146, 
the author carried out further analyses within Landing gear systems to have better 
understanding. There total of 100 SDR reports are collected for BAe 146 Landing gear system. 
Figure 7—4 illustrate the percentage distribution for BAe 146 Landing gear system in 
accordance with part conditions. The most reported part condition include cracked contributed 
24.0% SDR reports, failed with 20.0% SDR reports, and corroded with 10.0% of SDR reports. 
Other types of part condition are faulty with 7.0 SDR reports and followed by damaged and 
broken which each one contributed 5.0% SDR reports. 
In Table 7-2 show the detail SDR discrepancy statement which offer and useful to the 
designer to understand the scenario and condition why the components air failed. 
Air Conditioning 
Systems
6.06%
Equipment/Furnishings
3.03%
Flight Control System
10.61%
Hydraulic Power 
System
7.58%
Landing Gear System
18.18%
Oxygen System
3.79%
Fuselage
3.79%
Wing Structure
3.79%
Engine 
(Turbine/Turboprop)
15.91%
Engine Fuel and 
Control
5.30%
Others
21.97%
Others category includes all other 
Part Conditions contributing <2.5%
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Figure 7—4 Percentage distribution for BAe 146 in accordance with Part Conditions 
Table 7-2 Landing gear system SDR discrepancy statement in accordance with Part Condition 
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To have accurate understanding, the author carried out further analyses to identify 
which part name mostly affected and received the most SDR reports. Figure 7—5 illustrate the 
types of part name contributed the most SDR reports. Pin, actuator, and wheel contributed the 
most SDR reports which each one of the part name contributed 15.0% for pin, 8.0% for wheel, 
and 7.0% for actuator. In Table 7-3 shows the detail SDR discrepancy statement for BAe 146 
Landing gear system in accordance with part name. 
BROKEN              
5.0%
BYPASSING           
2.0%
CORRODED            
10.0%
CRACKED             
24.0%
DAMAGED             
5.0%
DISINTEGRATED       
2.0%
FAILED              
20.0% FAULTY              
7.0%
ICED                
2.0%
INTERMITTENT        
2.0%
MALFUNCTIONED       
5.0%
RUPTURED            
2.0%
SEPARATED           
2.0%
WORN                
2.0%
OTHERS
10.0%
Others category includes all other 
Part Contributions contributing <1%
JASCCode PartCondition PartLocation Discrepancy
3260 FAILED LT MLG (AUS) LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR UPLOCK ACTUATOR HOSE ASSEMBLY RUPTURED. HOSE LEAKING FROM END FITTING. LOSS OF `GREEN' SYSTEM HYDRAULICS.
3260 FAILED RT MLG LANDING GEAR HANDLE REQ OVERRIDE ON GEAR RETRACTION AFTER TAKEOFF FROM ORD. REMOVED AND REPLACED RIGHT MLG WEIGHT OFF HARNESS ASSY.
3230 FAILED NLG NOSE LANDING GEAR RETRACTION ACTUATOR FLEXIBLE HYDRAULIC HOSE RUPTURED. LOSS OF GREEN SYSTEM HYDRAULIC FLUID.
3297 FAILED LT MLG DOOR UPON GEAR RETRACTION LEFT MAIN GEAR SHOWS RED UNSAFE WITH GEAR HANDLE LT ON. REMOVED AND REPLACED LEFT MLG DOOR UPLOCK SENSOR HARNESS.
3234 FAILED MLG LANDING GEAR SELECTOR LEVER WOULD NOT MOVE TO THE `UP` POSITION.
3234 FAILED LANDING GEAR GEAR FAILED TO EXTEND WHEN SELECTED. WENT TO EMERGENCY AND GEAR EXTENDED. LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. SENT REPLACEMENT VALVE AND ACTUATOR TO DEN. 
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Figure 7—5 Percentage distribution for BAe 146 in accordance with Part Name 
Table 7-3 Landing gear system SDR discrepancy statement in accordance with Part Name 
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Based on this result, the author found that the landing gear system is a part name for 
the validation process. Table 7-4 shows the list of information sources of how the validation 
process was performed. 
Table 7-4 Summary of information sources for BAe 146 – 300 Landing Gear validation 
No Data and Information Sources 
1 List of Components Approved Aircraft Maintenance Manual; and Analysed FAA 
Service Difficulty Reports 
160
 
2 List of Failure Rate Non-electronic Part Reliability Data (NPRD) 1995 
155
 
3 Mean Time to Failure (MTBF) Equation 4-4 
4 Maintainability Predictions  MIL-HDBK-472 
13
; DOD-HDBK-791 
62
; CAAIP 
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5 Maintainability Prediction; 
Checklist C 
Developed approach by author 
6 Maintainability Allocation Improved modules and scores by author 
7 Process for Validation As shown in Integrated Methodology, Chapter 6 
ACTUATOR                
7.0%
BEARING                 
5.0%
BOLT                    
2.0%
BRACKET                 
2.0% BRAKE                   
3.0%
BRAKE ASSY              
2.0%
HEAT PACK             
2.0%HOSE                    
3.0%
INDICATOR               
2.0%
LINK                    
5.0%
MOTOR                   
3.0%
PIN                     
15.0%
SELECTOR VALVE          
5.0%
SENSOR                  
2.0%
TIRE                    
2.0%
VALVE                   
2.0%
WHEEL                   
8.0%
OTHERS
30.0%
Others category includes all other 
Part Name contributing <1%
JASCCode PartName PartLocation Discrepancy
3230 PIN NLG (AUS) NOSE LANDING GEAR RETRACTION JACK ATTACHMENT PIN CRACKED. FOUND DURING MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION. CRACK LENGTH 19.05 MM (0.75 INCH).
3230 PIN NLG (AUS) NOSE LANDING GEAR RETRACTION JACK ATTACHMENT PIN CRACKED. FOUND DURING MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION. CRACK LENGTHS 19.05 MM AND 12.7 MM.
3230 PIN NLG (AUS) NOSE LANDING GEAR RETRACTION JACK ATTACHMENT PIN CRACKED. FOUND DURING MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION. CRACK LENGTH 15.875 MM (0.625 INCH).
3230 PIN NLG (AUS) NOSE LANDING GEAR RETRACTION JACK ATTACHMENT PIN CRACKED. FOUND DURING MAGNETIC PARTICLE INSPECTION. CRACK LENGTH 76.2 MM (3 INCHES).
3213 PIN MLG
(AUS) LT MAIN LANDING GEAR DIRECTIONAL LINK UPPER ATTACHMENT PIN FOUND TO BE MIGRATING FROM THE LUG LOCATED AT FRAME 29. LOCKING PLATE AND PIN 
INCORRECTLY FITTED. MAIN LANDING GEAR IS A NEWLYOVERHAULED UNIT AND HAD ONLY JUST BEEN FITTED TO THE AIRCRAFT 48CYCLES PREVIOUSLY. 
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7.1.3 Maintainability allocation – BAe 146 – 300 Landing Gear 
Based on the methodology developed and described in chapter 4, the author’s extended 
maintainability allocation method was used. The maintainability allocation was the next process 
to be performed, using extended modules and score values, by the author, as shown in Table 
4-10. The maintainability allocation was predicted based on Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). The 
MTTR values can be predicted based on historical data, and/or the decision from top level 
management. 
In this case study, the methodology developed as per described in Chapter 6 and shown 
in Figure 6—1. For the purpose of comparison, the author used two different approaches. One 
of the approaches is to utilise the 1.00 hour as an MTTR value as per advised by industrial 
experts. The result of the maintainability allocation is shown in Table 7-5.  
Table 7-5 Maintainability allocation based on MTTR = 1.00 
 
The rest of the prediction values were calculated by using the existing methodology 
developed by Chipchak 
14
 and by using new module and score improved by the author as shown 
in Table 4-10. There are some listed components requiring more than one module. Component 
number 4: Brake Assembly for example, required two modules, namely electromechanical 
equipment and mechanical structures, with mechanisms for which each module offered 3 and 8 
score values respectively. Therefore allocation of the final score values for the brake assembly 
is by average, i.e. 5.5. 
Maintenance Allocation Time
MTTR = 1.00 hour
1 ACTUATOR 0.85
2 ANTI SKID 0.85
3 BRAKE 1.32
4 BRAKE ASSY 1.08
5 CONNECTOR 0.85
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.75
7 HYDRAULIC 0.85
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 1.13
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 1.13
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.85
11 SENSOR 0.94
12 STEERING 1.13
13 STRUCTURE 1.13
14 STRUT 1.13
15 SWITCH 0.85
16 TIRE 1.13
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.85
18 V-BELT 1.13
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.85
20 WARNING SYSTEM 1.13
21 WHEEL 1.13
22 WIRE 0.85
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.85
No Components
7.1.4 Maintainability prediction 
The maintainability full scale prediction was beg
predictions by using MIL-HDBL
has been described in the maintainability prediction chapter. MIL
consists of three main elements
Human Factors. Maintainability prediction was performed by using checklist
questions. 
To ensure the score values 
by the author such as Civil Aircraft Airworthiness Information and Procedure (CAAIP) or also 
known as CAP 562 and DoD-HDBK
statement used by author to understand the process of maintenance activities. 
used in order to have better illustration
design criteria. The final result is shown in 
Table 7-6 Removal procedure for aircraft wheel
 
– BAe 146 – Landing Gear 
un with maintainability task time 
-472, procedure III. The detailed process of task time predictions 
-HDBK
: Checklist A: Design; Checklist B; Facilities; and Checklist C: 
were accurately identified, additional references 
-791. Table 7-6 and Table 7-7 show the example of procedure 
s and DoD-HDBK-791 was used t
Table 7-8. 
s. Source: CAAIP, CAP 562
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-472, procedure III 
s A and B 
were used 
The former was 
o understand the 
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Table 7-7 Installation procedure for wheels. Source: CAAIP, CAP 562107 
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Table 7-8 Maintainability prediction tasks time for BAe 146 – 300 Landing Gear 
 
 
Check List A: DESIGN ACTUATOR ANTI SKID BRAKE BRAKE ASSY CONNECTOR CONTROL UNIT HYDRAULIC PROXIMITY SENSOR PROXIMITY SWITCH SELECTOR VALVE SENSOR STEERING STRUCTURE STRUT SWITCH TIRE UPLOCK SWITCH V-BELT WARNING LIGHT WARNING SYSTEM WHEEL WIRE WIRE HARNESS
References: CAAIP
1 Access (External) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
2 External lactches and/or fasterners 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0
3 Internal latches and/or fasterners 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0 0
4 Access (Internal) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 Packaging 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Units - Part (Failed) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 2
7 Visual Display 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
8 Fault and Operation Indicators (BITE) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2
9 Test Points (Availability) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 4 4 4
10 Test Points (Identifications) 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4
11 Labelling 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
12 Adjustments 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
13 Testing (In Circuit) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4
14 Protective Devices 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4
15 Safety (Personnel) 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4
38 38 36 36 38 42 40 42 44 40 42 46 50 48 42 45 42 44 46 46 46 44 44
Check List B: FACILTIES ACTUATOR ANTI SKID BRAKE BRAKE ASSY CONNECTOR CONTROL UNIT HYDRAULIC PROXIMITY SENSOR PROXIMITY SWITCH SELECTOR VALVE SENSOR STEERING STRUCTURE STRUT SWITCH TIRE UPLOCK SWITCH V-BELT WARNING LIGHT WARNING SYSTEM WHEEL WIRE WIRE HARNESS
1 External Test Equipment 1 1 2 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2
2 Connectors 0 4 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 0 3 3
3 Jigs or Fixtures 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
4 Visual Contact 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4
5 Assistance (Operational Personnel) 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 4
6 Assistance (Technical Personnel) 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 4
7 Assistance (Supervisor or Contractor Personnel) 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4
19 21 18 18 28 18 23 18 18 28 18 24 24 24 26 22 26 22 26 22 20 25 25
Check List C: Maintenance Skills (Human Factors) ACTUATOR ANTI SKID BRAKE BRAKE ASSY CONNECTOR CONTROL UNIT HYDRAULIC PROXIMITY SENSOR PROXIMITY SWITCH SELECTOR VALVE SENSOR STEERING STRUCTURE STRUT SWITCH TIRE UPLOCK SWITCH V-BELT WARNING LIGHT WARNING SYSTEM WHEEL WIRE WIRE HARNESS
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 4 2 4 4
2 Endurance and Energy 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 3 4 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2
3 Eye-hand Coordination, Manual Dexterity and Neatness 0 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 3
4 Visual Acuity 2 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
5 Logical Analysis 1 2 4 4 4 3 1 3 3 1 4 2 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 2 4 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 2 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 4
8 Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy 0 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 0 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
9 Concentration, Persistence and Patience 0 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 0 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 2 2 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 2 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
15 24 39 39 40 29 21 30 34 21 38 18 14 14 34 20 34 33 34 34 24 31 31
Mct (Minutes) 70.40 48.76 46.35 46.35 19.92 42.13 40.69 41.08 33.09 28.63 33.59 28.91 25.37 28.48 21.16 33.53 21.16 25.61 16.79 22.25 32.94 21.81 21.81
Mct (Hour) 1.17 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.33 0.70 0.68 0.25 0.55 0.48 0.56 0.48 0.42 0.47 0.35 0.56 0.35 0.43 0.28 0.37 0.55 0.36 0.36
Average (Minutes) 32.64
Average (hours) 0.53
No
105 
 
7.1.5 Process validation 
In this section, the author described the second stage of maintainability 
allocation process. In this stage a more accurate MTTR value is used based on the 
maintainability prediction results to check the allocation method. The process is 
carried out in accordance with Figure 6—1.  
The second stage utilises the MTTR calculated from the maintainability 
prediction results above shown in Table 7-8. In addition, the second stage is utilised for 
the purpose of comparison as to identify the accuracy of prediction. The result of the 
maintainability allocation is shown in Table 7-9. 
Table 7-9 Maintainability Allocation base on MTTR= 0.53 
 
The list of components as collected from the SDR analyses. All listed 
components are received the most reports of SDR. As results, Table 7-10 show the 
summary for both MTTR values and both results are illustrated in Figure 7—6. Both 
MTTR show almost the same trendlines. The detail of the maintenance allocation is 
also shown in Appendix J. 
 
 
Maintenance Allocation Time
MTTR = 0.53 hour
1 ACTUATOR 0.45
2 ANTI SKID 0.45
3 BRAKE 0.70
4 BRAKE ASSY 0.57
5 CONNECTOR 0.45
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.40
7 HYDRAULIC 0.45
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 0.60
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 0.60
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.45
11 SENSOR 0.50
12 STEERING 0.60
13 STRUCTURE 0.60
14 STRUT 0.60
15 SWITCH 0.45
16 TIRE 0.60
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.45
18 V-BELT 0.60
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.45
20 WARNING SYSTEM 0.60
21 WHEEL 0.60
22 WIRE 0.45
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.45
No Components
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Table 7-10 The summary of maintainability allocation for BAe 146 – 300 for both MTTR 
values. 
 
 
Figure 7—6 The trend of maintainability allocation times for both MTTR values for BAe 
146 – 300 Landing Gear 
 
MTTR = 1.00 hour MTTR = 0.53 hour
1 ACTUATOR 0.85 0.45
2 ANTI SKID 0.85 0.45
3 BRAKE 1.32 0.70
4 BRAKE ASSY 1.08 0.57
5 CONNECTOR 0.85 0.45
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.75 0.40
7 HYDRAULIC 0.85 0.45
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 1.13 0.60
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 1.13 0.60
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.85 0.45
11 SENSOR 0.94 0.50
12 STEERING 1.13 0.60
13 STRUCTURE 1.13 0.60
14 STRUT 1.13 0.60
15 SWITCH 0.85 0.45
16 TIRE 1.13 0.60
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.85 0.45
18 V-BELT 1.13 0.60
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.85 0.45
20 WARNING SYSTEM 1.13 0.60
21 WHEEL 1.13 0.60
22 WIRE 0.85 0.45
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.85 0.45
No Components
Maintenance Allocation Time in hour
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
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o
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r
Component
MTTR = 1.00 hour MTTR = 0.53 hour
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7.1.6 Summary – Validation 1 
There are two scenarios of results from this validation. Table 7-11 shows the 
summary for both maintenance allocation time and maintainability prediction. 
Meanwhile Figure 7—7 illustrated the summary results. Collectively, the results 
indicate that the MTTR 1.00 hour shows the better results compare MTTR 0.53 hour.  
By using MTTR 1.00 hour all components appear within and acceptable 
maintainability criteria where only one component need to re-examined for the 
maintainability prediction time. In MTTR 0.53 hour which is the value of average from 
the maintainability prediction time shows six components need to consider for 
maintainability re examination at the same time approximately 74% (17 components) 
are appear within maintainability acceptable range.  
Therefore, if the designer and maintainability evaluator focusing on simplify the 
design in order to have minimum task time as possible, therefore the MTTR value of 
0.53 hour is the best answer. 
Table 7-11 The summary of maintainability allocation and prediction tasks time for BAe 
146 – 300 for both MTTR values. 
 
Maintainability Prediction Time
(Hour) MTTR = 1.00 MTTR = 0.53 MTTR = 1.00 MTTR = 0.53
1 ACTUATOR 0.76 0.85 0.45 GOOD NOT GOOD
2 ANTI SKID 0.36 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
3 BRAKE 0.67 1.32 0.70 GOOD GOOD
4 BRAKE ASSY 0.67 1.08 0.57 GOOD NOT GOOD
5 CONNECTOR 0.34 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.78 0.75 0.40 NOT GOOD NOT GOOD
7 HYDRAULIC 0.61 0.85 0.45 GOOD NOT GOOD
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 0.55 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 0.28 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.36 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
11 SENSOR 0.55 0.94 0.50 GOOD NOT GOOD
12 STEERING 0.52 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
13 STRUCTURE 0.41 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
14 STRUT 0.41 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
15 SWITCH 0.31 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
16 TIRE 0.56 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.54 0.85 0.45 GOOD NOT GOOD
18 V-BELT 0.52 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.25 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
20 WARNING SYSTEM 0.34 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
21 WHEEL 0.59 1.13 0.60 GOOD GOOD
22 WIRE 0.30 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.30 0.85 0.45 GOOD GOOD
Average 0.48 22 17
No Components
Maintainability Allocation Time (hour) Decision
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Figure 7—7 The trend of maintainability prediction and allocation times for both MTTR 
values for BAe 146 – 300 Landing Gear 
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7.2 Validation 2 – Jetstream 31 – Landing Gear 
7.2.1 Introduction 
This second validation process was from aircraft Jetstream 31. This aircraft is 
owned by Cranfield University and maintained by certified personnel. There were two 
main components involved: Nose Landing Gear (NLG) as shown in Figure 7—8 and 
Main Landing Gear (MLG) as shown in Figure 7—10. Other component includes the 
uplock assembly as shown in Figure 7—9. 
 
Figure 7—8 Jetstream 31 Nose Landing Gear (Source: Cranfield University) 
 
Figure 7—9 Jetstream 31 Uplock Assembly (Source: Cranfield University) 
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Figure 7—10 Jetstream 31 Main Landing Gear (Source: Cranfield University) 
Table 7-12 Summary of information sources for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear validation 
No Data and Information Sources 
1 List of Components Approved Aircraft Maintenance Manual; 
2 List of Failure Rate Non-electronic Part Reliability Data (NPRD) 2011
152
 
3 Mean Time to Failure (MTBF) Equation 4-4 
4 Maintainability Predictions  MIL-HDBK-472 
13
; DOD-HDBK-791 
62
; CAAIP 
107
, & 
Approved Aircraft Maintenance Manual 
5 Maintainability Prediction; 
Checklist C 
Developed approach by author 
6 Maintainability Allocation Improved modules and scores by author 
7 Process for Validation As shown in Integrated Methodology, Chapter 6 
 
The main focus was to perform the validation by using the proposed research 
methodology, as shown in Figure 6—1 and compare the validation task time with the 
real task time supplied by Jetstream 31. The validation also included the use of 
improved techniques by the author in MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure III, checklist C Human 
Factor and described specifically in section 3.3.3. 
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Based on SDR analyses, the Jetstream 31 Landing Gear has contributed the 
most service difficulties since 2000. The detail of SDR analyses is described in the 
following section. 
7.2.2 Service Difficulty Reports (SDR) – Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
The first process was to understand the trend of SDR related to Jetstream. The 
historical data and information were analysed for a period of ten years (2000 – 2009) 
and the results are shown in Table 7-13 and illustrated in Figure 7—11. There have 
been 1,411 SDR for all Jetstream aircrafts since 2000. The results show a decreasing 
trend of SDR starting in 2004 and this could be as a result of the popularity of this type 
of aircraft. Other models have been included to provide a larger database. 
Table 7-13 Summary of Jetstream SDR analyses 
 
 
Figure 7—11 The trend of SDR analyses fro all types of Jetstream 
The following process of SDR analyses is to review and understand the trend of 
SDR part condition. This is to view the most reported type of part conditions for 
Jetstream 31 and the results are shown in Figure 7—12 the top ten JASC code and part 
name. The most reported SDR in according JASC code and part name are JASC code 34 
Navigation with 16.84%, JASC code 32 Landing Gear with 12.03%, and JASC code JASC 
code 24 Electrical Power with 11.68%. 
Jetstream 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL
31 20 5 19 13 10 6 8 4 1 86
32 71 49 19 7 4 5 3 2 160
41 145 123 259 274 184 144 36 1,165
TOTAL 236 177 297 294 198 155 47 4 3 0 1,411
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Figure 7—12 Failed Part Condition percentage distribution for Jetstream in accordance 
with JASC Code 
Meanwhile, Figure 7—13 shows the top ten types of part conditions. Table 7-16 
shows the detail data collected and it can be seen that the year 2000 contributed the 
most SDR reports. This could be because Jetstream were manufacture from 1969 to 
1997, and therefore by the year 2000 there were still many aircraft in service by they 
were now no new aircraft being produced. 
24 - Electrical 
Power, 11.68%
26 - Fire Protection, 
3.78%
30 - Ice and Rain 
Protection, 8.93%
32 - Landing Gear, 
12.03%
34 - Navigation, 
16.84%36 - Pneumatic, 
1.72%
61 -
Propeller/Propulsor
s, 4.81%
72 -
Turbine/Turboprop 
Engine, 6.19%
73 - Engine Fuel 
and Control, 5.15%
77 - Engine 
Indicating, 6.53%
79 - Engine Oil, 
5.15%
Other, 17.18%
Others category includes all other 
Part Conditions contributing <2.5%
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Figure 7—13 Part Condition percentage distribution for all Jetstream models 
Table 7-14 Landing gear system SDR discrepancy statement in accordance with Part 
Condition for failed part condition 
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BROKEN              
2.98%
BURNED OUT          
1.28%
CHAFED              
0.99%
CRACKED             
3.12%
DAMAGED             
2.27%
DEFECTIVE           
1.70%
DIRTY               
2.27%
DISCHARGED          
2.69%
DISCONNECTED        
2.83%
FAILED              
20.62%
FALSE ACTIVATION    
1.20%
FAULTY              
1.63%
ILLUMINATED         
1.49%
INOPERATIVE         
14.46%
INTERMITTENT        
0.99%
LEAKING             
2.48%
LOOSE               
7.37%
MALFUNCTIONED       
8.93%
OUT OF ADJUST       
1.91%
BLANK
4.39%
OTHERS
14.39%
Others category includes all other 
Part Condition contributing <1%
JASC CODE AIRCRAFT COMPONENT PART CONDITION DISCREPANCY
3250 NLG STEERING FAILED          
7301-DEC- DURING TAXI OUT NOSE WHEEL STEERING WOULD NOT TURN RIGHT.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND 
REPLACED THE STEERING SELEC
3250 NLG STEERING FAILED          
7301-DEC- DURING TAXI OUT NOSE WHEEL STEERING WOULD NOT TURN TO THE RIGHT.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED 
AND REPLACED THE STEERING CABLE IAW J41 MAINTENANCE MANUAL
3260 NLG FAILED          
5382-RIC- DURING FLIGHT NOSE LANDING GEAR INTRANSIT LIGHT INOP.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED 
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR MICRO SCITCH IAW J41 MAINTENANCE MANUAL
3241 NR 4 WHEEL FAILED          
STL-DURING TAXI ANTI-SKID CAPTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED NR 4 ANTI-
SKID WHEEL SPEED TRANSDUCER IAW J41 MAINTENANCE MANUAL
3241 ANTI- SKID FAILED          
5358-EWR-DURING TAXI IN LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR BRAKES LOCKED UP DUE TO ANTI-SKID FAILURE NR 1 
MAIN TIRE IS FLAT.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AN REPLACED NR 1 AND 2 MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRE IAW J41 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL.
3242 BRAKE SYS FAILED          
9549-ROC-AIRCRAFT PULLED TO THE LEFT AS IF LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES LOCKED UP, AIRCRAFT WAS 
UNABLE TO TAXI.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED THE DUAL BRAKE CONTROL VALVE IAW J41 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL.
3241 ANTI-SKID FAILED          
5358-EWR-DURING TAXI IN LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR BRAKES LOCKED UP DUE TO ANTI SKID FAILURE NR 2 
MAIN TIRE WAS FLAT.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED NR 2 MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRE IAW J41 
MAINTENANCE MANUAL.
3230 L/H MLG FAILED          
7412-STL-LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AFTER TAKEOFF. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED AND REPLACED LEFT 
MAIN LANDING GEAR RETRACT ACTUATOR
3230 INST PNL FAILED          
7439-CMI-UPON APPROACH NORMAL LANDING GEAR EXTENSION WAS INOPERATIVE, CREW PERFORMED 
EMERGENCY GEAR EXTENSION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCEDENT. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED AND REPLACED 
INSTRUMENT PANEL LANDING GEAR HANDLE, PERFORMED OPERATIONAL CHECK 
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Table 7-15Landing gear system SDR discrepancy statement in accordance with Part 
Condition for malfunctioned part condition 
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Figure 7—14 Percentage distribution for Jetstream in accordance with Part Name 
Table 7-16 The detailed report of the part condition for all Jetstream models 
 
JASC CODE AIRCRAFT COMPONENT PART CONDITION DISCREPANCY
3200 MLG MALFUNCTIONED   
LANDING GEAR INTRANSIT LIGHT STAYED ON LT.  COULD NOT DUPLICATE.  PRECAUTIONARY REPLACEMENT OF 
UPLOCK AND DOWNLOCK SWITCHES PER SB32-891142, PERFORMED ON LEFT MAIN GEAR.  (M)
3210 L/H  MLG MALFUNCTIONED   
7306-STL- DURING CLIMBOUT ALL LANDING GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT.  MAINTENANCE REMOVED AND REPLACED 
LEFT HAND MAIN LANDING GEAR IAW J41 MAINTENANCE MANUAL
3230 MLG MALFUNCTIONED   
GEAR WOULD NOT RETRACT AFTER TAKEOFF.  NO EMERGENCY DECLARED RETURN TO FIELD.  JACKED AIRCRAFT 
RESET MAIN LANDING GEAR BYPASS PIN OPERATIONALLY CHECKED LANDING GEAR.  NO FURTHER ACTION 
REQUIRED.
CONTROL CABLE           , 
2.40%
DOWNLOCK SWITCH         
, 3.59%
LANDING GEAR            
, 2.99%
MASTER CYLINDER         
, 2.40%
SELECTOR VALVE          
, 2.40%
SQUAT SWITCH            , 
2.40%
STRUT                   , 
2.99%
SWITCH                  , 
14.37%
TIRE                    
, 7.19%
UPLOCK 
SWITCH           , 
8.98%
VALVE                   , 
2.99%
WARNING LIGHT           
, 2.40%
WARNING SYSTEM          
, 2.40%
WIRE                    , 4.19%
OTHERS, 38.32%
Others category includes all other Part 
Name contributing <2%
NO PART CONDITION 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL %
1 BROKEN              2 6 14 9 2 6 3 42 2.98%
2 BURNED OUT          2 13 3 18 1.28%
3 CHAFED              3 2 3 3 2 1 14 0.99%
4 CRACKED             14 4 3 11 8 2 2 44 3.12%
5 DAMAGED             5 5 3 6 6 3 3 1 32 2.27%
6 DEFECTIVE           6 5 7 6 24 1.70%
7 DIRTY               2 3 5 6 1 12 3 32 2.27%
8 DISCHARGED          2 4 8 14 7 3 38 2.69%
9 DISCONNECTED        1 7 16 11 3 2 40 2.83%
10 FAILED              152 64 16 21 19 19 291 20.62%
11 FALSE ACTIVATION    1 10 3 2 1 17 1.20%
12 FAULTY              2 3 8 4 4 2 23 1.63%
13 ILLUMINATED         1 1 6 6 7 21 1.49%
14 INOPERATIVE         11 54 70 36 28 4 1 204 14.46%
15 INTERMITTENT        1 6 3 2 1 1 14 0.99%
16 LEAKING             7 5 9 6 5 2 1 35 2.48%
17 LOOSE               2 5 39 32 8 10 7 1 104 7.37%
18 MALFUNCTIONED       8 11 9 20 45 29 4 126 8.93%
19 OUT OF ADJUST       3 7 5 3 2 6 1 27 1.91%
20 BLANK 6 47 9 62 4.39%
21 OTHERS 203 14.39%
TOTAL 205 147 258 258 168 134 34 2 2 0 1,411 100.00%
7.2.3 Maintainability allocation 
The maintainability allocation prediction was performed to identify the 
maximum target of maintenance task time for each individual component. 
improved modules, as previously described in 
Table 7-17 and illustrated in 
that are suggested by industrial expert and both MTTR show almost the same 
trendlines. 
Table 7-17 The summary of maintainability allocation for 
Figure 7—15 The trend of maintainability allocation times for both MTTR values for 
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– Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
chapter 4, and the results 
Figure 7—15. The lists of components are the components 
Jetstream 31 
values 
Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
MTTR = 1.00 MTTR = 3.76
0.51 1.90
0.72 2.71
1.01 3.80
0.51 1.90
1.01 3.80
Maintainability Allocation Time (hour)
Main Landing Main Landing 
Gear
Nose Gear 
Uplock Assembly
Component
MTTR = 1.00 hour MTTR = 3.76 hour
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7.2.4 Maintainability prediction – Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
Based on SDR analyses described in section 7.2.2, the author decided to use 
Jetstream 31 landing gear as a case study for the validation process. The process of 
maintainability prediction is carried out by using approved aircraft maintenance 
manual provided by MRO company as shown in Table 7-12. 
Table 7-18 shows the summary of validation results. The real time column is 
the task time supplied by Jetstream 31. The real task time includes the time for the 
functional test. However, in this research the methodology was developed to predict 
the task time for removal and replace (R & R) only. The detail maintainability 
prediction for Jetstream 31 landing gear is shown in Appendix K, and the maintenance 
analysis for all components is given in Appendix L. 
Table 7-18 The summary of maintainability results for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
 
The real time mentioned above is also known as “billing” time from approved 
MRO to customer. By using MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III and improved checklist C, the 
predicted man-hour for each component is 1.26 hours for Main Gear Uplock Assembly, 
1.18 hours for MLG radius rod, 6.46 hours for MLG, 1.54 hours for Nose Gear Uplock 
Assembly, and 8.35 hours for NLG. The man-hours for NLG are more than other landing 
gear components because NLG is the most difficult task compared to MLG and this has 
been confirmed by a Jetstream engineer. 
 
“Grand Total” column is the total prediction hour by this research which is 
calculated by add column E, column, F, and column G. In “Error” column (Column I) 
calculated by subtracting the Grand total value (Column H) from billing time (Colum D). 
This is to see either the predicted values from this research are matching with 
industrial real time. As a result, MLG Radius Rod contributed 26.07% less than real 
billing time (column C). Mean while Main Gear Uplock Assembly contributed 22.05% 
less real billing time. During design review process or maintainability improvement 
A B C D E F G H I J
Manhour Functional Marginal Time GRAND TOTAL Error %
R & R Test (30%) in hour (10%) in hour (hour) (hour) (Column I/ H)
1 Main Gear Uplock Assembly 2 3.0 1.26 0.90 0.30 2.46 0.54 22.05%
2 Main Landing Gear Radius Rod 2 3.0 1.18 0.90 0.30 2.38 0.62 26.07%
3 Main Landing Gear 2 14.0 6.46 4.20 1.40 12.06 1.94 16.12%
4 Nose Gear Uplock Assembly 1 3.0 1.54 0.90 0.30 2.74 0.26 9.61%
5 Nose Landing Gear 1 14.0 8.35 4.20 1.40 13.95 0.05 0.36%
Note: Average 3.76
     The Functional Tests were NOT included in this predictions;
     Assuming Functional Test = 30% from real time;
     Assuming Marginal Time = 10% from real time;
     Industrial Info 1: Functional test only performed every 4 years.
     R & R = Remove and Replace
Component NameNo Billing TimeQty
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process those two components (MLG Radius Rod & Main Gear Uplock Assembly) needs 
to be considered for redesign. This may include simplifying the design or specification 
improvement. However, this research is a success because the improved checklist C 
from MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III has been tested and validation by using real 
industrial time and shows good results. 
 
The only reference provided by the industry is known as “billing time”. Billing 
time is the time charged to the customer which most of the times include extra time 
for contingency. Based on billing time that is provided by the industry, overall 
validation evaluation is successful. It is because all the predicted values fall within real 
industrial time as shown in Table 7-18 and Figure 7—16. Therefore, based on billing 
time provided by the industry, this research confirms that the developed methodology 
is viable and useful based on available data. However, the actual maintenance task 
time may differ from the billing time data used in the validation. As such, a more 
robust validation may be pursued in the future by collecting actual maintenance task 
time, in addition to the billing time. 
 
Figure 7—16 Summary of Maintainability Predicted Tasks Time for Jetstream 31
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Table 7-19 Maintainability prediction tasks time for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
 
Check List A: DESIGN Uplock Uplock Jack Radius Rod Main Gear Leg Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy Uplock Uplock Jack Nose Leg Retraction Jack Leg Cylinder Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy
1 Access (External) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 External lactches and/or fasterners 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 Internal latches and/or fasterners 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 Access (Internal) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
5 Packaging 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Units - Part (Failed) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
7 Visual Display 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 0 4 4 4 4 4 4
8 Fault and Operation Indicators (BITE) 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
9 Test Points (Availability) 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
10 Test Points (Identifications) 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
11 Labelling 0 0 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 4 4 4
12 Adjustments 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2
13 Testing (In Circuit) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4
14 Protective Devices 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
15 Safety (Personnel) 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
TOTAL 30 30 34 39 40 38 38 36 36 28 30 28 37 40 38 38 36 36
Check List B: FACILTIES Uplock Uplock Jack Radius Rod Main Gear Leg Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy Uplock Uplock Jack Nose Leg Retraction Jack Leg Cylinder Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy
1 External Test Equipment 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4
2 Connectors 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4
3 Jigs or Fixtures 4 4 4 0 4 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 0 4 2 4 2 2
4 Visual Contact 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 Assistance (Operational Personnel) 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 4 4
6 Assistance (Technical Personnel) 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4
7 Assistance (Supervisor or Contractor Personnel) 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 4
TOTAL 28 28 24 14 28 20 24 26 26 26 26 24 14 28 20 24 26 26
Check List C: Maintenance Skills (Human Factors) Uplock Uplock Jack Radius Rod Main Gear Leg Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy Uplock Uplock Jack Nose Leg Retraction Jack Leg Cylinder Anti Skid Main Wheel Brake System Yoke Bearing Toggle Assy
1 Arm, Leg, and Back Strength 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4
2 Endurance and Energy 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4
3 Eye-hand Coordination, Manual Dexterity and Neatness3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Visual Acuity 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Logical Analysis 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Memory - Things and Ideas 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Planfulness and Resourcefulness 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 Alertness, Cautiousness and Accuracy 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 Concentration, Persistence and Patience 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Initiative and Incisiveness 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 33 33 10 9 11 9 9 11 11 33 33 10 9 11 9 9 11 11
Corrective Maintenance Task Time (Mct) in MINUTES 37.74 37.74 70.78 109.84 36.82 76.31 57.59 53.41 53.41 48.77 43.44 100.15 123.31 36.82 76.31 57.59 53.41 53.41
Corrective Maintenance Task Time (Mct) in HOURS 0.63 0.63 1.18 1.83 0.61 1.27 0.96 0.89 0.89 0.81 0.72 1.67 2.06 0.61 1.27 0.96 0.89 0.89
TOTAL (HOURS) 1.18
Components
1.54 8.35
MLG Uplock MAIN LANDING GEAR NLG Uplock NOSE LANDING GEAR
1.26 6.46
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7.2.5 Summary – Validation 2 
There are two scenarios of results from second validation. Table 7-20 shows the 
summary for both maintenance allocation time and maintainability prediction. 
Meanwhile Figure 7—17 illustrated the summary results. Collectively, the results 
indicate that the MTTR 1.00 hour shows the poor results compare MTTR 3.76 hours. By 
using MTTR 1.00 hour all components falls below maintenance allocation and all 
components need to re-examine for the maintainability prediction time. In MTTR 3.76 
hours which is the value of average from the maintainability prediction time shows 
only two components need to consider for maintainability re examination. 
Clearly, the value of MTTR = 1.00 hour is not suitable for this second validation 
process. As the MTTR value is change to 3.76 hours which is the average of 
maintainability prediction methodology, the results show some improvement. 
Therefore, the in this second validation process required large number of MTTR. 
Table 7-20 The summary of maintainability allocation and prediction tasks time for 
Jetstream 31 both MTTR values 
 
 
Figure 7—17 The trend of maintainability prediction and allocation times for both 
MTTR values for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear 
Maintainability Prediction Time
(Hour) MTTR = 1.00 MTTR = 3.76 MTTR = 1.00 MTTR = 3.76
1 Main Gear Uplock Assembly 1.26 0.51 1.90 NOT GOOD GOOD
2 Main Landing Gear Radius Rod 1.18 0.72 2.71 NOT GOOD GOOD
3 Main Landing Gear 6.46 1.01 3.80 NOT GOOD NOT GOOD
4 Nose Gear Uplock Assembly 1.54 0.51 1.90 NOT GOOD GOOD
5 Nose Landing Gear 8.35 1.01 3.80 NOT GOOD NOT GOOD
Average 3.76
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Maintainability Allocation Time (hour) Decision
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
Main Gear Uplock 
Assembly
Main Landing Gear 
Radius Rod
Main Landing Gear Nose Gear Uplock 
Assembly
Nose Landing Gear
T
im
e
 in
 h
o
u
r
Components
Maintainability Prediction Time Allocation Time (MTTR = 1.00 hour)
Allocation Time (MTTR = 3.76 hour)
120 
 
Alternatively, to identify the most appropriate MTTR value for Jetstream 31 
validation process, the author decided to apply Equation 4-4, Equation 4-5, and 
Equation 4-6 to calculate potential MTTR value. There are two main inputs in this 
process; namely 1) Availability and 2) Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 
 The MTBF value can be calculate based on Equation 4-4. For Availability value 
the author decided to used acceptable assumption which is 99.70% Availability or A = 
0.997 as per advice by industry expert. The results of this process are shown Table 7-21 
below. Meanwhile Figure 7—18 illustrate the summary of all results of Jetstream 31. 
This exercise successfully proves that the second validation process required more 
than 3.76 hours of MTTR by using above mentioned formulas. 
Table 7-21 The Jetstream 31 validation process by using formula 
 
 
Figure 7—18 The summary of ALL results for Jetstream 31   
λ Allocated  Rpj
Module Isolation Accessiblity Fail/Cycles 106 (hour)
1 Main Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.298851 16.09 7.20 16.55
2 Main Landing Gear Radius Rod
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 4 3 10 7.994200 79.94 10.28 82.21
3 Main Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 249.740504 3,496.37 14.40 3595.70
4 Nose Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.298851 16.09 7.20 16.55
5 Nose Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 177.916948 2,490.84 14.40 2561.61
6,099.33 6,272.62
λ Landing Gear Fail/Cycles 106
Availability (A) Input Values
MTBF = 1/λ hour
MTTR = [MTBF(1-A)]/A hour Calculated Values
K = Σ λj Kj / Σ λ
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj
Check: MTTRsystem = Σ  λRpj/Σ  λ hour
RESULT GOOD
1.0284
14.25
211.191121
0.997
4,735
14.25
13.85
λRpjNo Allocation (Kj)List of Modules Σ  Kj λj KjComponents
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7.3 Validation conclusion 
The developed methodology has been tested and validated by using approved 
industrial references. The information has been provided and confirmed by aircraft 
certified personnel. The author also used and analysed the data information from 
reliable sources of information. The predicted task times are not only restricted to the 
most suitable maintenance task times but also include the appropriate approach and 
methodology to perform the maintainability prediction. Both aircraft have shown 
indications of successful results. Both aircraft types have been tested by using 
improved maintainability allocation and the final results shown the same trends as the 
data supplied by industry as well as estimation MTTR. 
The maintenance task time has been predicted by existing maintainability 
prediction known as MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III. The existing maintainability 
prediction methodology has been improved by the author through the development of 
a new quantitative approach in checklist C. The improved quantitative approach has 
been tested and validated by using two types of aircraft (i.e. BAe 146 and Jetstream). 
 
 Based on two validation processes the elements of human capabilities and 
number of maintenance sequential have been used in determining the most suitable 
score value for checklist C for each component in order to calculate the potential 
maintenance task time. The results are considerably accurate because the score value 
is assigned based on physical aircraft components. If the size of components is small 
and less than 5 lbs weight therefore the maintenance task required less effort remove 
and replace the affected components. 
 
 Overall, feedback information contributes data for future reliability and repair 
time predictions. The SDR analysis does indicate some deficiencies in design activities 
and service difficulty trend. Secondly, the maintenance allocation methodology does 
provide the maximum task time for each individual components. Thirdly, the improved 
check list C in MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III ease to identify the most appropriate score 
value than before where most of the times the estimation element is used to assign 
the score value. At the same time allow routine maintenance to be revised. 
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8 Discussion 
8.1 Service Difficulties Report (SDR) 
The availability of feedback information in aviation industry has been 
investigated. Based on the collection of sources of feedback information, it is of 
utmost importance to know the purpose of feedback information because it is 
valuable information that is capable of assisting future design improvements and 
enhancements. It is clear that different types of industry deal with the question of the 
role and purpose of feedback information from different perspectives. However, there 
are some common features: 
1. The collection of historical information is to aid in decision making for further 
enhancement. 
2. The information which indicates the condition, performance and/or trend of 
specific products/systems. 
3. The indication of the success of the developed products/systems. 
4. Collective information which can be used to identify, propose and improve the 
performance of developed products/systems. 
5. Collective information used to determine, propose and improve any potential 
error corrective and detection for future products/systems development. 
6. Collective information to set a level of confidence for the rejection and 
acceptance regions of developed products/systems. 
 
The values of a feedback system can be accessed through appropriately 
evaluating the feedback information by using suitable existing tools. One difficulty that 
has been identified from this investigation of information sources is that the 
information collected may be contained in large, complex datasets from which it is 
time consuming for the designer to extract the required information. Service Difficulty 
Reporting System (SDRS), due to its availability, accessibility, and data information 
arrangement (i.e.: JASC Code, Part Condition, Part Name) is good potential feedback 
information source for a design improvement as well as maintainability prediction 
improvement. 
 
A detailed analysis of the SDR data has been performed to demonstrate how 
the data could be used to provide feedback information for maintainability prediction. 
A global evaluation of the SDR data has provided general trends for different 
component types on aircraft. A more detailed analysis at the component level provides 
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information of greater direct relevance to the designer in understanding the potential 
causes of in-service failures. 
 
For example, the analysis of aircraft doors has highlighted that the frequent 
opening of the doors causes potential failures such as dents, being unsecured and 
other types of discrepancy. Once this has happened, such components need to be 
repaired or replaced within the specified time with available resources such as 
manpower and tools. The feedback about the frequencies of such incidents provides 
an indication to the designer of the potential problem associated with door access and 
opening/closing, so that better prediction and/or improvement in the design can be 
proposed. To date such feedback information has not been readily available to the 
designer. 
 
In this research, the author made an attempt to use the Equation 3-1 to 
convert the analysed SDR into service difficulties rate. This is performed to identify any 
potential correlation between service difficulties and failure rate. As a result there is 
no correlation between service difficulties rate and failure rate which previously 
described in section 3.6. 
 
Overall, the results of the SDRS studies have not led to significant surprises. 
However, the quantification of the magnitude of problems may be used to focus on 
design solutions. Furthermore, based on an extensive study of sources of feedback 
information, the author has concluded that existing feedback information can be 
summarised into three categories: 
 
1. Collective type (i.e. Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA), Service Difficulty 
Reporting Systems (SDRS), Government-Industry Data Exchange Program 
(GIDEP), and Air Accident Investigation Branch reports (AAIB)); 
2. Regulatory type (i.e. Airworthiness Directive (AD) and Service Bulletin (SB)); 
3. Monitoring type (i.e. Aircraft Engine Health/Monitoring Systems, Aircraft Tyre 
Monitoring Systems, Aircraft Systems Monitoring Systems (Hydraulic Pump), 
Structural Health Monitoring Systems (SHMS), and Integrated Vehicle/Structural 
Health Monitoring (IVHM/ISHM)). 
  A detailed analysis of Service Difficulty Reporting data has demonstrated that it 
is possible to use SDR data to support the maintainability prediction activities by 
providing trends of the frequency and causes of service difficulties, classified by 
aircraft component. This information will be of benefit to aircraft designers in 
understanding the causes of maintenance related problems for in-service aircraft.  
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  There is no doubt that feedback information is able to contribute an important 
role in the design activities. The design stage is the best option for the designer to 
design and develop systems in order to reduce the service difficulties from a 
maintainability perspective. 
  Others types of information also should be considered from lower level events 
including confidential reporting systems, Flight Data Monitoring, and others which 
could be used for further investigation as well as valuable information. 
 
8.2 Maintainability allocation methodology 
The existing maintainability allocation methodology has been improved by the 
author. The improved methodology is performed by adding more modules and score 
values related to mechanical aircraft components (i.e. Landing Gear, Mechanical 
parts). The additional modules and score values have been tested and validated by 
using several case studies (i.e. Fuel System and Communication Systems). 
The additional modules have been assigned with specific score values. The 
improved methodology, testing and validation results have been described in section 
4.3. The linear formula, as shown below, has been chosen as the primary formula to 
calculate the new score values for new modules and shown in Table 4-6. 
 = 1.4364 + 1.769 Equation 8-1 
Furthermore, to ensure the developed methodology and improved approach is 
applicable to industry, the two approved aircraft have been used for further testing 
and validation processes. The case studies have been tested and validated in 
accordance with the approved maintenance manual supplied by a certified aircraft 
Maintenance and Repair Organisation (MRO). Overall, the results are very successful. 
8.3 Maintainability prediction methodology 
This section present the works that have been performed with the intention of 
using the element of improved maintainability allocation, as previously described. This 
also includes identifying the element of value added into the existing maintainability 
prediction methodology, specifically procedure III. The initial outcome from this effort 
shows an element of success, as previously described in chapter 5. The outcome also 
shows that there is potential to utilise human data as one of the sources of 
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information to improve the existing prediction method. This is performed through the 
improved approach carried out by the author in MIL-HDBK-472, procedure III, in 
checklist C. Checklist C is the section which asked questions related to human 
capabilities. Although this piece of work shows only a very fundamental effort, at least 
it offers and generates ideas for future research development. 
The case studies have been used to ensure the developed approach is 
applicable. The author used both BAe 146 – 300 and Jetstream 31 for the case study 
due to availability and courtesy from the certified MRO. The list of components and 
historical data were extracted from reliable sources, i.e. from the approved MRO, and 
compared with the Service Difficulty Reporting System (SDRS) accessible data 
118
. In 
addition, the Civil Aircraft Airworthiness Information and Procedures (CAAIP) 
107
 were 
used as a general guide to identify potential score values for each question under each 
MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure III checklist.  
Before performing the maintainability prediction, the author applied the 
improved maintainability allocation method as one of the procedures in 
maintainability prediction methodology. The purpose was to have a task time target 
for each component. Through this approach, the author believes that the designer has 
a greater role in effectively designing components. Table 7-5, Table 7-9, Table 7-10, 
and Table 7-17 show the list of components and the maintainability allocation results. 
The maintainability allocation was performed by using improved modules and score 
values. 
In the initial stage of maintainability prediction, the author prepared a generic 
list of landing gear components. The purpose of performing initial stage of 
maintainability prediction was to ensure the author had a better understanding of MIL-
HDBK-472, procedure III, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach for the purpose of further improvement. 
The maintainability prediction in checklists A (Design) and B (Facilities) were 
evaluated based on observations made at the approved MRO and advice from 
industrial experts. In addition, the general guideline from Civil Aircraft Airworthiness 
Information and Procedures (CAAIP) was also used 
107
. 
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9 Conclusion and Future research 
9.1 Conclusion 
Application of the techniques contained in this research will help to promote 
consistency in the development of aviation forecasts. The most important conclusions 
drawn from this research are: 
1. A method has been developed to allow historical data of feedback information 
to help aircraft designer to understand the trends of service difficulties and 
failure in in-service aircraft; 
2. An improved maintainability allocation has been developed that can be used in 
the early stages of the design process to provide a maximum allowable task 
time; 
3. The developed approach for maintainability prediction offers the opportunity 
to accurately predict the maintainability related to human factors, hence 
reducing the potential human errors because the approach is developed in 
accordance with human data and capabilities; 
4. The developed methodology could be more useful if actual data is available for 
the purpose of validation. At the same time, the element of potential financial 
benefits such as the element of reduction maintenance cost flight hour. 
Furthermore, the benefits of utilising the developed methodology in this 
research will be able to reduce human related errors as well as design errors, 
improved maintenance schedule process, improved maintenance activities, and 
increase customers satisfactions. This is because the SDRS contains information 
such as JASC Code which the design will be able to focus on specific JASC for 
future improvement. Other than that SDRS contains information such as Stage 
of Operation where the specific maintenance difficulties are discovered, Type 
of Aircrafts as well as aircraft model which have contributed the most 
maintenance difficulties. Based on this information which also considered as 
feedback information, the future aircraft design can be improved and 
consequently contributed to improvement of aircraft maintenance activities. 
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9.2 Research Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis can be stated as follows: 
1. Contribution to the Prediction Methodology. 
2. Contribution to Academic Theory. 
9.2.1 Contribution to the maintainability prediction methodology 
The main intention of this research has been to look for alternative solutions to 
predict the maintainability prediction from the perspective of academicians.  In 
particular, this research argues that existing approaches for predicting maintainability 
at the conceptual design phase have only been focusing on the failure rate (λ) and that 
many other maintenance problems were very seldom taken into consideration during 
prediction. Failure can be from primary and/or secondary causes. This research made 
an effort to explore the information within the secondary failure such as 
manufacturing causes and other related elements. 
This research therefore contributes to the existing body of knowledge by 
offering an alternative maintainability prediction method that is based on valuable 
information from the end user which can be used during the early aircraft conceptual 
design stage. Overall, this piece of research work has contributed some values and to 
knowledge as follows: 
1. Based on advices and opinions from aircraft maintenance practitioners/experts 
the predicted values were acceptable because they are below real industrial 
task times; 
2. The idea proposed in this research is a starting point for further investigation 
and better maintainability prediction through the integration of human data 
into design consideration. 
3. This research has proved that the elements of human factors, human error and 
human data are able to improve maintainability prediction and therefore the 
author encourages the future development of maintainability prediction to 
include and consider the above mentioned elements.  
9.2.2 Contribution to academic theory 
This research contributes to the opportunities for academicians to use 
alternative inputs to propose, improve and predict future potential aircraft design. 
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However, these inputs have to be finalised or compared to real in-service feedback 
information which is collected by major aircraft manufacturers (i.e. Boeing and Airbus). 
In addition, the research is able to offer others potential techniques to be developed 
to accurately use and quantitatively convert the information from the user into some 
form of quantitative element such as rate. In this research all analysed feedback 
information was converted into service difficulty rate, abbreviated to SR. The analysed 
feedback information does show significant information for future improvement. The 
quantitative prediction can never be complete, and therefore this research offers 
many more opportunities to utilise aircraft related feedback information for 
potentially long-term design improvement. 
9.3 Suggestions & Potential for Future Research/Work  
This research attempt to extract and show the important as well as valuable 
information contains within feedback information. The selected feedback information 
in this research (i.e.: SDRS) be able to offer numerous causes & affect of existing 
discrepancies. At the same time when and how the discrepancies happened also 
mentioned within the feedback information. The author is able to analyse all of these 
information effectively. However, the analyses could be more accurate if there are 
cooperation and support from industry by providing real data information. 
 
Based on the research conclusions and finding issues, the author proposes the 
following suggestions for future and potential research: 
  
1. Improve the development of a systematic methodology to gather data from in-
service aircraft information before being channelled to the design team; 
a. To design appropriate/suitable methodology to convert as well as 
summarise the whole set of feedback information into valuable 
information to be use for future design improvement.  
2. Develop the overall maintainability assessment is to be performed on particular 
and/or all aircraft systems using real in-service maintenance difficulties 
reported. The process could be as follows: 
a. To collect real maintenance task time by using stop watch to and 
further to compare the collected real maintenance time to the 
predicted maintenance time; 
3. Identify the importance measures for aircraft maintenance related feedback 
formation and compare to Failure Rate (λ). 
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a. Analysed information has to be converted into quantitative information 
such as total operations time (i.e.: Total engine run in hour, Total flying 
hours). 
 
The benefits of those main element of future works as previously mentioned is 
not only limited to identify the most effective method to predict the maintainability 
effective but it is also to identify the potential cost benefits. The actual data supply by 
industry is one of the suitable and effective ways to make this research successful as 
well as could be a better approach for future aircraft design and development. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Regulation Issues: EASA Part 145 
In aircraft maintenance, all personal involved in aircraft maintenance activities are 
required to record all work carried out. This is clearly stated in Official Journal of 
European Journal, 2003a & b. 
145. A.45 Maintenance data 
a) The organisation shall hold and use applicable current maintenance data in the 
performance of maintenance, including modifications and repairs. ‘Applicable’ 
means relevant to any aircraft, component or process specified in the 
organisation's approval class rating schedule and in any associated capability list. 
b) For the purposes of this Part, applicable maintenance data shall be any of the 
following: 
4. Any applicable standard, such as but not limited to, maintenance standard 
practices recognised by the Agency as a good standard for maintenance; 
d) The organisation may only modify maintenance instructions in accordance with a 
procedure specified in the maintenance organisation's exposition. With respect to 
those changes, the organisation shall demonstrate that they result in equivalent 
or improved maintenance standards and shall inform the type-certificate holder 
of such changes. Maintenance instructions for the purposes of this paragraph 
means instructions on how to carry out the particular maintenance task: they 
exclude the engineering design of repairs and modifications. 
f) The organisation shall ensure that all applicable maintenance data is readily 
available for use when required by maintenance personnel. 
g) The organisation shall establish a procedure to ensure that maintenance data it 
controls is kept up to date. In the case of operator/customer controlled and 
provided maintenance data, the organisation shall be able to show that either it 
has written confirmation from the operator/customer that all such 
maintenance data is up to date or it has work orders specifying the amendment 
status of the maintenance data to be used or it can show that it is on the 
operator/customer maintenance data amendment list. 
145. A.55 Maintenance records 
a) The organisation shall record all details of maintenance work carried out. As a 
minimum, the organisation shall retain records necessary to prove that all 
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requirements have been met for issuance of the certificate of release to service, 
including subcontractor's release documents. 
b) The organisation shall provide a copy of each certificate of release to service to 
the aircraft operator, together with a copy of any specific approved 
repair/modification data used for repairs/modifications carried out. 
c) The organisation shall retain a copy of all detailed maintenance records and any 
associated maintenance data for two years from the date the aircraft or 
component to which the work relates was released from the organisation. 
1. Records under this paragraph shall be stored in a safe way with regard to 
fire, flood and theft. 
2. Computer backup discs, tapes etc. shall be stored in a different location from 
that containing the working discs, tapes etc., in an environment that ensures 
they remain in good condition. 
3. Where an organisation approved under this Part terminates its operation, all 
retained maintenance records covering the last two years shall be distributed 
to the last owner or customer of the respective aircraft or component or shall 
be stored as specified by the competent authority. 
 
145. A.60 Occurrence reporting 
a) The organisation shall report to the competent authority, the state of registry and 
the organisation responsible for the design of the aircraft or component any 
condition of the aircraft or component identified by the organisation that has 
resulted or may result in an unsafe condition that hazards seriously the flight 
safety. 
b) The organisation shall establish an internal occurrence reporting system as 
detailed in the exposition to enable the collection and evaluation of such reports, 
including the assessment and extraction of those occurrences to be reported 
under paragraph (a). This procedure shall identify adverse trends, corrective 
actions taken or to be taken by the organisation to address deficiencies and 
include evaluation of all known relevant information relating to such 
occurrences and a method to circulate the information as necessary. 
c) The organisation shall make such reports in a form and manner established by the 
Agency and ensures that they contain all pertinent information about the 
condition and evaluation results known to the organisation. 
d) Where the organisation is contracted by a commercial operator to carry out 
maintenance, the organisation shall also report to the operator any such 
condition affecting the operator's aircraft or component. 
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e) The organisation shall produce and submit such reports as soon as practicable but 
in any case within 72 hours of the organisation identifying the condition to which 
the report relates. 
 
145. A.65 Safety and quality policy, maintenance procedures and quality 
system 
4. Maintenance procedures shall be established to ensure that damage is assessed 
and modifications and repairs are carried out using data approved by the 
Agency or by an approved Part-21 design organisation, as appropriate. 
c) The organisation shall establish a quality system that includes the following: 
1) Independent audits in order to monitor compliance with required 
aircraft/aircraft component standards and adequacy of the procedures to 
ensure that such procedures invoke good maintenance practices and 
airworthy aircraft/aircraft components. In the smallest organisations the 
independent audit part of the quality system may be contracted to another 
organisation approved under this Part or a person with appropriate 
technical knowledge and proven satisfactory audit experience; and 
2) A quality feedback reporting system to the person or group of persons 
specified in 145.A.30 (b) and ultimately to the accountable manager that 
ensures proper and timely corrective action is taken in response to reports 
resulting from the independent audits established to meet paragraph (1). 
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Appendix B Service Difficulties Report global analyses 
Table B-1 Service Difficulties Report (SDR) analyses in accordance with four main 
categories 
 
Table B-2 SDR analyses in accordance with Airframe systems 
 
Table B-3 SDR analyses in accordance with 2 series JASC Code of Airframe systems 
 
Table B-4 SDR analyses in accordance with 3 series JASC Code of Airframe systems 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B-5 SDR analyses in accordance with 5 series JASC Code of Airframe systems 
SYSTEM 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL % AVERAGE
AIRCRAFT 7 13 161 199 305 77 36 78 61 62 999 0.24% 100
AIRFRAME SYSTEMS 40,555 37,326 32,435 31,204 33,640 34,681 43,454 46,917 47,194 49,406 396,812 93.40% 39,681
PROPELLER/ROTOR SYSTEMS 291 392 1,062 1,555 502 315 225 209 186 136 4,873 1.15% 487
POWERPLANT SYSTEM 2,238 2,386 2,937 2,735 2,176 1,985 1,998 1,956 1,879 1,860 22,150 5.21% 2,215
424,834 100.00%
AIRRAME SYSTEMS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL % AVERAGE
2XXX 5,171 6,275 6,238 6,397 5,943 5,943 7,492 7,152 6,856 6,237 63,704 16.14% 6,370
3XXX 8,693 8,911 7,994 8,114 7,518 7,186 9,667 12,037 12,161 13,098 95,379 24.16% 9,538
4XXX 175 198 208 170 192 209 258 351 320 410 2,491 0.63% 249
5XXX 26,352 21,716 17,807 16,350 19,827 21,192 25,848 27,154 27,649 29,333 233,228 59.07% 23,323
394,802 100.00%
AIRRAME SYSTEMS (2XXX) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL % AVERAGE
21 AIR CONDITIONING 933 953 851 756 824 950 1,135 1,232 1,219 1,177 10,030 15.74% 1,003
22 AUTO FLIGHT 83 284 225 302 268 148 259 140 123 114 1,946 3.05% 195
23 COMMUNICATIONS 87 88 175 254 106 107 140 148 145 180 1,430 2.24% 143
24 ELECTRICAL POWER 433 510 628 702 408 392 460 507 533 513 5,086 7.98% 509
25 EQUIPMENT/FURNISHINGS 1,065 1,178 1,185 1,342 1,497 1,195 1,389 1,954 1,952 1,910 14,667 23.02% 1,467
26 FIRE PROTECTION 651 766 720 813 651 528 599 785 790 482 6,785 10.65% 679
27 FLIGHT CONTROLS 1,199 1,721 1,451 1,281 1,484 1,954 2,757 1,561 1,307 1,048 15,763 24.74% 1,576
28 FUEL 195 204 364 401 238 174 246 257 269 337 2,685 4.21% 269
29 HYDRAULIC POWER 525 571 639 546 467 495 507 568 518 476 5,312 8.34% 531
63,704 100.00%
AIRRAME SYSTEMS (3XXX) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL % AVERAGE
30 ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION 272 311 271 230 243 213 235 332 248 228 2,583 2.65% 258
31 INSTRUMENTS 139 189 255 206 149 150 497 414 277 235 2,511 2.58% 251
32 LANDING GEAR 2,030 1,790 1,928 1,945 1,722 1,819 1,698 2,068 1,880 1,691 18,571 19.07% 1,857
33 LIGHTS 5,612 5,869 4,739 4,758 4,702 4,416 6,493 8,510 8,988 10,270 64,357 66.08% 6,436
34 NAVIGATIONS 547 641 753 909 634 504 646 456 444 515 6,049 6.21% 605
35 OXYGEN 72 85 30 44 45 61 77 226 291 122 1,053 1.08% 105
36 PNEUMATIC 164 226 188 173 160 151 189 223 208 328 2,010 2.06% 201
37 VACUUM 4 7 3 9 6 4 3 3 3 4 46 0.05% 5
38 WATER/WASTE 17 19 15 13 17 19 18 28 30 33 209 0.21% 21
97,389 100.00%
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AIRRAME SYSTEMS (5XXX) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL % AVERAGE
51 STANDARDS PRACTICES/STRUCTURES 6 70 18 17 23 97 647 142 100 25 1,145 0.49% 115
52 DOORS 1,873 1,472 1,365 1,277 1,319 1,548 1,771 2,268 2,272 2,575 17,740 7.61% 1,774
53 FUSELAGE 19,719 16,190 13,049 10,765 13,047 14,831 17,629 19,033 19,397 21,010 164,670 70.60% 16,467
54 NACELLES/PYLONS 332 364 469 514 353 359 588 597 632 428 4,636 1.99% 464
55 STABILIZERS 964 769 683 817 1,110 1,112 1,015 1,136 1,107 815 9,528 4.09% 953
56 WINDOWS 223 342 294 239 231 246 312 319 266 244 2,716 1.16% 272
57 WINGS 3,235 2,509 1,929 2,721 3,744 2,999 3,886 3,659 3,875 4,236 32,793 14.06% 3,279
233,228 100.00%
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Appendix C Aircraft Hours Flown 
Table C-1 The information for aircraft hours flown 
153
 
 
Air Carrier General Aviation
1990 12.150 28.510
1991 11.781 27.678
1992 12.360 24.780
1993 12.706 22.796
1994 13.124 22.235
1995 13.505 24.906
1996 13.746 24.881
1997 15.838 25.591
1998 16.817 25.518
1999 17.555 29.246
2000 18.299 27.838
2001 17.814 25.431
2002 17.290 25.545
2003 17.468 25.998
2004 18.883 24.888
2005 19.390 23.168
2006 19.263 23.963
2007 19.637 23.819
2008 19.098 22.805
2009 18.001 20.456
Year
Aircraft Hours Flown (Millions)
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Appendix D  Case study 1 – Aircraft fuel systems 
Table D-1 Service difficulties rate for Aircraft fuel systems 
 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
18.299 17.814 17.290 17.468 18.883 19.390 19.263 19.637 19.098 18.001
1 Hand Pump Pump 977 292 1.5957E-05 1.6392E-05 1.6888E-05 1.6716E-05 1.5464E-05 1.5059E-05 1.5159E-05 1.4870E-05 1.5290E-05 1.6221E-05 1.5802E-05
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Selector Valve 1113 10 5.4648E-07 5.6136E-07 5.7837E-07 5.7248E-07 5.2958E-07 5.1573E-07 5.1913E-07 5.0924E-07 5.2362E-07 5.5552E-07 5.4115E-07
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Pressure Valve 955 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
4 Reservoir Reservoir 1013 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1427 166 9.0715E-06 9.3185E-06 9.6009E-06 9.5031E-06 8.7910E-06 8.5611E-06 8.6176E-06 8.4534E-06 8.6920E-06 9.2217E-06 8.9831E-06
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Pump 977 292 1.5957E-05 1.6392E-05 1.6888E-05 1.6716E-05 1.5464E-05 1.5059E-05 1.5159E-05 1.4870E-05 1.5290E-05 1.6221E-05 1.5802E-05
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1427 166 9.0715E-06 9.3185E-06 9.6009E-06 9.5031E-06 8.7910E-06 8.5611E-06 8.6176E-06 8.4534E-06 8.6920E-06 9.2217E-06 8.9831E-06
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Pump 977 292 1.5957E-05 1.6392E-05 1.6888E-05 1.6716E-05 1.5464E-05 1.5059E-05 1.5159E-05 1.4870E-05 1.5290E-05 1.6221E-05 1.5802E-05
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1427 166 9.0715E-06 9.3185E-06 9.6009E-06 9.5031E-06 8.7910E-06 8.5611E-06 8.6176E-06 8.4534E-06 8.6920E-06 9.2217E-06 8.9831E-06
10 Pipe Pipe 904 5 2.7324E-07 2.8068E-07 2.8918E-07 2.8624E-07 2.6479E-07 2.5786E-07 2.5956E-07 2.5462E-07 2.6181E-07 2.7776E-07 2.7057E-07
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Heat Exchanger 644 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Light 759 1 5.4648E-08 5.6136E-08 5.7837E-08 5.7248E-08 5.2958E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.0924E-08 5.2362E-08 5.5552E-08 5.4115E-08
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Indicator 691 113 6.1752E-06 6.3433E-06 6.5356E-06 6.4690E-06 5.9842E-06 5.8277E-06 5.8662E-06 5.7544E-06 5.9168E-06 6.2774E-06 6.1150E-06
20 Hose Hose 662 21 1.1476E-06 1.1788E-06 1.2146E-06 1.2022E-06 1.1121E-06 1.0830E-06 1.0902E-06 1.0694E-06 1.0996E-06 1.1666E-06 1.1364E-06
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Valve 1427 166 9.0715E-06 9.3185E-06 9.6009E-06 9.5031E-06 8.7910E-06 8.5611E-06 8.6176E-06 8.4534E-06 8.6920E-06 9.2217E-06 8.9831E-06
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1427 166 9.0715E-06 9.3185E-06 9.6009E-06 9.5031E-06 8.7910E-06 8.5611E-06 8.6176E-06 8.4534E-06 8.6920E-06 9.2217E-06 8.9831E-06
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Vent 1438 9 4.9183E-07 5.0522E-07 5.2053E-07 5.1523E-07 4.7662E-07 4.6416E-07 4.6722E-07 4.5832E-07 4.7125E-07 4.9997E-07 4.8703E-07
Number of flight flown hours per year (millions)
Average difficulties rate
AVERAGENo System /  Sub System CODE FEEDBACK
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Appendix E Case Study 2 – Aircraft Communications 
Table E-1 Service difficulties rate for Aircraft Communication 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
18.299 17.814 17.29 17.468 18.883 19.39 19.263 19.637 19.098 18.001
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 Audio Panel 68 35 1.91267E-06 1.96475E-06 2.02429E-06 2.00366E-06 1.85352E-06 1.80505E-06 1.81695E-06 1.78235E-06 1.83265E-06 1.94434E-06 1.89402E-06
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 Audio Panel 68 35 1.91267E-06 1.96475E-06 2.02429E-06 2.00366E-06 1.85352E-06 1.80505E-06 1.81695E-06 1.78235E-06 1.83265E-06 1.94434E-06 1.89402E-06
3 Headset 1 Headset 642 13 7.10421E-07 7.29763E-07 7.5188E-07 7.44218E-07 6.8845E-07 6.70449E-07 6.74869E-07 6.62016E-07 6.807E-07 7.22182E-07 7.03495E-07
4 Headset 2 Headset 642 13 7.10421E-07 7.29763E-07 7.5188E-07 7.44218E-07 6.8845E-07 6.70449E-07 6.74869E-07 6.62016E-07 6.807E-07 7.22182E-07 7.03495E-07
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Microphone 819 33 1.80338E-06 1.85248E-06 1.90862E-06 1.88917E-06 1.7476E-06 1.70191E-06 1.71313E-06 1.6805E-06 1.72793E-06 1.83323E-06 1.78579E-06
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Microphone 819 33 1.80338E-06 1.85248E-06 1.90862E-06 1.88917E-06 1.7476E-06 1.70191E-06 1.71313E-06 1.6805E-06 1.72793E-06 1.83323E-06 1.78579E-06
7 Speaker 1 Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
8 Speaker 2 Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
9 VHF 1 Antenna Antenna 50 46 2.5138E-06 2.58224E-06 2.6605E-06 2.63339E-06 2.43605E-06 2.37236E-06 2.388E-06 2.34252E-06 2.40863E-06 2.55541E-06 2.48929E-06
10 VHF 1 Transceiver Transceiver 1369 217 1.18586E-05 1.21814E-05 1.25506E-05 1.24227E-05 1.14918E-05 1.11913E-05 1.12651E-05 1.10506E-05 1.13624E-05 1.20549E-05 1.17429E-05
11 VHF 1 Control Panel Control Panel 292 56 3.06028E-06 3.14359E-06 3.23887E-06 3.20586E-06 2.96563E-06 2.88809E-06 2.90713E-06 2.85176E-06 2.93224E-06 3.11094E-06 3.03044E-06
12 VHF 2 Antenna Antenna 50 46 2.5138E-06 2.58224E-06 2.6605E-06 2.63339E-06 2.43605E-06 2.37236E-06 2.388E-06 2.34252E-06 2.40863E-06 2.55541E-06 2.48929E-06
13 VHF 2 Transceiver Transceiver 1369 217 1.18586E-05 1.21814E-05 1.25506E-05 1.24227E-05 1.14918E-05 1.11913E-05 1.12651E-05 1.10506E-05 1.13624E-05 1.20549E-05 1.17429E-05
14 VHF 2 Control Panel Control Panel 292 56 3.06028E-06 3.14359E-06 3.23887E-06 3.20586E-06 2.96563E-06 2.88809E-06 2.90713E-06 2.85176E-06 2.93224E-06 3.11094E-06 3.03044E-06
15 HF Antenna Antenna 50 46 2.5138E-06 2.58224E-06 2.6605E-06 2.63339E-06 2.43605E-06 2.37236E-06 2.388E-06 2.34252E-06 2.40863E-06 2.55541E-06 2.48929E-06
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Light 759 1 5.46478E-08 5.61356E-08 5.78369E-08 5.72475E-08 5.29577E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.09243E-08 5.23615E-08 5.55525E-08 5.4115E-08
17 HF Antenna Coupler Coupler 314 58 3.16957E-06 3.25587E-06 3.35454E-06 3.32036E-06 3.07155E-06 2.99123E-06 3.01095E-06 2.95361E-06 3.03697E-06 3.22204E-06 3.13867E-06
18 HF Transceiver Transceiver 1369 217 1.18586E-05 1.21814E-05 1.25506E-05 1.24227E-05 1.14918E-05 1.11913E-05 1.12651E-05 1.10506E-05 1.13624E-05 1.20549E-05 1.17429E-05
19 HF Control Panel Control Panel 292 56 3.06028E-06 3.14359E-06 3.23887E-06 3.20586E-06 2.96563E-06 2.88809E-06 2.90713E-06 2.85176E-06 2.93224E-06 3.11094E-06 3.03044E-06
20 Selcal Decoder Decoder 363 6 3.27887E-07 3.36814E-07 3.47021E-07 3.43485E-07 3.17746E-07 3.09438E-07 3.11478E-07 3.05546E-07 3.14169E-07 3.33315E-07 3.2469E-07
21 Selcal Control Panel Control Panel 292 56 3.06028E-06 3.14359E-06 3.23887E-06 3.20586E-06 2.96563E-06 2.88809E-06 2.90713E-06 2.85176E-06 2.93224E-06 3.11094E-06 3.03044E-06
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 Amplifier 38 26 1.42084E-06 1.45953E-06 1.50376E-06 1.48844E-06 1.3769E-06 1.3409E-06 1.34974E-06 1.32403E-06 1.3614E-06 1.44436E-06 1.40699E-06
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 Amplifier 38 26 1.42084E-06 1.45953E-06 1.50376E-06 1.48844E-06 1.3769E-06 1.3409E-06 1.34974E-06 1.32403E-06 1.3614E-06 1.44436E-06 1.40699E-06
24 PA Speaker Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
25 PA Speaker Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
26 PA Speaker Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
27 PA Speaker Speaker 1196 11 6.01126E-07 6.17492E-07 6.36206E-07 6.29723E-07 5.82535E-07 5.67303E-07 5.71043E-07 5.60167E-07 5.75977E-07 6.11077E-07 5.95265E-07
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Recorder 999 1 5.46478E-08 5.61356E-08 5.78369E-08 5.72475E-08 5.29577E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.09243E-08 5.23615E-08 5.55525E-08 5.4115E-08
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Recorder 999 1 5.46478E-08 5.61356E-08 5.78369E-08 5.72475E-08 5.29577E-08 5.1573E-08 5.1913E-08 5.09243E-08 5.23615E-08 5.55525E-08 5.4115E-08
Number of flight flown hours per year (millions)
Average difficulties rate
AVERAGEFEEDBACKCODESUB SYSTEMNO
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Appendix F Case study 3 – Landing Gear 
Table F-1 Service difficulties rate for Aircraft Landing Gear 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
18.299 17.814 17.290 17.468 18.883 19.390 19.263 19.637 19.098 18.001
1 ACTUATOR                16 917 5.0112E-05 5.14764E-05 5.30364E-05 5.2496E-05 4.85622E-05 4.72924E-05 4.76042E-05 4.66976E-05 4.80155E-05 5.09416E-05 4.9623E-05
2 BRAKE                   148 484 2.645E-05 2.71696E-05 2.79931E-05 2.77078E-05 2.56315E-05 2.49613E-05 2.51259E-05 2.46473E-05 2.5343E-05 2.68874E-05 2.6192E-05
3 BRAKE ASSY              149 417 2.2788E-05 2.34086E-05 2.4118E-05 2.38722E-05 2.20834E-05 2.15059E-05 2.16477E-05 2.12354E-05 2.18347E-05 2.31654E-05 2.2566E-05
4 CONNECTOR               275 395 2.1586E-05 2.21736E-05 2.28456E-05 2.26128E-05 2.09183E-05 2.03713E-05 2.05056E-05 2.01151E-05 2.06828E-05 2.19432E-05 2.1375E-05
5 CONTROL UNIT            300 302 1.6504E-05 1.6953E-05 1.74667E-05 1.72888E-05 1.59932E-05 1.5575E-05 1.56777E-05 1.53791E-05 1.58132E-05 1.67768E-05 1.6343E-05
6 LANDING GEAR            742 784 4.2844E-05 4.40103E-05 4.53441E-05 4.48821E-05 4.15188E-05 4.04332E-05 4.06998E-05 3.99246E-05 4.10514E-05 4.35531E-05 4.2426E-05
7 PROXIMITY SENSOR        968 529 2.8909E-05 2.96957E-05 3.05957E-05 3.02839E-05 2.80146E-05 2.72821E-05 2.7462E-05 2.69389E-05 2.76992E-05 2.93873E-05 2.8627E-05
8 PROXIMITY SWITCH        969 476 2.6012E-05 2.67206E-05 2.75304E-05 2.72498E-05 2.52079E-05 2.45487E-05 2.47106E-05 2.424E-05 2.49241E-05 2.6443E-05 2.5759E-05
9 SELECTOR VALVE          1113 439 2.399E-05 2.46435E-05 2.53904E-05 2.51317E-05 2.32484E-05 2.26405E-05 2.27898E-05 2.23558E-05 2.29867E-05 2.43875E-05 2.3756E-05
10 SENSOR                  1116 390 2.1313E-05 2.18929E-05 2.25564E-05 2.23265E-05 2.06535E-05 2.01135E-05 2.02461E-05 1.98605E-05 2.0421E-05 2.16655E-05 2.1105E-05
11 STRUT                   1270 540 2.951E-05 3.03132E-05 3.12319E-05 3.09137E-05 2.85972E-05 2.78494E-05 2.8033E-05 2.74991E-05 2.82752E-05 2.99983E-05 2.9222E-05
12 SWITCH                  1286 575 3.1422E-05 3.2278E-05 3.32562E-05 3.29173E-05 3.04507E-05 2.96545E-05 2.985E-05 2.92815E-05 3.01079E-05 3.19427E-05 3.1116E-05
13 TIRE                    1350 643 3.5139E-05 3.60952E-05 3.71891E-05 3.68102E-05 3.40518E-05 3.31614E-05 3.33801E-05 3.27443E-05 3.36684E-05 3.57202E-05 3.4796E-05
14 UPLOCK SWITCH           1424 249 1.3607E-05 1.39778E-05 1.44014E-05 1.42546E-05 1.31865E-05 1.28417E-05 1.29263E-05 1.26801E-05 1.3038E-05 1.38326E-05 1.3475E-05
15 V-BELT                  1427 304 1.6613E-05 1.70652E-05 1.75824E-05 1.74033E-05 1.60991E-05 1.56782E-05 1.57816E-05 1.5481E-05 1.59179E-05 1.6888E-05 1.6451E-05
16 WARNING LIGHT           1464 414 2.2624E-05 2.32401E-05 2.39445E-05 2.37005E-05 2.19245E-05 2.13512E-05 2.1492E-05 2.10827E-05 2.16777E-05 2.29987E-05 2.2404E-05
17 WARNING SYSTEM          1466 296 1.6176E-05 1.66161E-05 1.71197E-05 1.69453E-05 1.56755E-05 1.52656E-05 1.53662E-05 1.50736E-05 1.5499E-05 1.64435E-05 1.6018E-05
18 WHEEL                   1478 352 1.9236E-05 1.97597E-05 2.03586E-05 2.01511E-05 1.86411E-05 1.81537E-05 1.82734E-05 1.79253E-05 1.84312E-05 1.95545E-05 1.9048E-05
19 WIRE                    1488 295 1.6121E-05 1.656E-05 1.70619E-05 1.6888E-05 1.56225E-05 1.5214E-05 1.53143E-05 1.50227E-05 1.54466E-05 1.6388E-05 1.5964E-05
20 WIRE HARNESS            1489 260 1.4208E-05 1.45953E-05 1.50376E-05 1.48844E-05 1.3769E-05 1.3409E-05 1.34974E-05 1.32403E-05 1.3614E-05 1.44436E-05 1.407E-05
Number of flight flown hours per year (millions)
Average difficulties rate
AVERAGENo System /  Sub System CODE FEEDBACK
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Appendix G Sequential evaluation of Allocation repair time 
Table G-1 Sequential equation for allocation repair time 
14
 
No Equations Description 
1 5 = 	
"5"
 +⋯+
5
  
k = Weighting Factor 
λj, …….., λp = failure rate of each unit 
λ = λj + …… + λp = failure rate of system/sub 
system 
2 λ =	"5"5 +⋯+
5
5  Solve for λ 
3   =	"" + ⋯+

  
Existing formula (known), where: 
λj, …….., λp = failure rate of each unit 
λ = λj + …… + λp = failure rate of system/sub 
system 
Rpj, ……, Rpp = Active repair time of each unit 
MTTR = Mean Time to Repair of system 
4 λ =	 ""  +⋯+

   Solve for λ 
5 
"5"
5 +⋯+
5
5 = 	
""
  +⋯+

   Therefore: equation (2) = (4) 
6 " Q5"5 −
"
 R +	…+ 	 Q
5
5 −

 R = 0 Rearrange the equations (5) 
7 Q5"5 −
"
 R = 0 Simplifies equation (6) 
8 
5"
5 = 	
"
  Rearrange equation (7) 
9 " = 	 5 5" Equation to Allocated Active Repair (Rpj) 
10 5 = 	∑ "5"
6789
Σ	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Appendix H Testing and validating the four selected 
trendlines 
Table H-1 List of initial maintainability allocation predictions 
 
 
Table H-2 List of maintainability allocation testing 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM TO
1 0.000 0.526 1.0
2 0.527 1.053 1.5
3 1.054 1.579 2.0
4 1.580 2.105 2.5
5 2.106 2.632 3.0
6 2.633 3.158 3.5
7 3.159 3.684 4.0
8 3.685 4.211 4.5
9 4.212 4.737 5.0
10 4.738 5.263 5.5
11 5.264 5.789 6.0
12 5.790 6.316 6.5
13 6.317 6.842 7.0
14 6.843 7.368 7.5
15 7.369 7.895 8.0
16 7.896 8.421 8.5
17 8.422 8.947 9.0
18 8.948 9.474 9.5
19 9.475 10.000 10.0
TIME IN HOURS
SCORESEQ
log Linear Power Expon. log Linear Power Expon.
1 0.148 1.0 1.0 -0.7 2.0 0.9 2.0 -1.7 1.0 -0.1 1.0
2 0.532 1.0 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.2
3 0.532 1.5 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7
4 0.532 1.5 1.5 2.6 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7
5 0.378 2.0 1.0 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 0.1
6 0.336 2.0 1.0 1.4 2.3 1.6 2.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.4 0.1
7 1.074 3.0 2.0 4.4 3.3 3.5 2.7 1.4 0.3 0.5 -0.3
8 0.811 4.0 1.5 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.4 -0.3 -1.1 -1.1 -1.6
9 0.677 4.0 1.5 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.3 -0.8 -1.3 -1.4 -1.7
10 1.007 4.0 1.5 4.2 3.2 3.4 2.6 0.2 -0.8 -0.6 -1.4
11 1.130 4.0 2.0 4.5 3.4 3.7 2.7 0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -1.3
12 1.320 6.0 2.0 4.9 3.7 4.1 2.9 -1.1 -2.3 -1.9 -3.1
13 6.147 10.0 6.5 8.9 10.6 11.7 13.2 -1.1 0.6 1.7 3.2
SCORE
Error
No
PREDICTION SCORE
TIME (HR) Vlookup
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Table H-3 Testing and validating by using EXISTING modules and score values 
 
Table H-4 Testing and validating by using LOG formula for new score values 
 
Table H-5 Testing and validating by using LINEAR formula for new score values 
 
  
No Unit Generic Module Types Kj1 Kj2 Kj3 Σ Kj F/10-6 hours Fj Kj Allocated Rpj FR * Rpj
1 Output TWT Power Supply Power Supplies 2.0 0 0 2.0 776 1,552 0.72 555.56
2 Driver TWT and Auxiliary Power Supply Power Supplies 2.0 0 0 2.0 1270 2,540 0.72 909.22
3 System Control Unit Electromechanical+digital+electromechanical 2.3 0 0 2.3 368 859 0.84 307.37
4 Modulator Unit Analog 1.5 0 0 1.5 282 423 0.54 151.42
5 Output TWT High-power/High-frequency components 4.0 0 0 4.0 252 1,008 1.43 360.83
6 Driver TWT High-power/High-frequency components 4.0 0 0 4.0 1300 5,200 1.43 1861.40
7 Antenna Drive Eletromechanical equipment 3.0 0 0 3.0 682 2,046 1.07 732.39
8 Cooling pump/motor Liquid coolant systems 4.0 0 0 4.0 120 480 1.43 171.82
5,050 14,108 5,050
MTBF 198
MTTR 1.0
K 2.79
Rpj 0.3580
Check: MTTRsystem 1.0
No Unit Generic Module Types Kj1 Kj2 Kj3 Σ Kj F/10-6 hours Fj Kj Allocated Rpj FR * Rpj
1 Output TWT Power Supply Power Supplies 1.0 0 0 1.0 776 776 0.37 286.99
2 Driver TWT and Auxiliary Power Supply Power Supplies 1.0 0 0 1.0 1270 1,270 0.37 469.69
3 System Control Unit Electromechanical+digital+electromechanical 3.3 0 0 3.3 368 1,227 1.23 453.67
4 Modulator Unit Analog 3.0 0 0 3.0 282 846 1.11 312.88
5 Output TWT High-power/High-frequency components 4.0 0 0 4.0 252 1,008 1.48 372.80
6 Driver TWT High-power/High-frequency components 4.0 0 0 4.0 1300 5,200 1.48 1923.15
7 Antenna Drive Eletromechanical equipment 4.0 0 0 4.0 682 2,728 1.48 1008.92
8 Cooling pump/motor Liquid coolant systems 5.0 0 0 5.0 120 600 1.85 221.90
5,050 13,655 5,050
MTBF 198
MTTR 1.0
K 2.70
Rpj 0.3698
Check: MTTRsystem 1.0
No Unit Generic Module Types Kj1 Kj2 Kj3 Σ Kj F/10-6 hours Fj Kj Allocated Rpj FR * Rpj
1 Output TWT Power Supply Power Supplies 2.0 0 0 2.0 776 1,552 0.74 573.99
2 Driver TWT and Auxiliary Power Supply Power Supplies 2.0 0 0 2.0 1270 2,540 0.74 939.39
3 System Control Unit Electromechanical+digital+electromechanical 2.7 0 0 2.7 368 981 0.99 362.93
4 Modulator Unit Analog 3.0 0 0 3.0 282 846 1.11 312.88
5 Output TWT High-power/High-frequency components 3.0 0 0 3.0 252 756 1.11 279.60
6 Driver TWT High-power/High-frequency components 3.0 0 0 3.0 1300 3,900 1.11 1442.36
7 Antenna Drive Eletromechanical equipment 3.0 0 0 3.0 682 2,046 1.11 756.69
8 Cooling pump/motor Liquid coolant systems 3.0 0 0 3.0 120 360 1.11 133.14
5,050 12,981 4,801
MTBF 198
MTTR 1.0
K 2.57
Rpj 0.3890
Check: MTTRsystem 1.0
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H.1 Test results summary 
Table H-6 Summary the three different inputs 
 
Table H-7 Summary of the three different outputs 
 
 
Figure H-1 Comparison of allocation time between existing score and two formulae
Existing Log Linear
MTBF 198 198 198
MTTR 1 1 1
K 2.7936 2.7039 2.5706
Rpj 0.3580 0.3698 0.3890
Check: MTTRsystem 1.000 1.000 0.951
Existing Log Linear
1 Output TWT Power Supply 0.72 0.37 0.74
2 Driver TWT and Auxiliary Power Supply 0.72 0.37 0.74
3 System Control Unit 0.84 1.23 0.99
4 Modulator Unit 0.54 1.11 1.11
5 Output TWT 1.43 1.48 1.11
6 Driver TWT 1.43 1.48 1.11
7 Antenna Drive 1.07 1.48 1.11
8 Cooling pump/motor 1.43 1.85 1.11
Allocated Rpj
No Unit
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
Output TWT 
Power Supply
Driver TWT 
and Auxiliary 
Power Supply
System 
Control Unit
Modulator 
Unit
Output TWT Driver TWT Antenna 
Drive
Cooling 
pump/motor
S
co
re
Unit
Comparison Allocation time between Existing and Formula Score values
Existing Score Log Linear
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Appendix I Maintainability Allocation – Testing process 
I.1 Case Study 1: Aircraft Fuel Systems 
I.1.1 Existing Modules vs. Logarithmic Formula 
Table I-1 Validation results using EXISTING modules and LOGARITHMIC score values 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 SUM 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 15.446 1.451 0.869 1.141
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 28.000 4.600 95.000 34.300 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 98.000 16.100 332.500 120.050 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 75.683 10.155 144.515 59.531
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 28.000 5.600 25.100 2.900 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 98.000 19.600 87.850 10.150 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 75.683 12.362 38.182 5.033
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 0.130 0.128 618.000 0.128 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.325 0.320 1545.000 0.320 1.93 1.58 1.09 1.24 0.251 0.202 671.504 0.159
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 94.500 60.200 332.500 332.150 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 72.980 37.969 144.515 164.707
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Power Supplies 48.000 369.000 48.600 369.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 96.000 738.000 97.200 738.000 1.54 1.26 0.87 0.99 74.139 465.469 42.246 365.961
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 94.500 60.200 332.500 332.150 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 72.980 37.969 144.515 164.707
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Power Supplies 8.200 16.900 36.900 16.900 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 8.200 16.900 36.900 16.900 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 6.333 10.659 16.038 8.380
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 94.500 60.200 332.500 332.150 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 72.980 37.969 144.515 164.707
10 Pipe Interconnections 1.400 0.032 1.400 0.032 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.200 0.096 4.200 0.096 2.32 1.89 1.30 1.49 3.244 0.061 1.825 0.048
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 54.909 9.398 30.902 73.886
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 54.909 9.398 30.902 73.886
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 467.229 25.103 30.902 19.736
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 467.229 25.103 30.902 19.736
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.120 1.180 1.120 16.200 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.920 4.130 3.920 56.700 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 3.027 2.605 1.704 28.117
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 241.723 93.977 64.760 73.886
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 241.723 93.977 64.760 73.886
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 241.723 93.977 64.760 73.886
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 15.000 6.040 71.200 71.200 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 52.500 21.140 249.200 249.200 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 40.545 13.333 108.310 123.574
20 Hose Interconnections 11.000 11.600 116.000 116.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.000 34.800 348.000 348.000 2.32 1.89 1.30 1.49 25.485 21.949 151.251 172.567
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 107.000 1.280 107.000 1.280 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 374.500 4.480 374.500 4.480 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 289.218 2.826 162.769 2.222
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 94.500 60.200 332.500 332.150 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 72.980 37.969 144.515 164.707
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 11.430 0.030 1.108 0.024
2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488 3,472.645 1,655.114 5,145.220 3,699.444 2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488
MTTR requirement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
K Value 1.29 1.59 2.30 2.02
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50
MTTR system 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
No System /  Sub System
FR (10-6 hour) FRj Kj Allocated Rpj
LOG Formula
SCORE FR * Rpj
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Table I-2 Validation results using IMPROVED modules and LOGARITHMIC score values 
 
 
 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 SUM 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 14.171 0.837 0.779 0.830
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 28.000 4.600 95.000 34.300 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 112.000 18.400 380.000 137.200 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 79.358 6.693 147.990 49.516
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Valve 28.000 5.600 25.100 2.900 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 112.000 22.400 100.400 11.600 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 79.358 8.148 39.100 4.186
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 0.130 0.128 618.000 0.128 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.325 0.320 1545.000 0.320 1.77 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.230 0.116 601.695 0.115
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 108.000 68.800 380.000 379.600 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 76.524 25.026 147.990 136.998
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Pump 48.000 369.000 48.600 369.000 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 240.000 1845.000 243.000 1845.000 3.54 1.82 1.95 1.80 170.054 671.118 94.636 665.862
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 108.000 68.800 380.000 379.600 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 76.524 25.026 147.990 136.998
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Pump 8.200 16.900 36.900 16.900 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 41.000 84.500 184.500 84.500 3.54 1.82 1.95 1.80 29.051 30.737 71.853 30.496
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 108.000 68.800 380.000 379.600 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 76.524 25.026 147.990 136.998
10 Pipe Pipe 1.400 0.032 1.400 0.032 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.200 0.096 4.200 0.096 2.13 1.09 1.17 1.08 2.976 0.035 1.636 0.035
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 50.378 5.420 27.690 53.774
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 50.378 5.420 27.690 53.774
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 428.677 14.477 27.690 14.364
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 428.677 14.477 27.690 14.364
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.120 1.180 1.120 16.200 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.920 4.130 3.920 56.700 2.48 1.27 1.36 1.26 2.778 1.502 1.527 20.463
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 221.778 54.199 58.028 53.774
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 221.778 54.199 58.028 53.774
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 221.778 54.199 58.028 53.774
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 15.000 6.040 71.200 71.200 3.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 52.500 21.140 249.200 249.200 2.48 1.27 1.36 1.26 37.199 7.690 97.050 89.936
20 Hose Interconnections 11.000 11.600 116.000 116.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.000 34.800 348.000 348.000 2.13 1.09 1.17 1.08 23.382 12.658 135.528 125.593
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Valve 107.000 1.280 107.000 1.280 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 428.000 5.120 428.000 5.120 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 303.262 1.862 166.683 1.848
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 108.000 68.800 380.000 379.600 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 76.524 25.026 147.990 136.998
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 10.487 0.017 0.993 0.017
2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488 3,784.945 2,869.854 5,742.170 5,083.084 2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488
MTTR requirement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
K Value 1.41 2.75 2.57 2.77
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36
MTTR system 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
LOG Formula
Allocated Rpj FR * Rpj
No System /  Sub System
FR (10-6 hour) SCORE FRj Kj
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Table I-3 Validation summary by using EXISTING modules and LOGARITHMIC score values 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 1.56 0.94 1.33 1.12
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 1.31 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.93 1.58 1.09 1.24 0.62 0.69 0.09 0.33
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 1.54 1.26 0.87 0.99 0.79 0.31 0.90 0.63
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 1.56 0.94 1.33 1.12
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
10 Pipe Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 2.32 1.89 1.30 1.49 0.56 0.72 0.02 0.27
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
20 Hose Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 2.32 1.89 1.30 1.49 0.56 0.72 0.02 0.27
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.70 2.21 1.52 1.74 1.10 1.13 0.31 0.62
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.77 0.63 0.43 0.50 0.10 0.04 0.23 0.11
0.71 0.64 0.36 0.45
8.00 9.00 20.00 11.00
34.78% 39.13% 86.96% 47.83%
0.54
52.17%
Average on MEAN Absolute Error
Average on Percentage
Σ  Mean Absolute Error
Percentage (%)
No System /  Sub System
Allocation (Existing) Allocation (LOG Formula) Absolute Error (LOG Formula - Existing)
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Table I-4 Validation summary by using IMPROVED modules and LOGARITHMIC score values 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 1.63 1.20 1.38 1.26
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 1.31 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.77 0.91 0.97 0.90 0.46 0.03 0.02 0.01
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Pump 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 3.54 1.82 1.95 1.80 1.21 0.25 0.18 0.18
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Pump 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 3.54 1.82 1.95 1.80 1.21 0.25 0.18 0.18
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
10 Pipe Pipe 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 2.13 1.09 1.17 1.08 0.37 0.08 0.16 0.13
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.48 1.27 1.36 1.26 0.87 0.20 0.15 0.15
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.48 1.27 1.36 1.26 0.87 0.20 0.15 0.15
20 Hose Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 2.13 1.09 1.17 1.08 0.37 0.08 0.16 0.13
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 2.83 1.45 1.56 1.44 1.23 0.38 0.34 0.33
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.36 0.39 0.36 0.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
0.74 0.29 0.30 0.28
11.00 22.00 22.00 22.00
47.83% 95.65% 95.65% 95.65%
0.40
83.70%
Average on MEAN Absolute Error
Average on Percentage
Σ  Mean Absolute Error
Percentage (%)
No System /  Sub System
Allocation (Existing) Allocation (LOG Formula) Absolute Error (LOG Formula - Existing)
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Figure I-1 Summary results by using EXISTING modules for 3
rd
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Figure I-2 Summary results by using IMPROVED modules and score values for 3
rd
 
Failure Rate 
 
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Sc
o
re
Module
Comparison Allocation Repair Time - Existing vs Prediction (LOG Trendline) - 3rd Case Study
Existing Modules Improved Modules
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Sc
o
re
Module
Comparison Allocation Repair Time - Existing vs Prediction (LOG Trendline) - 3rd Case Study
Existing Modules Improved Modules
162 
 
I.1.2 Existing Modules vs. Linear Formula 
Table I-5 Validation results using EXISTING modules and LINEAR score values 
 
 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 SUM 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 40.000 4.600 4.000 4.600 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 18.942 2.196 1.604 1.967
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 28.000 4.600 95.000 34.300 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 84.000 13.800 285.000 102.900 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 39.778 6.587 114.252 43.996
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 28.000 5.600 25.100 2.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 84.000 16.800 75.300 8.700 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 39.778 8.019 30.186 3.720
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 0.130 0.128 618.000 0.128 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.325 0.320 1545.000 0.320 1.18 1.19 1.00 1.07 0.154 0.153 619.364 0.137
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 38.358 24.630 114.252 121.728
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Power Supplies 48.000 369.000 48.600 369.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 96.000 738.000 97.200 738.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 45.461 352.263 38.966 315.543
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 38.358 24.630 114.252 121.728
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Power Supplies 8.200 16.900 36.900 16.900 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 16.400 33.800 73.800 33.800 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 7.766 16.133 29.585 14.452
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 38.358 24.630 114.252 121.728
10 Pipe Interconnections 1.400 0.032 1.400 0.032 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.200 0.096 4.200 0.096 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 1.989 0.046 1.684 0.041
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 142.200 29.800 142.200 298.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 67.339 14.224 57.006 127.414
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 142.200 29.800 142.200 298.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 67.339 14.224 57.006 127.414
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1210.000 79.600 142.200 79.600 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 572.996 37.995 57.006 34.034
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1210.000 79.600 142.200 79.600 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 572.996 37.995 57.006 34.034
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.120 1.180 1.120 16.200 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.360 3.540 3.360 48.600 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 1.591 1.690 1.347 20.780
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 296.442 142.242 119.463 127.414
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 296.442 142.242 119.463 127.414
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 296.442 142.242 119.463 127.414
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 15.000 6.040 71.200 71.200 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 45.000 18.120 213.600 213.600 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 21.310 8.649 85.629 91.328
20 Hose Interconnections 11.000 11.600 116.000 116.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.000 34.800 348.000 348.000 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 15.627 16.611 139.507 148.792
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 107.000 1.280 107.000 1.280 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 321.000 3.840 321.000 3.840 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 152.010 1.833 128.683 1.642
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 38.358 24.630 114.252 121.728
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 29.600 0.096 5.100 0.096 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 14.017 0.046 2.045 0.041
2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488 5,663.285 2,187.012 5,578.360 4,290.552 2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488
MTTR requirement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
K Value 2.11 2.10 2.49 2.34
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.47 0.48 0.40 0.43
MTTR system 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
FRj Kj Allocated Rpj
LINEAR Formula
No System /  Sub System
FR (10-6 hour) SCORE FR * Rpj
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Table I-6 Validation results using IMPROVED modules and LINEAR score values 
 
 
 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 SUM 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 20.000 2.300 2.000 2.300 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 40.000 4.600 4.000 4.600 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 18.756 1.866 1.579 1.804
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Valve 28.000 4.600 95.000 34.300 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 84.000 13.800 285.000 102.900 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 39.387 5.599 112.527 40.366
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Valve 28.000 5.600 25.100 2.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 84.000 16.800 75.300 8.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 39.387 6.816 29.731 3.413
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 0.130 0.128 618.000 0.128 2.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.325 0.320 1545.000 0.320 1.17 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.152 0.130 610.015 0.126
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 37.981 20.936 112.527 111.683
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Pump 48.000 369.000 48.600 369.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 144.000 1107.000 145.800 1107.000 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 67.521 449.143 57.566 434.256
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 37.981 20.936 112.527 111.683
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Pump 8.200 16.900 36.900 16.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 24.600 50.700 110.700 50.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 11.535 20.571 43.708 19.889
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 37.981 20.936 112.527 111.683
10 Pipe Pipe 1.400 0.032 1.400 0.032 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.200 0.096 4.200 0.096 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 1.969 0.039 1.658 0.038
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 142.200 29.800 142.200 298.000 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 66.677 12.091 56.145 116.900
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 71.100 14.900 71.100 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 142.200 29.800 142.200 298.000 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 66.677 12.091 56.145 116.900
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1210.000 79.600 142.200 79.600 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 567.366 32.296 56.145 31.226
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 605.000 39.800 71.100 39.800 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1210.000 79.600 142.200 79.600 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 567.366 32.296 56.145 31.226
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.120 1.180 1.120 16.200 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.360 3.540 3.360 48.600 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 1.575 1.436 1.327 19.065
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 293.530 120.908 117.660 116.900
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 293.530 120.908 117.660 116.900
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 313.000 149.000 149.000 149.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 626.000 298.000 298.000 298.000 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 293.530 120.908 117.660 116.900
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 15.000 6.040 71.200 71.200 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 45.000 18.120 213.600 213.600 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 21.100 7.352 84.336 83.791
20 Hose Interconnections 11.000 11.600 116.000 116.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 33.000 34.800 348.000 348.000 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 15.474 14.119 137.401 136.514
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Valve 107.000 1.280 107.000 1.280 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 321.000 3.840 321.000 3.840 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 150.516 1.558 126.741 1.506
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 27.000 17.200 95.000 94.900 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 81.000 51.600 285.000 284.700 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 37.981 20.936 112.527 111.683
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 14.800 0.048 2.550 0.048 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 29.600 0.096 5.100 0.096 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 13.879 0.039 2.014 0.038
2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488 5,719.485 2,572.912 5,663.860 4,676.452 2,681.850 1,043.908 2,236.270 1,834.488
MTTR requirement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
K Value 2.13 2.46 2.53 2.55
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.39
MTTR system 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
No System /  Sub System
FR (10-6 hour) SCORE FRj Kj
LINEAR Formula
Allocated Rpj FR * Rpj
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Table I-7 Validation summary by using EXISTING modules and LINEAR score values 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 1.39 0.61 0.97 0.77
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 1.31 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.18 1.19 1.00 1.07 0.13 0.31 0.01 0.16
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 1.39 0.61 0.97 0.77
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 1.39 0.61 0.97 0.77
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
10 Pipe Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.33 0.26 0.12 0.07
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
20 Hose Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.33 0.26 0.12 0.07
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.42 1.43 1.20 1.28 0.19 0.35 0.01 0.17
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.95 0.95 0.80 0.86 0.07 0.37 0.14 0.25
0.31 0.38 0.19 0.26
20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
86.96% 86.96% 86.96% 86.96%
0.29
86.96%
Percentage (%)
Σ  MEAN Absolute Error
Average on Percentage
Average on MEAN Absolute Error
No System /  Sub System
Allocation (Existing) Allocation (LINEAR Formula) Absolute Error (Linear Formula - Existing)
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Table I-8 Validation summary by using IMPROVED modules and LINEAR score values 
 
Generic Module Types
IAW New Allocation Scheme 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 Hand Pump Power Supplies 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 1.40 0.76 0.98 0.84
2 Reservoir Fill Selection Valve (RFSV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
3 Pressure Valve (PV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
4 Reservoir Electromechanical + Power Supplies 1.31 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.17 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.07
5 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
6 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) Pump 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.93 0.35 0.58 0.44
7 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
8 Aircraft Motor Pump (ACMP) Pump 2.34 1.57 1.77 1.62 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.93 0.35 0.58 0.44
9 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
10 Pipe Pipe 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.04
11 Pump Overheat Light (POL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
12 Pump Overheat Light (POL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
13 Pump Low Light (PLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
14 Pump Low Light (PLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
15 Heat Exchanger (HEX) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
16 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 1) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
17 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 2) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
18 Hydraulic Low Light (HLL 3) Lights 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
19 Hydraulic Quantity Indicator (HQ 1) Interconnections +Electromechanical 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
20 Hose Interconnections 1.75 1.18 1.33 1.22 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.04
21 Depressurisation Valve (DPV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
22 Non Return Valve (NRV) Valve 1.61 1.08 1.21 1.11 1.41 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.20 0.14 0.03 0.06
23 Moisture Vent Trap (MVT) Accessories 0.88 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.18
0.28 0.20 0.16 0.17
20.00 22.00 20.00 22.00
86.96% 95.65% 86.96% 95.65%
0.20
91.30%
Average on MEAN Absolute Error
Average on Percentage
Percentage (%)
Σ  MEAN Absolute Error
No System /  Sub System
Allocation (Existing) Allocation (LINEAR Formula) Absolute Error (Linear Formula - Existing)
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Figure I-3 Summary results by using EXISTING modules 
 
Figure I-4 Summary results by using IMPROVED modules and score values 
  
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
S
co
re
Module
Comparison Allocation Repair Time - Existing vs Prediction (LINEAR Trendline) - 3rd Case Study
Existing Modules Improved Modules
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
S
co
re
Module
Comparison Allocation Repair Time - Existing vs Prediction (LINEAR Trendline) - 3rd Case Study
Existing Modules Improved Modules
167 
 
I.2 Case Study 2: Aircraft Communication Systems 
Table I-9 Validation results by using EXISTING modules and score values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
λ Σ Allocated Σ
10
-6
 hour Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 λMi Rpj (hour) λRpj
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 High-level analogue 166.805 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.0 500 0.72 120.4
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 High-level analogue 166.805 1.5 0.0 0.0 3.5 584 0.84 140.5
3 Headset 1 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.96 150.5
4 Headset 2 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.96 150.5
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.96 342.4
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.96 342.4
7 Speaker 1 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 190 0.96 45.7
8 Speaker 2 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 285 1.44 68.5
9 VHF 1 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 43 0.96 10.4
10 VHF 1 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 240 0.96 57.7
11 VHF 1 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.48 51.3
12 VHF 2 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 43 0.96 10.4
13 VHF 2 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 240 0.96 57.7
14 VHF 2 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.48 51.3
15 HF Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 33.100 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 132 0.96 31.9
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Lights 23.814 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 24 0.24 5.7
17 HF Antenna Coupler High-power/high-frequency components 96.089 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 384 0.96 92.5
18 HF Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 58.338 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 233 0.96 56.1
19 HF Control Panel Digital Computer 11.775 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 24 0.48 5.7
20 Selcal Decoder High-power/high-frequency components 24.675 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 99 0.96 23.7
21 Selcal Control  Panel Digital Computer 72.384 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 145 0.48 34.8
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 1,120 1.92 269.5
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 1,120 1.92 269.5
24 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.92 87.2
25 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.92 87.2
26 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.92 87.2
27 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 272 1.44 65.4
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Digital Computer 26.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 52 0.48 12.5
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Digital 150.000 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 150 0.24 36.1
TOTAL (Σ) 2,765 11,490 2,765
MTTR Requirement (hour) 1.00
Σ λMi 11,490
λ 2,765
MTTR 1.00
Msystem 4.16
 Therefore: Allocated Active Repair Time (Rpj) = 0.2406 x Mi
Σ λRpj 2,765
Σ λ 2,765
To check MTTR REQUIREMENT (HOUR) 1.00 PASSED
Msystem = 4.16
No System /  Sub System
SCORE
ΣKj
(Rpj = (MTTR/Msystem)Mi = Rpj = 0.2406
Generic Module Types
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Table I-10 Validation results by using LOGARITHMIC formula for new score values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
λ Σ Allocated Σ
10
-6
 hour Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 λKj Rpj (hour) λRpj
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 High-level analogue 166.805 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 1,001 1.32 220.6
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 High-level analogue 166.805 3.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 834 1.10 183.9
3 Headset 1 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.88 137.9
4 Headset 2 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.88 137.9
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.88 313.7
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.88 313.7
7 Speaker 1 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 190 0.88 41.9
8 Speaker 2 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 285 1.32 62.8
9 VHF 1 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 43 0.88 9.5
10 VHF 1 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 240 0.88 52.9
11 VHF 1 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.44 47.0
12 VHF 2 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 43 0.88 9.5
13 VHF 2 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 240 0.88 52.9
14 VHF 2 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.44 47.0
15 HF Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 33.100 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 132 0.88 29.2
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Lights 23.814 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 24 0.22 5.3
17 HF Antenna Coupler High-power/high-frequency components 96.089 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 384 0.88 84.7
18 HF Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 58.338 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 233 0.88 51.4
19 HF Control Panel Digital Computer 11.775 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 24 0.44 5.2
20 Selcal Decoder High-power/high-frequency components 24.675 4.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 99 0.88 21.8
21 Selcal Control  Panel Digital Computer 72.384 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 145 0.44 31.9
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 1,120 1.76 246.9
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 1,120 1.76 246.9
24 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.76 79.9
25 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.76 79.9
26 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 363 1.76 79.9
27 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 4.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 272 1.32 59.9
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Digital Computer 26.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 52 0.44 11.5
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Digital 150.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 450 0.66 99.2
TOTAL (Σ) 2,765 12,541 2,765
MTTR Requirement (hour) 1.00
Σ λMi 12,541
λ 2,765
MTTR 1.00
Msystem 4.54
 Therefore: Allocated Active Repair Time (Rpj) = 0.2205 x Mi
Σ λRpj 2,765
Σ λ 2,765
ΣKj
PASSED
No System /  Sub System Generic Module Types
SCORE (LOG)
Msystem = 4.54
(Rpj = (MTTR/Msystem)Mi = Rpj = 0.2205
To check MTTR REQUIREMENT (HOUR) 1.00
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Table I-11 Validation results by using LINEAR formula for new score values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
λ Σ Allocated Σ
10
-6
 hour Kj 1 Kj 2 Kj 3 λKj Rpj (hour) λRpj
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 High-level analogue 166.805 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 1,001 1.47 245.2
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 High-level analogue 166.805 3.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 834 1.22 204.3
3 Headset 1 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.98 153.3
4 Headset 2 Communication 156.400 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 626 0.98 153.3
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.98 348.5
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Communication 355.700 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1,423 0.98 348.5
7 Speaker 1 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 190 0.98 46.5
8 Speaker 2 Communication 47.460 2.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 237 1.22 58.1
9 VHF 1 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 32 0.73 7.9
10 VHF 1 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 180 0.73 44.1
11 VHF 1 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.49 52.2
12 VHF 2 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 10.758 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 32 0.73 7.9
13 VHF 2 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 60.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 180 0.73 44.1
14 VHF 2 Control  Panel Digital Computer 106.596 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 213 0.49 52.2
15 HF Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 33.100 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 99 0.73 24.3
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Lights 23.814 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 48 0.49 11.7
17 HF Antenna Coupler High-power/high-frequency components 96.089 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 288 0.73 70.6
18 HF Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 58.338 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 175 0.73 42.9
19 HF Control Panel Digital Computer 11.775 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 24 0.49 5.8
20 Selcal Decoder High-power/high-frequency components 24.675 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 74 0.73 18.1
21 Selcal Control  Panel Digital Computer 72.384 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 145 0.49 35.5
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 840 1.47 205.8
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 High-power/high-frequency components 139.992 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 840 1.47 205.8
24 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 272 1.47 66.6
25 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 272 1.47 66.6
26 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 3.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 272 1.47 66.6
27 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 45.320 3.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 227 1.22 55.5
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Digital Computer 26.000 2.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 52 0.49 12.7
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Digital 150.000 3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 450 0.73 110.2
TOTAL (Σ) 2,765 11,287 2,765
MTTR Requirement (hour) 1.00
Σ λMi 11,287
λ 2,765
MTTR 1.00
Msystem 4.08
 Therefore: Allocated Active Repair Time (Rpj) = 0.2450 x Mi
Σ λRpj 2,765
Σ λ 2,765
ΣKj
PASSED
No System /  Sub System Generic Module Types
SCORE
Msystem = 4.08
(Rpj = (MTTR/Msystem)Mi = Rpj = 0.2450
To check MTTR REQUIREMENT (HOUR) 1.00
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able I-12 Validation results summary for Aircraft Communication Systems 
 
Existing LOG LINEAR LOG LINEAR
1 Audio Selector Panel 1 High-level analogue 0.72 1.32 1.47 0.60 0.75
2 Audio Selector Panel 2 High-level analogue 0.84 1.10 1.22 0.26 0.38
3 Headset 1 Communication 0.96 0.88 0.98 -0.08 0.02
4 Headset 2 Communication 0.96 0.88 0.98 -0.08 0.02
5 Handheld Microphone 1 Communication 0.96 0.88 0.98 -0.08 0.02
6 Handheld Microphone 2 Communication 0.96 0.88 0.98 -0.08 0.02
7 Speaker 1 Communication 0.96 0.88 0.98 -0.08 0.02
8 Speaker 2 Communication 1.44 1.32 1.22 -0.12 -0.22
9 VHF 1 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
10 VHF 1 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
11 VHF 1 Control Panel Digital  Computer 0.48 0.44 0.49 -0.04 0.01
12 VHF 2 Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
13 VHF 2 Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
14 VHF 2 Control Panel Digital  Computer 0.48 0.44 0.49 -0.04 0.01
15 HF Antenna High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
16 HF Lightning Arrestor Lights 0.24 0.22 0.49 -0.02 0.25
17 HF Antenna Coupler High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
18 HF Transceiver High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
19 HF Control Panel Digital  Computer 0.48 0.44 0.49 -0.04 0.01
20 Selcal  Decoder High-power/high-frequency components 0.96 0.88 0.73 -0.08 -0.23
21 Selcal  Control Panel Digital  Computer 0.48 0.44 0.49 -0.04 0.01
22 Passenger Address Amplifier 1 High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 1.76 1.47 -0.16 -0.46
23 Passenger Address Amplifier 2 High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 1.76 1.47 -0.16 -0.46
24 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 1.76 1.47 -0.16 -0.46
25 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 1.76 1.47 -0.16 -0.46
26 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.92 1.76 1.47 -0.16 -0.46
27 PA Speaker High-power/high-frequency components 1.44 1.32 1.22 -0.12 -0.22
28 Cockpit Voice Recorder Control Panel Digital  Computer 0.48 0.44 0.49 -0.04 0.01
29 Cockpit Voice Recorder Digital 0.24 0.66 0.73 0.42 0.49
QTY 28 28
% 96.55% 96.55%
AVERAGE -0.04 -0.09
Allocation Value (Hour) ERROR
No Components Generic Module Types
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Figure I-5 Comparison between all validation results for maintainability allocation 
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Appendix J Validation – BAe 146: Maintainability 
allocation 
J.1 Maintainability allocation – Approach 1 
Table J-1 The maintainability allocation tasks time for BAe 146 – 300 by using 
estimation MTTR equal to 1.00 hour – Allocation approach 1 
 
Table J-2 The summary of maintainability allocation and prediction tasks time for BAe 
146 – 300 – Allocation approach 1 
 
Generic Module Types λ Allocated  Rpj
(in accordance with New Allocation Scheme) 1 2 3 x 10
-6 (hour)
1 ACTUATOR Electromechanical Equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 136.8370 1231.53 0.85 115.79
2 ANTI SKID Electromechanical Equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 672.3670 6051.30 0.85 568.94
3 BRAKE Mechanial Structure with mechanisms 8.0 2.0 4.0 14.0 636.0930 8905.30 1.32 837.27
4 BRAKE ASSY Electromechanical Equipment + Mechanial Structure with mechanism 5.5 2.0 4.0 11.5 2.1000 24.15 1.08 2.27
5 CONNECTOR Interconnections (Mechanical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 41.0560 369.50 0.85 34.74
6 CONTROL UNIT Power Supplies + Electromechanical Equipment + Digital 2.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 235.5158 1884.13 0.75 177.14
7 HYDRAULIC Electromechanical Equipment + Interconnections (Mechanical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 598.1837 5383.65 0.85 506.17
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 672.3670 8068.40 1.13 758.59
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 116.2524 1395.03 1.13 131.16
10 SELECTOR VALVE Interconnections (Mechanical) + Electromechanical equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 95.2380 857.14 0.85 80.59
11 SENSOR High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 2.0 10.0 6.9634 69.63 0.94 6.55
12 STEERING Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 3.2361 38.83 1.13 3.65
13 STRUCTURE Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 1.0000 12.00 1.13 1.13
14 STRUT Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 6.6270 79.52 1.13 7.48
15 SWITCH Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 116.2524 1046.27 0.85 98.37
16 TIRE Mechanial Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 14.9601 179.52 1.13 16.88
17 UPLOCK SWITCH Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 67.0166 603.15 0.85 56.71
18 V-BELT Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 164.0140 1968.17 1.13 185.05
19 WARNING LIGHT Light 1.0 4.0 4.0 9.0 32.4918 292.43 0.85 27.49
20 WARNING SYSTEM High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 20.4420 245.30 1.13 23.06
21 WHEEL Mechanial Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 3.2361 38.83 1.13 3.65
22 WIRE Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 0.5090 4.58 0.85 0.43
23 WIRE HARNESS Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 2.2727 20.45 0.85 1.92
Average
241.50 3,645.03 38,768.85 0.99 3,645.03
MTTR 1.00
K = ΣFj Kj / ΣFR 10.64
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.0940
Check: MTTRsystem 1.00
Notes: Kj2 = Same value as BITE from Check list A
Kj3 = Average question 1, 2, 3, & 4 from Check list A, 
No System /  Sub System
Estimation
GOOD
λj Kj λ * RpjKj Σ  Kj
Maintenance Allocation Time
MTTR = 1.00 hour
1 ACTUATOR 0.85
2 ANTI SKID 0.85
3 BRAKE 1.32
4 BRAKE ASSY 1.08
5 CONNECTOR 0.85
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.75
7 HYDRAULIC 0.85
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 1.13
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 1.13
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.85
11 SENSOR 0.94
12 STEERING 1.13
13 STRUCTURE 1.13
14 STRUT 1.13
15 SWITCH 0.85
16 TIRE 1.13
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.85
18 V-BELT 1.13
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.85
20 WARNING SYSTEM 1.13
21 WHEEL 1.13
22 WIRE 0.85
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.85
No Components
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Figure J-1 The trend of maintainability allocation and prediction tasks time for BAe 146 
– 300 – Allocation approach 1  
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J.2 Maintainability allocation – Approach 2 
Table J-3 The maintainability allocation tasks time for BAe 146 – 300 by using average 
MTTR equal to 0.53 hour – Allocation approach 2 
 
Table J-4 The summary of maintainability allocation and prediction tasks time for BAe 
146 – 300 – Allocation approach 2 
 
Generic Module Types λ Allocated  Rpj
(in accordance with New Allocation Scheme) 1 2 3 x 10
-6 (hour)
1 ACTUATOR Electromechanical Equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 136.8370 1231.53 0.45 61.37
2 ANTI SKID Electromechanical Equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 672.3670 6051.30 0.45 301.54
3 BRAKE Mechanial Structure with mechanisms 8.0 2.0 4.0 14.0 636.0930 8905.30 0.70 443.75
4 BRAKE ASSY Electromechanical Equipment + Mechanial Structure with mechanism 5.5 2.0 4.0 11.5 2.1000 24.15 0.57 1.20
5 CONNECTOR Interconnections (Mechanical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 41.0560 369.50 0.45 18.41
6 CONTROL UNIT Power Supplies + Electromechanical Equipment + Digital 2.0 2.0 4.0 8.0 235.5158 1884.13 0.40 93.89
7 HYDRAULIC Electromechanical Equipment + Interconnections (Mechanical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 598.1837 5383.65 0.45 268.27
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 672.3670 8068.40 0.60 402.05
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 116.2524 1395.03 0.60 69.51
10 SELECTOR VALVE Interconnections (Mechanical) + Electromechanical equipment 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 95.2380 857.14 0.45 42.71
11 SENSOR High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 2.0 10.0 6.9634 69.63 0.50 3.47
12 STEERING Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 3.2361 38.83 0.60 1.94
13 STRUCTURE Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 1.0000 12.00 0.60 0.60
14 STRUT Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 6.6270 79.52 0.60 3.96
15 SWITCH Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 116.2524 1046.27 0.45 52.14
16 TIRE Mechanial Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 14.9601 179.52 0.60 8.95
17 UPLOCK SWITCH Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 67.0166 603.15 0.45 30.06
18 V-BELT Mechanical Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 164.0140 1968.17 0.60 98.07
19 WARNING LIGHT Light 1.0 4.0 4.0 9.0 32.4918 292.43 0.45 14.57
20 WARNING SYSTEM High-power/high-frequency components 4.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 20.4420 245.30 0.60 12.22
21 WHEEL Mechanial Structures 6.0 2.0 4.0 12.0 3.2361 38.83 0.60 1.94
22 WIRE Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 0.5090 4.58 0.45 0.23
23 WIRE HARNESS Power Supplies + Interconnection (Electrical) 3.0 2.0 4.0 9.0 2.2727 20.45 0.45 1.02
Average
241.50 3,645.03 38,768.85 0.52 1,931.87
MTTR 0.53
K = ΣFj Kj / ΣFR 10.64
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.0498
Check: MTTRsystem 0.53
Notes: Kj2 = Same value as BITE from Check list A
Kj3 = Average question 1, 2, 3, & 4 from Check list A, 
λ * Rpj
Average tasks time from MIL-HDBK-472, Procedure III
GOOD
No System /  Sub System
Kj
Σ  Kj λj Kj
Maintenance Allocation Time
MTTR = 0.53 hour
1 ACTUATOR 0.45
2 ANTI SKID 0.45
3 BRAKE 0.70
4 BRAKE ASSY 0.57
5 CONNECTOR 0.45
6 CONTROL UNIT 0.40
7 HYDRAULIC 0.45
8 PROXIMITY SENSOR 0.60
9 PROXIMITY SWITCH 0.60
10 SELECTOR VALVE 0.45
11 SENSOR 0.50
12 STEERING 0.60
13 STRUCTURE 0.60
14 STRUT 0.60
15 SWITCH 0.45
16 TIRE 0.60
17 UPLOCK SWITCH 0.45
18 V-BELT 0.60
19 WARNING LIGHT 0.45
20 WARNING SYSTEM 0.60
21 WHEEL 0.60
22 WIRE 0.45
23 WIRE HARNESS 0.45
No Components
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Figure J-2 The trend of maintainability prediction and allocation times for both MTT 
values for BAe 146 – 300 Landing Gear – Allocation approach 2  
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Appendix K Validation – Jetstream 31: Maintainability 
allocation 
K.1 Maintainability allocation – Approach 1 
Table K-1 Maintainability prediction tasks time prediction for Jetstream 31 – Landing 
Gear – Approach 1 
 
 
 
Figure K-1 The trend of maintainability prediction and allocation times for both MTT 
values for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear – Approach 1  
λ Allocated  Rpj
Module Isolation Accessiblity Fail/Cycles 106 (hour)
1 Main Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.29885 16.09 0.51 1.16
2 Main Landing Gear Radius Rod
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 4 3 10 7.99420 79.94 0.72 5.77
3 Main Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 249.74050 3,496.37 1.01 252.37
4 Nose Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.29885 16.09 0.51 1.16
5 Nose Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 177.91695 2,490.84 1.01 179.79
440.24935 6,099.33 440.25
MTTR 1.00
K = Σλj Kj / ΣFR 13.85
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.0722
Check: MTTRsystem 1.00 GOOD
λj Kj λRpj
Estimation
No Components List of Modules
Allocation (Kj) Σ  Kj
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Main Gear 
Uplock 
Assembly
Main Landing 
Gear Radius Rod
Main Landing 
Gear
Nose Gear 
Uplock 
Assembly
Nose Landing 
Gear
T
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e
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o
u
r
Components
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K.2 Maintainability allocation – Approach 2 
Table K-2 Maintainability prediction tasks time prediction for Jetstream 31 – Landing 
Gear – Approach 2 
 
 
 
Figure K-2 The trend of maintainability prediction and allocation times for both MTT 
values for Jetstream 31 Landing Gear – Approach 2 
  
λ Allocated  Rpj
Module Isolation Accessiblity Fail/Cycles 106 (hour)
1 Main Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.29885 16.09 1.90 4.37
2 Main Landing Gear Radius Rod
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 4 3 10 7.99420 79.94 2.71 21.70
3 Main Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 249.74050 3,496.37 3.80 948.90
4 Nose Gear Uplock Assembly
Electromechanical Equipment + 
Interconnection (Mechanical)
3 2 2 7 2.29885 16.09 1.90 4.37
5 Nose Landing Gear
Mechanical Structure with 
mechanism
8 4 2 14 177.91695 2,490.84 3.80 676.00
440.24935 6,099.33 1,655.34
MTTR 3.76
K = Σλj Kj / ΣFR 13.85
Rpj = (MTTR/K)*Kj 0.2714
Check: MTTRsystem 3.76
λj Kj λRpj
Estimation
GOOD
No Components List of Modules
Allocation (Kj) Σ  Kj
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Main Gear 
Uplock 
Assembly
Main Landing 
Gear Radius Rod
Main Landing 
Gear
Nose Gear 
Uplock 
Assembly
Nose Landing 
Gear
T
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e
 in
 h
o
u
r
Components
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Appendix L  Jetstream – Maintenance Analysis 
Aircraft  : Jetstream 31 
Component Name : Main Gear Uplock 
 
Step Maintenance Scoring Comments 
Removal procedure 
1 De-energise aircraft DC bus-bars Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = None 
2 Raise aircraft on jacks Manpower  = 3 person minimum 
Tools = Aircraft jacks and jigs and 
fixtures 
3 Reduce system pressure to zero by release valve 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
4 Disconnect pipes from uplock jack and install 
blanking cap 
5 Remove nuts, washers, and bolts from 
microswitch 
6 Identify cable for subsequent connection 
7 Remove split pins, nut, washer, bolts securing 
uplock unit 
8 Remove uplock unit from aircraft 
Prior Installation 
9 Disconnect and remove unions from normal-
down emergency-down and up connection on 
removed uplock jack 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
10 Remove blanking cap from replacement uplock 
jack 
11 Install new fibre seals and O-ring seals install 
unions in normal-down emergency-down and up 
connections 
Installation procedure 
12 Position and secure uplock unit on mounting 
bracket 
 
13 Install microswitch (mechanical and electrical 
connection) 
 
14 Connect hydraulic pipes  
15 Energise aircraft DC Bus  
16 Tighten connection and install nose landing gear 
downlock 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
Safety = High 
17 Operate emergency hand pump and tighten 
connection 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
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Safety = High 
18 Remove LG ground lock and operate emergency 
hydraulic hand pump until leg is up and locked 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Hydraulic Pump 
Safety = High 
19 Check clearance between  uplock and hook Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Filler gauge 
Safety = High 
20 Reset release valve Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
22 Perform functional test Manpower = 2 person minimum 
Tools = Special functional test 
23 Lower aircraft Manpower = 3 person minimum 
Tools = None 
Caution level = High 
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Aircraft  : Jetstream 31 
Component Name : Radius Rod Change 
 
Step Maintenance Scoring Comments 
Removal procedure 
1 Jack the aircraft at the Nose and Wing Station Manpower = 2 person minimum 
Tools -= 3 aircraft jacks and jigs and 
fixtures 
Caution level = High 
2 Reduce hydraulic system pressure to zero by 
release valve 
Manpower = 2 person minimum 
Tools = Standard tools 
3 Open, tag, and safety circuit breaker 
Electronics components 
Manpower -= 1 person 
Tools = None 
4 De-energise aircraft DC Bus-bars 
5 Disconnect electrical cable from down lock 
microswitch 
6 Remove clips securing cable from unit cylinder 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
7 Disconnect flexible hoses from radius rod 
8 Install blanking cap to hose ends 
9 Remove radius rod from aircraft 
Prior Installation 
10 Remove banjo bolt and shuttle valve 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools =Standard Tools 
11 Install O-Ring to banjo bolt and shuttle vale 
12 Install  shuttle valve parallel to radius rod 
13 Secure shuttle valve with banjo bolt 
14 Safety banjo bolt with lockwire 
15 Lubricate O-ring seals with hydraulic oil 
16 Remove blanking caps 
17 Install O-ring seal restrictor and install securely 
and safety with lockwire 
18 Make sure replacement unit is fully extended and 
locked 
Installation procedure 
19 Install radius rod anchorage end 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = None 
20 Position unit ram end connection on leg 
attachment, DO NOT SECURE 
21 Check alignment Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Clinometers 
22 Secure radius rod and lock with split pin Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tool 
23 Safety radius rod ram end adjuster with lockwire Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools and wire 
twister 
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24 Check clearance at anchorage end connection  Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = filler gauge & standard 
tools 
25 Torque loaded to 500 ± 50 lbf in Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Torque wrench 
26 Safety nut to key with stainless steel lockwire Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools & wire 
twister 
27 Connect flexible hoses Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard wrenches 
28 Bleed main landing gear Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standards tools 
29 Adjust main landing gear Manpower = 2 person minimum 
Tools = Special functional test 30 Perform functional test 
31 Lower aircraft Manpower = 3 person minimum 
Tools = None 
Caution level = High 
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Aircraft   : Jetstream 31 
Component Name : Main Gear Leg 
 
Step Maintenance Scoring Comments 
Removal procedure 
1 Jack the aircraft Manpower = 3 person 
Tools = Jacking equipments 
Safety = High 
2 Release hydraulic pressure in main and brake 
system 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
3 Disconnect lockwire and remove door link nut 
and door link angled washer, securing landing 
gear bay door operating rod 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
4 Disconnect & remove anti skid 
5 Disconnect & remove brake unit 
6 Disconnect brake system flexible hoses 
7 Disconnect radius rod from leg and secure to 
landing gear bay roof 
8 Disconnect & remove yoke bearing half caps. Ease 
leg from bearing housing and carefully remove 
from landing gear bay 
Installation procedure (New leg) 
1 Open gas charging valve and slowly release 
pressure 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
2 Remove free and datum bearing. 
3 Clean & examine for condition and wear Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = White Sprit 
4 Disconnect rigid brake pipes from distribution 
block and install blanking cap 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
5 Disconnect rigid brakes pipes mounting bracket 
from leg yoke 
6 Disconnect flexible hoses from axle bracket and 
distribution block 
7 Disconnect and remove six unions complete with 
O-ring 
Prior Installation 
1 Make sure toggle assembly shims are in correct 
position 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard Tools 
2 Make sure toggle assembly shims in correct 
position for toe-in 
3 Clean & examine pipes and brackets for signs of 
damage and/or wear 
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4 Examine new leg for obvious damage 
5 Remove blanking caps from distribution block and 
install six unions complete with new O-ring seals. 
Tighten unions 
6 Remove blanking caps from axle bracket and 
hoses. Connect and secure flexible hoses 
7 Place rigid pipe assembly against leg and connect 
mounting bracket to yoke. 
8 Remove blanking caps and connect and secure 
lower ends of pipes to distribution block. 
9 Clean protective treatment from yoke bearing 
spigots and apply specified grease 
10 Install datum split bearing to front spigot 
11 Make sure wide flanges face leg yoke, slide free 
bearing onto rear spigot 
Installation Main Landing leg assembly 
1 Make sure toggles on leg face forward. Move leg 
into  landing gear bay and align yoke bearing 
spigots with their associated housings 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
2 Make sure free bearing on rear spigot has wide 
flanges facing forwards, towards landing gear 
yoke 
3 Position bearing half caps on their respective 
bearings. Rotate each bearing, aligning scallops 
with locating pins 
4 Push yoke fully home. Install four bolt and barrel 
nuts, Torques bolts to 335 to 355 lbf in. Safety 
with lockwire and make sure barrel nuts are 
positioned correctly 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools & Torque 
wrench 
5 Install radius rod Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Clinometers, Standard tools 
6 Connect all flexible hoses 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
7 Install brake unit 
8 Install anti skid unit 
9 Release gas pressure and replenish main gear 
oleo leg 
10 Bleed and test brakes 
11 Perform adjustment & test procedure 
12 Lowered off jacks Manpower = 3 person 
Tools = Jacking equipment 
Safety = High 
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Aircraft   : JETSTREAM 31 
Component Name : Nose Gear Leg 
 
Step Maintenance Scoring Comments 
Removal procedure 
1 Raise aircraft on jacks Manpower = 3 persons 
Tools = Jacking equipments 
Safety = High 
2 Release hydraulic pressure 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
3 Lower access panels 
4 Disconnect, open, & restrain forwards nose LG 
doors 
5 Disconnect rear door operating rid from NLG leg 
6 De-energise aircraft DC bus-bars 
7 Open & tag essential bus-bar circuit breakers 
8 Place a warning notice on circuit breaker 
9 Switch OFF the taxi lamp switch on roof panel 
10 Disconnect oleo switch from mounting bracket, 
leaving upper but undisturbed 
11 Release switch loom conduit from leg and secure 
conduit 
12 Remove nose wheels, install cones and axle nuts 
and secure wheel locking plates 
13 Disconnect steering follow-up mechanism links 
arc enter bolt, tie back upper link 
14 Energise aircraft DC Bus bars 
15 Remove tag and close essential bus-bar circuit 
breaker GEAR CONT/WARN and GEAR POSN IND 
16 Set LG selector know UP and operate hand pump 
sufficiently to disengage downlock pin from hook 
17 Release hydraulic pressure 
18 De-energise aircraft DC bus bar 
19 Open & tag essential bus bar circuit breaker 
20 Open bleed screws on steering jack to disperse 
residual fluid, then disconnect flexible hose from 
rear face of leg yoke 
21 Disconnect retraction jack from leg 
22 Support leg, restrain leg yoke, then disconnect 
and remove yoke bearing half caps. 
23 Ease leg from bearing housing then carefully 
remove from wheel bay 
Manpower = 2 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
Safety = High 
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Installation procedure (New Leg) 
1 Open charging valve, release pressure Manpower = 1 person; 
Tools = Standard tools 
2 Remove free bearing and split bearing from leg & 
half bearing from aircraft. Clean in solvent (white 
spirit) and examine for condition and wear 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = White spirit, standard tools 
Safety = medium 
3 Disconnect door break rod connection 
Manpower = 2 person; 
Tools = Standard tools 
4 Disconnect and remove steering hoses 
5 Disconnect and remove bulkhead union from 
right yoke web 
6 Disconnect and remove unions from steering jack, 
discard O-ring seals 
7 Remove follow-up mechanism upper link from 
aircraft 
Prior Installation 
1 Disconnect and remove upper toggle link; 
assemble to steering selector in same direction as 
removed link 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
2 Install door operating rod to replacement leg, 
safety with split pin 
3 Install bulkhead unions to right yoke web 
4 Install unions, complete with new O-ring seals 
into steering jack connections  
5 Remove caps, connect and tighten steering 
unions 
6 Attach bolt and secure with lock wire 
Installation procedure 
1 Clean inhibitor from yoke bearing spigots and 
coat with specified grease. Make sure wide flange 
inboard and install free bearing to right spigot 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools and grease 
2 Secure yoke bearing with lockwire  
3 Lubricate the bearing using specified grease. 
Install ½ to left housing on aircraft and remaining 
half to left half cap, making sure scallop in each 
wide flange faces inboard to engage with its 
associated barrel nuts 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools and grease 
4 Transfer electrical loom conduit securing clips 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
5 With leg torque links facing forward, move leg 
into nose wheel bay and raise until yoke bearings 
are engaged and seated in their respective 
housings 
6 Install half caps and attachment bolts and torque 
to 200 to 250 lbf.in 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools and Torque 
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wrench 
7 Connect retraction jack to leg. Identify original or 
new installation 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
8 Remove caps, connect and secure steering hoses 
9 Connect steering follow-up links. Make sure gap 
of 0.001 to 0.002 exists between links before 
installing split pin 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools & filler 
gauge 
10 Install taxi lamp 
Manpower = 1 person 
Tools = Standard tools 
11 Install nose oleo switch 
12 Remove tag and close essential bus-bar circuit 
breaker  
13 Install left and right wheel 
14 Replenish nose oleo 
15 Adjust nose landing gear 
16 Cleaning work area and clear all tools 
17 Close access panel 
18 Perform functional test 
19 Lowered the aircraft  
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